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In 1989-1990 the communist rule in Central and Eastern Europe collapsed, opening up the 
road to democracy, came about by means of mass demonstrations, the first of which took 
place in Plauen (GDR) on 7 October 1989. Only a fewmonths later, no-one could be sure 
how the world would develop. The so-called ‘voice’ was followed by ‘exit’ in the German 
Democratic Republic – and the Czechoslovakians were close to the events taking place in the 
embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in Prague. The end of the autocratic system was 
followed by the process of democratisation, characterised by upheavals and the restructuring 
of political conditions. Free and independent elections marked the end of democratisation in 
both the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia. The consolidation period was 
determined by the dissolution of both of the aforementioned countries. The author’s focus was 
on economic consolidation, as well as on political onsolidation with regard to regional 
integration by means of the countries’ membership of international organisations and regional 
and sub-regional bodies. Finally, a comparison has been made of the German Democratic 
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1. How can the development of the transitional process of Czechoslovakia and German 
Democratic Republic and their successor states be outlined? 
2. What are the similarities between these mentioned states, what are the differences regarding 
to the level of transition and where do these countries stand today? 
3. How can the geopolitical impacts of the transition be analyzed and evaluated (regarding to 
the membership of these mentioned states in international organisations)? 
 
 
Reasons and Purpose of Thesis: 
 
The author would like to outline the chosen topic due to his former area of interests. During 
his Bachelor Studies at University of Technology in Chemnitz (Germany) in the field of 
political science the writer was focussed on transition studies with regarding to countries in 
Middle and Eastern Europe. His Bachelor thesis, rated with 1.8, was dealing about a very 
special topic. Titled as “Continuity between Yesterday and Today? Transition of ‘Junge Welt’ 
from the Central Organ of FDJ [Free German Youth] to a left-wing extremist Daily Paper 
with Particular Focus on the years 1989/1990”, Eric Holtschke discussed the development and 
the changing point of a former central organ of the communist youth movement to an ultra 
left-wing newspaper in reunited Germany. 
 The purpose of the current Master thesis is lying in the survey of the development and 
comparison of the processes of transition as well as consolidation in both former communist 
countries Czechoslovakia and German Democratic Republic and their three successor states. 
An enormous lack of scientific investigation can be found referring to the transition of the 
German Democratic Republic due to the reunification with (West) Germany; nevertheless 
significant distinctions between the West and the East of Germany in regard to society, 
economy and politics are still more than visible which shall be in the focus of the thesis. 
Concerning Czechoslovakia, Czech Republic and Slovakia, the thesis shall follow a 
geopolitical framework and its aftermaths with respct to the membership in North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization, European Union and Eurozone. Due to the Master Program in Prague 
the author tries to connect and to combine his country of origin and his current state of living 
to look behind the history happened in the past and to look for the future which will determine 
the transitional process tomorrow. 
 
Description of Contents: 
 
The Master thesis shall consists of seven ideally numbers of content. In the beginning the 
thesis should introduce the main area of interest which is going to be discussed in the further 
text. The introductory chapter will be especially focussed on the core problem statement and 
on an evaluation of the current state of research. Furthermore the thesis presents the structure 
and the methods which will be used during the thesis’ drawing up. 
 The first content-related aspect will introduce thmain terminologies. It seems to be 
very important for the topic’s understanding to bring the readers of the final assignment closer 
 
 
to the theory behind the essay. The author of the thesis would like to be concentrated on 
several definitions with regard to the terms “system” and “transition”. 
 In the third chapter Czechoslovakia and its successor tates Czech Republic and 
Slovakia will be in the focus of discussion. In this and the following chapter the main content-
related work of the thesis will be done. The writer will be particular orientated on a historical 
rapprochement starting in the mid 1980’s before the emergence of the process of transition 
towards geopolitical effects regarding to territorial changes and membership in different 
international organizations will be in contemplation. Afterwards a brief evaluation of the 
today’s level of transition will be added. The same structure is going to be used for the 
German Democratic Republic and later on the new-born federal states of reunited Germany. 
 In point 5 a comparison of both transitional processes will be given by the author 
before the thesis will be finished by a final evaluation. The main content is followed by a 
conclusion. The conclusion shall be used firstly to summarize the main topic and, secondly, to 
maintain a further outlook regarding to the future of both transitional states. The thesis finally 
ends by a bibliographical overview. 
 
Description of Methodology: 
 
The final assignment consists of two methods. The main method which will be used within 
the thesis consists of comparative studies of all three current countries in transition or parts of 
a country in transition. This method will be supplemented with the measurement of the level 
of transition given by the organisations “Freedom House” and “Bertelsmann Stiftung”. Both 
“Freedom House” and “Bertelsmann Stiftung” are focussed on nations in transition and their 
progresses. Not only the evolution of Czechoslovakia, Czech Republic, Slovakia and German 
Democratic Republic and its successor will be compared; the author is going to be 
concentrated on the two different assessments of both organisation which will be included in 
the comparative studies, too. Furthermore, the second method consists of two interviews with 
contemporary witnesses and their experience within e process of the exchange of the 
political systems in Czechoslovakia and German Democratic Republic. It will be done by 
means of a journalism fact interview underlain by certain formulation of questions. 
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1.1 Object of Research 
 
When the people across the Eastern bloc of Central and Eastern Europe went out on the street 
demonstrating and uprising en masse against the Communist regime, firstly in October 1989 
on the territory of East Germany and then in Novembr 1989 in Prague, Bratislava and other 
large cities of Czechoslovakia, the aftermath of the ongoing revolution was not predictable for 
either the scholars or for those directly involved. On 9 October 1989 more than 70,000 people 
demonstrated in Leipzig; a week later this number had grown to 120,000, and almost one 
month later half of a million in East Berlin: “On 4 November [1989] East Berlin experienced 
the biggest demonstration not to be organised by the SED in post-war history.”1 At the same 
time, demonstrations were also taking place in Czechoslovakia: on 24 and 25 November 
1989, between 700,000 and 800,0002 people demonstrated in Prague, the biggest mass 
demonstration the country has ever experienced. The progress of the ‘Velvet Revolution’ at 
the time in Czechoslovakia is deeply connected with, and most comparable to, the 
development of the ‘Peaceful Revolution’ in the GDR.3 The citizens of the Warsaw Pact 
countries did not, and could not, know that they would find themselves in the middle of a new 
chapter of their daily lives and the life of the global community. In fact, they were in the 
middle of a new chapter of historiography. The end of the Cold War and thus the collapse of 
the Eastern Bloc was, in the words of Mary Farrell, “one of the late twentieth century’s 
defining moments”4. Sharon Wolchik and Jane Curry described the situation in their book 
Central and East European Politics – From Communism to Democracy as follows: “In 1989, 
the unthinkable happened: communist rule collapsed, virtually like a house of cards, all over 
what had been the former Soviet bloc.”5 The former Communist bloc saw a gradual transition 
to democracy. The revolutions, upheavals and watershed events that ended the world’s 
bipolarity, with NATO on the one side and the Warsaw Pact on the other, took place at 
breathtaking speed. The political, social, societal and economic changes soon led to a new 
geopolitical order: former state unions were dissolved and new states emerged, old borders 
were abolished and new borders were drawn, old treaties expired and new treaties were 
                                                
1 Fraude, Andreas: Die friedliche Revolution in der DDR im Herbst 1989, p. 20 f. 
2 Comp. Juchler, Jakob: Osteuropa im Umbruch. Politische, wirtschaftliche und gesellschaftliche Entwicklungen 
1989-1993. Gesamtüberbick und Fallstudien, Zürich 1994, p. 325. 
3 Comp. Ib., p. 322-324. 
4 Farrell, Mary: The Global Politics of Regionalism. An Introduction, in: Farell, Mary/Hettne, Björn and others 
(editors): Global Politics of Regionalism. Theory and Practice, 2005, p. 1. 
5 Wolchik, Sharon L./Curry, Jane L. (editors): Central & East European Politics. From Communism to 
Democracy, 2nd edition, 2011, p. 3. 
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signed. “As Germany came together, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union came 
apart, creating, from what had been eight states, twenty-nine states, nineteen of which are 
geographically in Europe.”6 However, the most important geopolitical act of the former 
Warsaw Pact states was, and still is, their return to Europe by joining the European 
Communities (EC), NATO, European Union (EU), later the Schengen Agreement and finally 
the Euro Currency Zone among others – the last-mentioned of these applying to at least a few 
of them. The accession of the former Soviet satellite states to the EU can be judged as a 
logical consequence of the upheavals, but “it has complicated the EU’s politics and 
economics”7. Regionalism, as a result of the transition to democratic states, became an 
important topic from the mid-1980s and beginning of the 1990s, particularly in the former 
Communist states, which were considerable affected by both fragmentation and integration: 
“The early years of the twenty-first century have witnessed an intensification in regionalism 
across the globe.”8 Furthermore, it is said that “renewed interest in regionalism has seen even 
reluctant actors move towards deeper cooperative arrangements and enhanced integration 
with neighbouring countries through either formal or informal institutional frameworks”9. In 
addition, inter-regionalism and sub-regionalism, as well as regionalisation – which will be 
defined later on – also played a major role in the transition process. 
 While the German Democratic Republic, and later th Neue Länder10 in the reunited 
Federal Republic of Germany had the advantage of a rapidly progressing transition in almost 
all regards, the Slovak Republic fell into a brief period of political dictatorship. The Czech 
Republic performed inconspicuously, even though the rapid economic changes following the 
split from Slovakia led to a large number of people suffering from reduced social 
circumstances. Nevertheless, in the GDR as well as in the Czech Republic and Slovakia the 
changes represented an opportunity to establish a democracy and its necessary institutional 
framework due to their “early and decisive break with the past”11. In the words of Vaclav 
Havel: “You may ask what kind of republic I dream of. Let me reply: I dream of a republic 
independent, free, and democratic, of a republic economically prosperous and yet socially 
just; in short, of a humane republic that serves th individual and that therefore holds the hope 
                                                
6 Ib. 
7 Ib., p. 4. 
8 Farrell, Mary: Ib., in: Ib. p. 1.  
9 Ib. 
10 Neue Länder is the German term for the so-called New Federal States which were a part of German 
Democratic Republic and became independent federal states following German reunification. Five new federal 
states emerged out of the GDR: Sachsen (Saxony), Thüringen (Thuringia), Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern (Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania) and Sachsen-Anhalt (Saxony-Anhalt).  
11 Wolchik, Sharon L./Curry, Jane L. (editors): Ib., p. 4. 
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that the individual will serve it in turn. Of a republic of well-rounded people, because without 
such people it is impossible to solve any of our problems – human, economic, ecological, 
social, or political.”12 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
 
The transition as a topic in scientific research is generally well analysed. Especially the 
democratic transition in Central and Eastern Europe in particular has been, and still is, at the 
centre of studies since the radical changes began in 1989/1990. There is a significant lack of 
scientific study concerning the transition of the Grman Democratic Republic following 
reunification with (West) Germany; nevertheless, signif cant distinctions between the West 
and the East of Germany with regard to society, economy and politics continue to be more 
than visible – these shall be mentioned addressed in the thesis. This thesis aims to help close 
the gap in transitional research concerning the GDR. With regard to the lack of research and 
literature, the transition of the GDR will be examined in relation to the transition in 
Czechoslovakia and its successor states, the Czech and Slovak Republics. This will have three 
main advantages, which will positively influence th used methodology: firstly, it is easier to 
compare the transition process in an international context; secondly, the comparison of the 
GDR with the Czech Republic and Slovakia will both form part of the methodology. While 
comparative studies are a rarely used approach in te field of transition, they will be highly 
suitable for this type of investigation; and thirdly, one considerable advantage of the 
comparative approach is its high level of transparency. 
 The purpose of this thesis is to give an overview of the development and provide a 
comparison of the transition and consolidation processes in both former communist states, 
Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic, and their three successor states. With 
regard to Czechoslovakia, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the thesis shall examine the 
geopolitical framework and its consequences with rega d to regionalism and membership of 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), European Union and the Eurozone, amongst 
others. This thesis intends to take detailed look at past events and identify the factors that will 
determine the transitional process into the future. Overall, the transformation of the GDR and 
Czechoslovakia will be examined on four core layers: a) research, b) analysis, c) evaluation 
and d) classification of the developments and the backgrounds of the transformational 
process. The key questions are: how can the developm nt of the transition process of 
                                                
12 Havel, Vaclav: Angst vor der Freiheit. Reden des Staatspräsidenten, Reinbek/Hamburg 1991, p. 17. 
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Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic and their successor states be outlined? 
What are the similarities between the afore mentioned countries and what are the differences 
regarding the level of transition and where do these countries stand today, and how can the 
geopolitical impact of the transition be analysed and evaluated (with regard to the 
membership of the aforementioned states of internatio l organisations)? 
 
1.3 State of Research 
 
Transformational research is a relatively new discipline. The first articles on the subject were 
published during the third wave of democratisation13 at the beginning of the 1970s14. Even 
though the tradition of this field of research is not a long one, transformational studies are an 
elementary and indispensible department of research within the field of political systems and 
institutions of (geo)political science. Initially, macro-sociological and structuralist theories of 
social sciences formed the dominant approach of scholars such as Talcott Parson (1951, 
1969), Seymour Martin Lipset (1959) and Samuel Huntigton (1969). During the 1980s , these 
early approaches shifted to a consideration of a micro-sociological and player-theoretical 
approaches. The most important representatives of the second wave of transitional studies 
were: Adam Przeworski (1986, 1991, 1992), Guiseppe Di Palmas (1990), Samuel Huntigton 
(1991), Sharon L. Wolchik (1991). Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan (1996) focused particularly 
on the process of consolidation within a transition. Their core publication is called “Problems 
of Democratic Transition and Consolidation – Southern Europe, South America, and Post 
Communist Europe”15. 
 The theoretically-led discussion of transition in Germany, which fundamentally 
focuses on a conceptual approach, is mainly founded on the achievements of Wolfgang 
Merkel16. Other pioneering personalities included Klaus vonBeyme17, Manfred G. Schmidt18 
                                                
13 Transformational examined the military coup d’état in Portugal and the upheavals in Greece and Spain in the 
early to mid of 1970s before research moved on to the revolutions in Latin America in the early 1980s and in 
mid of 1980s to the changes in East Asia finally getting to the dissolution of the Socialist and Communist states 
in Central and Eastern Europe. 
14 Comp. Thomaß, Barbara/Tzankoff, Michaela: Medien und Transformation in Osteuropa, 1st edition, 
Wiesbaden 2001, p. 11. 
15 Comp. Linz, Juan J./Stepan, Alfred: Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Southern Europe, 
South America, and Post Communist Europe, Baltimore 1996. 
16 See the five volumes of „Systemwechsel“, edited an published by Wolfgang Merkel. 
17 See Beyme, Klaus: Systemwechsel in Osteuropa, Frankfurt am Main 1994. 
18 See Schmidt, Manfred G.: Der Januskopf der Transformationsperiode. Kontinuität und Wandel der 
Demokratietheorie, in: Politische Vierteljahresschrift, Sonderheft 26 (1995), p. 182-210. 
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and Eckhard Jesse19. Beyme classified the changes in Central and Eastern Europe in a new 
fourth wave, while Schmidt was especially focused on the term ‘democracy’ and Jesse 
retrospectively analysed and classified all four Geman transitions. Unfortunately, the change 
of political system in East Germany in 1989/1990 has never been the main focus of scientific 
research in the reunited Germany. One key reason for this may be the rapid adoption of the 
West German political, societal, social and economic system in the newly-established federal 
states on the former territory of the GDR. However, this change of political structures did not, 
and still has not, led to a common political culture. That is: while the GDR was certainly 
converted to the West German system, the transition – r rather rapid change – did not lead 
per se to a democratic consolidation of the newly acquired democracy. Nevertheless, the 
adoption of West German structures significantly supported the process of consolidation in 
the east of the country. A further reason for this is described by Wolchik/Curry: “This volume 
does not deal with East Germany, for former German Democratic Republic, which went 
through many of the same processes in its shift to democracy but in the context of 
reunification with West Germany rather than a separate state.”20 This shall be a reason why it 
is high time for the GDR to be included in transitional research. 
 The chief representatives of transitional research on Czechoslovakia and its successor 
states are Vít Hloušek (together with Lubomír Kopeček)21 and Sharon L. Wolchik22. Vít 
Hloušek significantly combined the interaction of a theoretical approach and practice in the 
study of the transition in Czechoslovakia and later in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. On 
the other hand, he concentrated on an analysis of political parties and their transition in 
Europe, while Wolchik mainly analysed the upheavals in Central and Eastern Europe as a 
whole. 
 Regionalism as a scientific subject and object emerged during Second World War, 
even though regionalism itself is “as old as history” 23. According to Louise Fawcett24 three 
waves of regionalism can be defined: the first wave occurred between 1945 and 1965 with the 
                                                
19 See Jesse, Eckhard: Systemwechsel in Deutschland: 1918/19 – 1933 – 1945/49 – 1989/90, 2nd edition, Köln 
and others 2011. 
20 Wolchik, Sharon L./Curry, Jane L. (editors): Ib., p. 5. 
21 See Kopeček, Lubomír/Hloušek, Vít and others: Democratic Institution Building Process. The Czech 
Republic’s Transition to Democracy, viewed on http://www.eduinitiatives.org/publications/democratic-
institution-building-process-czech-republic%E2%80%99s-transition-democracy, retrieved on 23 February 2014. 
22 See Wolchik, Sharon L.: Czechoslovakia in Transition. Politics, Economics and Society, London 
1991 and Wolchik, Sharon L./Curry, Jane L. (editors): Central & East European Politics. From Communism to 
Democracy, 2nd edition, 2011. 
23 Tavares, Rodrigo: The State of the Art of Regionalism. The Past, Present and Future of a Discipline, in: UNI-
CRIS e-Working Papers, No. 10 (2004), viewed on 
http://www.cris.unu.edu/fileadmin/workingpapers/WProd igo%20tavares.pdf, p. 7, retrieved on 7 March 2014. 
24 Comp. Fawcett, Louise: Regionalism in World Politics. Past and Present. 
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emergence of the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Community, the United 
Nations and NATO; the second, mainly during the 1970s, saw the emergence of the European 
Monetary Union, ASEAN and other organisations that emerged in Asia and Africa, such as 
ECOWAS; the third wave, which began in the mid-1980s and continues into the present day, 
has been characterised by the agglomeration of European Union and the foundation of new 
free trade areas (such as NAFTA or MERCUSOR). The most important representatives of the 
first wave of regionalism were Ernst Haas, Leon Lindberg and David Mitrany.25 The main 
scholars of modern regionalism, including Louise Fawcett, Mary Farrell and Björn Hettne26, 
see themselves as followers of a so called ‘new regionalism’. According to Rodrigo27, the 
three waves of regionalism can be distinguished by: 1) agency, 2) vectors/motivation, 3) 
direction and 4) coverage. Other representatives ar Edward D. Mansfield/Helen V. Milner28 
and Andrew Hurrell29, all of whom consider regionalism to be a global phenomenon. Barbara 
Lippert is considered a leading scholar in English and German scientific literature describing 




The thesis will start with a typical introduction to the topic of the thesis, including the object 
of research, the problem statement and the state of r search, as well as a description of the 
methodology used. The first chapter is followed by three important and necessary definitions 
of regionalism, regions and transition, which are necessary for an in-depth understanding of 
the subject-matter. The third chapter will focus on the transition of the German Democratic 
Republic, particularly the end of the autocratic system and the democratisation and 
consolidation process. The six main features of the end of East Germany’s autocratic system 
are introduced: 1) notice of electoral fraud, 2) ‘exit’ (the departure of GDR citizens to West 
Germany), 3) ‘voice’ (mass demonstrations), 4) economic crisis, 5) changes in the 
international political framework and 6) loss of international financial benefits. Three stages 
of the democratisation process will be distinguished: 1) beginning, 2) further progress and 3) 
                                                
25 Comp. Farrell, Mary: Ib., in: Ib., p. 7. 
26 See Farell, Mary/Hettne, Björn and others (editors): Global Politics of Regionalism. Theory and Practice, 
2005. 
27 Comp. Tavares, Rodrigo: Ib., p. 10. 
28 See Mansfield, Edward D./Milner, Helen V.: The New Wave of Regionalism, in: International Organizations, 
Vol. 53, No. 3 (1999), p. 589-627. 
29 See Fawcett, Louise/Hurrell, Andrew (editors): Regionalism in World Politics. Regional Organization ad 
International Order, New York 2000.  
30 See Lippert, Barbara/Umbach, Gaby: The Pressure of Europeanisation. From Post-Communist State 
Administrations to Normal Players in the EU System, 1st edition, Baden-Baden 2005. 
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the end of the process, culminating in external elem nts of East Germany’s democratisation 
process, such as the role played by the Federal Republic of Germany and the international 
dimension of Germany’s reunification. The upheavals in the political sphere will be mainly 
considered by means of an explanation and description of the process of changing the political 
elite in 1989 and 1990. The last aspect considered will be that of the consolidation of East 
Germany, which will form the main part of the thesis. The author shall focus mainly on socio-
economic consolidation such as unemployment rates (a comparison shall be made between 
West and East Germany), migration to the West, the development of GDP as well as inflation. 
The author shall thus cover the main economic indicators in the period between 1991/1992 
and 2013. Research will further focus on economic, monetary and social union through 
currency change and the establishment of the Treuhandanstalt (Trust Agency) as important 
milestones in the consolidation of East Germany. The second part of the consolidation of East 
Germany shall be presented in chapter 3.3.2 (‘Political Consolidation’). There, the core issue 
of the thesis shall be addressed through the use of regionalism as a key approach. The GDR’s 
shift towards the European Community/European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization shall be the focus of attention due to its symbolism with regard to regionalism. 
Furthermore, GDR’s path towards NATO and the EU can be evaluated as the most substantial 
one following the reunification of Germany. Generally, the international framework played a 
major role in the reunification of the two German states. Additionally, the thesis addresses 
two more aspects of the political consolidation: the Two Plus Four Negotiations, which 
officially permitted the reunification, as well as coming to terms with the Stasi past. Both 
aspects are integral to the transfer of political, social and economical institutions and 
structures from the West to the East. 
 The rapid change of the political system in Czechoslovakia and its division into two 
successor states, the Czech and Slovak Republics, and the end of the autocratic system, will 
be only briefly described, while presenting two key aspects leading to the democratisation of 
Czechoslovakia: ‘voice’ (mass demonstrations) and the emergence of opposition movements. 
A distinction is made between three phases of the democratisation process: the beginning, 
progress and the end of the process; the same structure as previously used to describe the 
situation in the GDR. The author shall initially focus on the political upheavals in November 
and December 1989, followed by the establishment of democratic structures and institutions, 
as well as some elements of a market economy later on, concluding with an analysis of the 
first free and democratic elections, with a focus on their results and outcomes. The chapter on 
consolidation initially deals with socio-economic consolidation from 1990 to the present. First 
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of all, substantial rules and laws introduced under the newly elected government, which 
significantly changed the economic structures of Czechoslovakia and its successor states, the 
Czech and Slovak Republics, with regard to the market economy, will be described, while 
also focusing on the social impact of the change of c nomic system. The author will thus 
concentrate on the development of three key economic indicators: 1) inflation, 2) 
unemployment rate and 3) growth in GDP in both the Cz ch and Slovak Republics, illustrated 
using different graphs. The process of privatisation, as well as Václav Klaus’s concept of 
neoliberalism, which led Czechoslovakia and, subsequently, the Czech Republic through a 
painful economic transition are also described, concluding with a personal view of Klaus, 
supplemented with further background information from the political and socio-economic 
spheres. In addition to this, the chapter on consolidation shall consist not only of an analysis, 
but also an evaluation, of the socio-economic path t ken. In the second part, concerning the 
political consolidation, the author shall start with an overview of the progress of and reasons 
for the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, which has to be the focus when studying its transition. 
Attention is then focused on the Czech and Slovak Republic’s ‘return to Europe’, followed by 
their path towards accession to international organisations such as NATO, the EU/EC, 
CEFTA, CEI and V4 due to the fact that they are key g opolitical players. Accordingly, these 
international and sub-regional organisations are more than suitable for providing a description 
of the geopolitical framework of Czechoslovakia’s (and the GDR’s) transition. 
 The thesis will conclude with a brief comparison of the most substantial distinctions 
between the course of the transitions of East Germany and Czechoslovakia and its successor 
states. The conclusion will include a summary which will form the final chapter of the thesis, 
followed by bibliography of primary and secondary literature used, as well as Internet 
sources, newspapers and magazines. 
 
1.5 Methodology  
 
The core assignment of the thesis’ methodology utilises three different methods. The first 
method shall consist of the classification of the transitional process of the German Democratic 
Republic (including its federal successor states) and Czechoslovakia, including its successor 
states, the Czech and Slovak Republics, into the theoretical framework of transition studies 
according to Wolfgang Merkel. The point of departure is marked by the beginning of the end 
of the autocratic system, followed by process of democratisation and, finally, consolidation. 
The historical steps will thus be classified, first chronologically and second, associatively, 
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although it will be impossible to completely avoid chronological overlaps. The 
democratisation process has a describing function, while consolidation consists of a wide 
range of figures and statistics with regard to contrasting the economic development of all 
involved states as the second key method; this will be analysed, and thus evaluated, with 
regard to socio-economic impacts. The consolidation of democracy in East Germany, 
Czechoslovakia and their successor states concluded with political consolidation, which 
mainly consisted of the accession and integration of the aforementioned countries into 
international organisations and sub-regional bodies. With regard to the co-operation and 
integration of the reunited Germany, the Czech and Slovak Republics into international 
organisation, particular focus will be placed on the geopolitical framework, which will be 
presented through an explanation and analysis of the development of regionalism within these 
countries. Research was thus conducted through the explanation of the preconditions of their 
participation, followed by analysis, and then evaluation, of accession. The third methodology 
which will be used in the thesis is the method of cmparison, which will be addressed in a 
separate chapter, in which the key distinctions betwe n the transitions of East Germany and 
Czechoslovakia and its successor states will be present d, compared and evaluated. 
 Two further theoretical approaches of the thesis’ methodology can be found: 1) two-
level game theory and 2) domestic-level theory. Both theoretical methods are used to 
categorise regionalism and describe the regional development of the reunited Germany and 
the Czech and Slovak Republics in the chapters concerning political consolidation. Both 
theories are de facto used as expedients to analyse regional entrenchment. While the two-level 
game theory provides information about the dependency of negotiations (negotiations are a 
major issue when joining international organisations) on both domestic (i.e. negotiations 
between the two Germanies) and an international aspect  (i.e. negotiations between the two 
Germanies with other countries), the domestic-level th ory discusses “the role of shared 
domestic attributes or characteristics”31. There are three strands of domestic-level theory, 
these being: 1) regionalism and state coherence, 2) regime type and democratisation and 3) 
convergence theories. The first of these sees regionalism “as an alternative to the state or as a 
means of going ‘beyond the nation state’”, in which the possibilities of regional co-operation 
and integration “are likely to depend very heavily on the coherence and viability of the states 
and state structures within a given region”. The second strand must be considered the most 
valuable for the present thesis due to “the commitment to multiparty democracy [which] was 
                                                
31 Here and following: Hurrell, Andrew (editor): Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective, in: Fawcett, 
Louise/Hurrell, Andrew (editors): Ib., p. 66 f. 
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an explicit feature of the Treaty of Rome”. It further focused on the re-evaluation of domestic 
aspects and the “impact of democracy and democratisation”. The second strand emerged in 
response to neoliberalism in economics, being based on the assumption that “democracies do 
not go to war with each other”, concerned with “general propositions about the behaviour of 
liberal states”. Thus, the “relationship between regionalism and democracy is complex”. The 
third strand “understands the dynamics of regional co-operation and especially regional 
economic integration in terms of converging domestic policy preferences among regional 
states” whilst taking into account that “domestic policy convergence has undoubtedly been an 
important factor in the resurgence of regionalism […]”. 
 The thesis attempts to achieve at least a seamless introduction of the process of 
transition as a whole, with a focus on the period from 1989-1990, which must be considered 
the most important in the countries’ transition process. The particular focus on regionalism as 
part of the thesis can be justified by the considerabl  importance of regional involvement for 
states engaged in a democratic transition. Considering the scope of the thesis, the author 
concentrated on using a descriptive, analytical and comparative approach. Description was 
used as a method particularly in the chapters on the end of the autocratic system and 
beginning of democratisation. Unfortunately the present thesis cannot provide a 
comprehensive overview of the transition process as a whole; nor was this the intention, as 
can be seen in the chapters on consolidation. The author focused only on key aspects which 
can be justified by an almost unlimited range of content. Based to the thesis’ scope and the 
available timeframe, the concentration on socio-economic and political developments during 





The term ‘regionalism’ indicates a general endeavour f a region or entity for greater 
autonomy and personal responsibility against a unitary/central power or hegemon.32 It can be 
seen as a political process characterised by cooperation and coordination among countries. 
Furthermore, ‘regionalism in international relations’ describes political activity that wishes to 
achieve union or cooperation to settle or resolve specific issues of at least two or more states 
                                                
32 Comp. Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung: Regionalismus, viewed on http://www.bpb.de/wissen/17F6KL, 
retrieved on 25 February 2014. 
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within a particular region at the regional level.33 A region or an entity can be distinguished 
from others by geographical, ethnic, historical or administrative boundaries. According to 
Mansfield/Milner, regionalism is defined as “an economic process whereby economic flows 
grow more rapidly among a given group of states (in the same region) than between these 
states and those located elsewhere”34. Mary Farrell defined ‘regionalism’ as follows: 
“[Regionalism] is a response to globalisation a reaction to the diverse aspects of global 
processes in their entirety.”35 Expressed in her words, regionalism is connected to the “many-
faced phenomenon” of globalisation, with both positive and negative impacts on countries; for 
countries suffering from negative impacts, regionalism can be seen as a means to “respond 
through regionalism as both a defensive and offensiv  trategy”36. According to Mary Farrell, 
the development of regionalism is based on a region’s internal structures and dynamics, as 
well as on the regional actors’ strategy and motivation. Regionalism is a multi-modelled, 
global approach without a dominating feature that might encompass all countries. Hence 
many different approaches to the understanding of the processes and concepts of regionalism 
can be found in literature. Cooperation is further a main goal, a result of and, at the same time, 
de facto an inherent reason for and a goal of regionalism. This interplay can be regarded as 
evidence that regionalism and cooperation are deeply connected to a transition to democracy, 
stressed by domestic-level theories especially in European regionalism with regard to NATO 
and the EU, because: “Substantial cooperation has emerged among democratic countries, 
partly out of necessity and partly driven by the political strategies of the countries involved.”37 
In other words: the higher the democratic consolidation of a country (or rather of a country’s 
democratic standards), the greater the international cooperation between global regions.  
 Regionalism can be divided into a number of sub-categories, e.g. military/security 
regionalism and economic regionalism. ‘Economic regionalism’ contributes to regionalism 
via “reproducing global governance at the regional level” and as a “form of resistance to 
globalisation”38. Economic regionalism may solely focus on cooperation in economic issues, 
and be therefore one-dimensional rather than multi-dimensional, while an economically-based 
regionalism can be regarded as the goal of regionalism itself: “[Regionalism] is a political 
process characterized by economic policy cooperation and coordination among countries.”39 
                                                
33 Comp. Ib. 
34 Mansfield, Edward D./Milner, Helen V.: Ib., p. 591. 
35 Farrell, Mary: Ib., in: Farell, Mary/Hettne, Björn and others (editors): Ib., p. 2. 
36 Ib. 
37 Ib., in: Ib., p. 4. 
38 Nesadurai, Helen E.S.: The Global Politics of Regionalism. Asia and the Asia-Pacific, in: Ib., p. 158. 
39 Mansfield, Edward D./Milner, Helen V.: Ib., p. 591. 
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Examples of economic regionalism are the European Economic Community (EEC), EC, EU, 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA), North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). Implications to welfare are 
usually at the centre of economic regionalism approaches. Scholarly opinion on and 
approaches to the differences between ‘regionalism’ and ‘regionalisation’ vary. While 
Hettne/Katzenstein40 recognise regionalisation as a process of interaction on a regional level 
and regionalism as a set of different principles and ideas, Fishlow/Haggard41 regarded 
regionalisation as a concentration of economic flows ithin a certain region. Fishlow and 
Haggard define regionalism as a political process characterised by coordination and 
cooperation among countries and among economic policies. Taking a different tack 
Gamble/Payne42 regard regionalism as a project led by states and regionalisation as primarily 
a societal construction. Based to the suffix ‘-ism’ regionalism, in my view, denotes more a 
theory or ideology than a process, which is rather related to the suffix ‘-sation’. 
 Thus, military regionalism – also known as security egionalism – is an aspect of 
regionalism that focuses on cooperation and exchange in the field of armies and armaments. It 
is described as the “earliest account of regional constructions reflect military dominions or 
strategic territorial possessions brought together by violence”43. The North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization is the best-known current military organisation representing regionalism. Other 
organisations in the past included e.g. the Warsaw P ct (1955-1991) and the Partnership for 




After defining the term regionalism, it is a necessity to also define ‘region’. The word derives 
from the Latin ‘regio’ which can be translated as ‘direction’. It is also rooted in the Latin verb 
‘rego’ which means ‘to rule’. The concept of a region “has frequently been used to denote 
‘border’ or a delimited space, often a ‘province’”44. ‘Region’ is deeply connected to 
territories, functions and rules. A further definition can be found in one online dictionary, 
which distinguishes between five different general types of region. A region is thus 1) “an 
extensive, continuous part of a surface, space, or body”, 2) “[…] the vast or indefinite entirety 
                                                
40 Comp. Tavares, Rodrigo: Ib., p. 6, retrieved on 11 March 2014. 
41 Comp. Ib. 
42 Comp. Ib. 
43 Ib., p. 7, retrieved on 7 March 2014. 
44 Söderbaum, Frederik: Exploring the Links between Micro-Regionalism and Macro-Regionalism, in: Farell, 
Mary/Hettne, Björn and others (editors): Ib., p. 90
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of a space or area, or something compared to one”, 3) “a part of the earth’s surface (land or 
sea) of considerable and usually indefinite extent”, 4) “a district without respect to boundaries 
or extent” and 5) “a part or division of the univers , as the heavens”.45 
 A region have different dimensions: a physiographical-geographical dimension, an 
historico-cultural dimension and socially as well as geologically, ecologically, economically 




According to Wolfgang Merkel46 a transition can generally be defined as a process of the 
dissolution of an old dominant structure to a new one in terms of politics, policy, economy 
and society. O’Donnell and Schmitter defined transition as follows: “The ‘transition’ is the 
interval between one political regime and another […] Transitions are delimited, on the one 
side, by the launching of the process of dissolution of an authoritarian regime and, on the 
other, by the installation of some form of democracy, the return of some form of authoritarian 
rule, or the emergence of a revolutionary alternative.”47 Ideally, a transition can be split into 
three distinct phases. The progress of these phases may overlap, with no clear boundary 
between the different phases. All three phases often p rate in interplay with one another. The 
three phases are: 1) end of an autocratic system due to internal (‘voice’/‘exit’) and external 
reasons, 2) democratisation and 3) consolidation. A transition can occur from a non-
democratic political system to a democracy, as wellas vice versa; however, the change from 
an autocratic to an democratic political system will be described in these terms.  
 1) Further examples of internal reasons for a transition might be the loss of legitimacy 
of an autocratic system and/or economic developments l ading to an internal modernisation of 
societal structures. External triggers for the beginning of a transition can be defeat in a 
military conflict or loss of the protection and/or support of another (outside) party. The end of 
an autocratic system can take four different continuous forms: (a) controlled change of a 
political system (initiated and directed by an elite), (b) forced change of a political system 
from the bottom up (e.g. through uprisings and demonstrations of an opposition, usually 
leading to a rapid succession of autocratic authorities), (c) negotiated change of a political 
                                                
45 Dictionary: Region, viewed on http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/region, retrieved on 1 March 2014. 
46 Comp. Merkel, Wolfgang/Sandschneider, Eberhard and others: Einleitung. Die Institutionalisierung der 
Demokratie, p. 13, in: Merkel, Wolfgang/Sandschneider, Eberhard (editors): Systemwechsel, Opladen 1996. 
47 Mainwaring, Scott: Transition to Democracy and Democratic Consolidation. Working Paper, No. 130 
(November 1989), viewed on https://kellogg.nd.edu/publications/workingpapers/WPS/130.pdf, p. 4, retrieved on 
2 March 2014. 
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system (usually due to a stalemate between opposition and regime/government) and (d) a 
collapse of the autocratic system (with a total loss f legitimacy of old authorities due to 
external factors). 
 2) The next step is the process of democratisation, which can be divided into two 
phases. Democratisation itself can be described as a crossover of political reign of a person or 
a group of persons on a set of institutionalised rules. Democracy must be recognised as the 
goal of the transitional process by a clear majority of people in the changing political system 
in order to achieve a successful transition. (a) The first phase, the start of the democratisation 
process, can be recognised through a loss of political control by the old political, illiberal 
elites while the opposition responds directly via democratic processes. The outcome of these 
procedures cannot be determined a priori. (b) The second phase is the ending of the 
democratisation process when a democratic constitution is established and – as a consequence 
– political competition and political decisions are formally binding. A further direct result of 
the ending of the democratisation process is the establi hment of all features of democratic 
institutions as well as the replacement of the rules and norms of the previous regime. The new 
political actors thus have a considerable scope for action due to the non-existence of rules and 
laws in the newly formed political system. A well-balanced consideration of the interest of 
several political actors and of the general public interest is necessary in order to achieve 
successful democratisation. 
 3) The final step in a transition is known as consolidation. The consolidation of 
democracy is the basis for the stabilisation of the newly established democratic institutions, 
and can start even before the establishment of democratic institutions. Consolidation usually 
take place on four different levels: (a) constitutional/structural consolidation, (b) 
representational consolidation, (c) behavioural consolidation of the conduct of informal 
political actors and (d) attitudinal consolidation f civic society. (a) Constitutional/structural 
consolidation involves the generation of a consensus on the constitution by all central 
constitutional institutions and serves to construct and maintain a stable and legitimate 
constitution. (b) Representational consolidation is u ed to develop stable, long-lasting 
intermediary structures of political parties and interest groups to mediate between the state 
and society. This level of consolidation leads to a securing of freedom, autonomy and 
pluralism in a democracy. The (c) behavioural consolidation of the conduct of informal 
political actors targets potential societal and political veto-holding powers such as the armed 
forces, large landowners, entrepreneurs and financial capital, as well as radical groups and 
movements. This level of consolidation can be prefer d in the event of the deep consolidation 
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of the two previous layers due to the loss of the int rvention potential of non-formal political 
actors. These political actors thus accept democracy and become compliant to democratic 
structures. The final level, the (d) attitudinal cons lidation of civic society, is an important 
socio-cultural substructure and the foundation of the legitimacy of a functioning democracy. 
This is a long-term process, which can last decades nd can have a protective effect on the 
previous three layers of consolidation. The primary function of the consolidation of civic 
society is to develop support for a democratic system independent of the performance of the 
economy and politics. 
 
3. The Transition of the German Democratic Republic 
3.1 The End of the Autocratic System 
 
The end of the autocratic system of the German Democratic Republic occurred for a number 
of different internal and external political, military and economic reasons. Four key reasons 
for the internal end of the autocratic system can be found: 1) recognition of electoral fraud, 2) 
escapes and departures (‘exit’; German: Ausreise), 3) the emergence of mass demonstrations 
(‘voice’) and 4) economic crash (e.g. fast-growing national debt, underdeveloped economic 
structures and lack of competitive ability). Two key external factors were also present: 1) the 
political changes in the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries leading to 
discontinuation of backing following the perestroika and glasnost reforms of Mikhail 
Gorbachev, as well as 2) loss of aid from the Federal Republic of Germany, for example 
transfer benefits and other financial assistance. 
 The aforementioned internal and external reasons are interrelated; all were mutually 
dependent and influenced one other. The dividing lie between the internal and external 
factors is not always clear. The GDR started to collapse following an increase of internal 
pressure due to a forced change of political system fro  the bottom up through uprisings and 
demonstrations of the opposition and civil rights activists, leading to a rapid change of 
autocratic authorities by the elite itself. It might therefore be possible to add a partly 
controlled change of political system (initiated and directed by the elite) as a second cause of 
the end of the dictatorship due to an exchange of the elite and by the elite itself, leading to a 
weakening of internal structures and support. This resulted in the wide modern acceptance of 
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the political party Die Linke48, the successor party of the SED, in the societies of both the east 
and the west of Germany. A third form of change canbe added to the above: a negotiated 
change of the political system. Negotiations took place primarily between Germany and the 
Soviet Union and further with the victorious Western powers of Great Britain, the USA and 
France, as well as with the German Democratic Republic. Helmut Kohl, the Federal 
Chancellor in Bonn, played a leading role in these negotiations. A further fourth cause of the 
end of the autocratic system might be found in the total collapse of the regime, although the 
loss of legitimacy by the authorities was a gradual process that started with a latent crisis of 
legitimacy and ended in an acute, all-encompassing crisis of legitimacy. However, there were 
two key causes of the end of the autocratic system in East Germany: change of the political 
system from the bottom up and negotiated change of the political system. Two more potential 
causes can be perceived or evaluated: controlled change of the political system (initiated and 
directed by the elite) and a collapse of the autocratic system. 
 
3.1.1 Notice of Electoral Fraud49 
 
On 7 May 1989 civil rights activists and other oppositi n representatives declared the de facto 
simulated regional elections to be an electoral fraud, and the political elite lost its last 
remaining shred of legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens. Even though the SED was alerted 
towards the negative atmosphere in the bulk of the population, the party did not backtrack on 
its clear decision to directly manipulate the GDR regional elections. According to official 
figures, the election turnout in Leipzig-Mitte was 98.54%, while exactly 96% of voters 
elected for the so-called ‘list of unity’. As a result of the fraudulent elections a small number 
of demonstrations broke out, particularly in Dresden and Leipzig. 
 
3.1.2 ‘Exit’ from Prague, Budapest and Warsaw: Mass Departures, Escapes – and the 
Externalisation of the Transition 
 
A further internal reason for the end of the autocrati  system even occurred a short period 
before mass demonstrations broke out in the GDR: the departures (‘exits’) and escape of 
thousands of East German citizens to West Germany and Western Europe (e.g. to Austria via 
                                                
48 Comp. Jesse, Eckhard: Zäsuren und Neuanfänge in der deutschen Geschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts im 
Vergleich, in: Gallus, Alexander (editor): Systemwechsel in der deutschen Geschichte, Köln and others 2006, p. 
291-327. 
49 Comp. Richter, Michael: Die friedliche Revolution. Aufbruch zur Demokratie in Sachsen 1989/90, 1st edition, 
Göttingen 2009, p. 103-118. 
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Hungary). Departures and escapes to West Germany unequivocally led to later waves of 
demonstrations, even encouraging mass demonstrations and thus the collapse of the GDR. 
‘Exit’ and ‘voice’ are, here interrelated: ‘exit’ primary led to ‘voice’ and ‘voice’ subsequently 
amplified ‘exit’. Ever since the GDR’s signing of the Helsinki Accords in 1975, the 
government had faced continuous request for departure, primarily to West Germany. Between 
1977 and 1989 316,000 GDR citizens (not including pensioners) officially applied to leave 
the country for the first time; only 176,200 applicants (including ransoms by Bonn) actually 
received permission.50 More than 100,000 GDR citizens left the country in 1989 (up till 
September)51, and the West German embassies in Prague, Budapest nd Warsaw became 
meccas for tens of thousands of refugees from the GDR. 
 Sporadic occupations of the US and Danish embassies by GDR citizens had been 
occurring in East Berlin since as far back the early 1980s.52 These events were usually 
resolved through official silence. By the end of July and beginning of August increasing 
numbers of citizens were going to the West German embassy in Budapest to apply for 
departure to West Germany. A majority stated that tey would leave the embassy only when 
they were allowed to depart for the Federal Republic of Germany. On 7 August the West 
German53 ‘embassy’ in East Berlin was occupied by people who anted to leave the GDR, at 
which point the state authority decided to close the Federal Republic of Germany’s Permanent 
Representation in the GDR. Following the Hungarian decision to open its borders with 
Austria on the night of 10-11 of September 1989, the GDR transition took on an international 
dimension. By the end of September more than 25,000 GDR citizens54 had taken the 
opportunity to escape into West Germany via Hungary and Austria, leading to a significant 
deterioration in relation between East Germany and Hungary. In the second half of September 
1989 attention turned towards the West Germany embassies in Prague and Warsaw. About 
5,000 people55 sought temporary refuge in the embassy in Lobkowicz Palace in Prague, nearly 
leading to a humanitarian disaster due to lack of hygiene and food, while about 800 people56 
awaited departure in Warsaw. Erich Honecker, the General Secretary of the Socialist Unity 
                                                
50 Comp. Henke, Klaus Dietmar and others (editors): Anatomie der Staatssicherheit. Geschichte, Struktur und 
Methoden. MfS-Handbuch. Teil 3: Wichtige Diensteiheiten. Teil 17: Die zentrale Koordinierungsgruppe 
Bekämpfung von Flucht und Übersiedlung, Berlin 1995, p. 50. 
51 Comp. Eisenfeld, Bernd: Flucht und Ausreise, Macht und Ohnmacht, in: Kuhrt, Eberhard (editor): Oppositi n 
in der DDR von den 70er Jahren bis zum Zusammenbruch der SED-Herrschaft, Opladen 1999, p. 399. 
52 Comp. Here and following: Küsters, Hanns Jürgen: Das Ringen um die Deutsche Einheit. Die Regierung 
Helmut Kohl im Brennpunkt der Entscheidungen 1989/90, 1st edition, Freiburg 2009, p. 52. 
53 The Federal Republic of Germany never maintained an embassy in the GDR; only a so called ‘Permanent 
Representative’ with limited rights and power. 
54 Comp. Fraude, Andreas: Die friedliche Revolution in der DDR im Herbst 1989, p. 7. 
55 Comp. Küsters, Hanns Jürgen: Ib., p. 61. 
56 Comp. Küsters, Hanns Jürgen: Ib., p. 63. 
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Party, personally came to the decision to accept the departure requests of thousands of GDR 
citizens in Prague and Warsaw. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the 
Federal Republic of Germany, announced an agreement on passage to West Germany on the 
balcony of Lobkowicz Palace in the evening of 30 September 1989; this was probably one of 
the most positive, impressive moments in German history. The East German refugees were 
subsequently conveyed by chartered train through the territory of the GDR57 (via Dresden and 
Plauen) to Bavaria on 3-4 October 1989; brutal clashes broke out between police and 
demonstrators in Dresden58 while the train passed through. As a consequence, the GDR 
authorities decided to close the borders with Czechoslovakia in order to stem the flow of 
refugees. This decision increased the internal pressu  in the already tense, heated atmosphere 
of East Germany. 
 
Figure 1: Relocations from the German Democratic Republic to the Federal Republic of 
Germany 1981-199059 
 Relocations to West 
Germany (according 
to West Germany) 
 
Approved relocations 
Relocations to West 
Germany (according 
to East Germany) 
1990* 250,000 0 238,384 
1989 343,854 101,947 203,116 
1988 39,832 27,939 0 
1987 18,958 11,459 0 
1986 26,178 19,982 0 
1985 24,912 18,752 0 
1984 40,974 34,982 0 
1983 11,343 7,729 9,154 
1982 13,208 9,113 11,118 
1981 15,433 11,093 13,166 
Total 784,692 242,996 474,938 
* estimated indication 
 
3.1.3 ‘Voice’: The ‘Peaceful Revolution’ of October/November 1989 
 
The foundation of the GDR on 7 October 1949 as a sep rate, formally independent state was a 
direct result of the aftermath of World War Two in the eastern part of Germany. Forty years 
                                                
57 MDR: Die Botschaft von Prag, viewed on http://www.mdr.de/damals/archiv/artikel88860.html, retrieved on 
10 March 2014. 
58 Comp. Richter, Michael: Die friedliche Revolution. Aufbruch zur Demokratie in Sachsen 1989/90, p. 258. 
59 Comp. Mayer, Wolfgang: Flucht und Ausreise, 2002, p. 113 f. in: Statista: Übersiedlungen zwischen der DDR 
und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1949 bis 1990, viewed on 
http://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/248905/umfrage/uebersiedlungen-zwischen-der-ddr-und-der-




later, when the political leadership was celebrating the country’s fortieth anniversary, the 
GDR and its autocratic structures were hit by the biggest, most substantial crisis the country 
had ever experienced. The country was severely weakened internally by mass protests, a high 
concentration of which had begun only days before. The so-called ‘Monday Demonstrations’, 
mainly organised by and taking place in Christian chur hes, had already been taking place for 
a number of weeks. The first mass demonstration on the territory of the GDR, involving 
approximately 15,000 people, took place in Plauen on 7 October 1989, while the political 
leadership was celebrating the anniversary in East Berlin. One article about the event in the 
well-known German political periodical Der Spiegel read: “The unnoticed heroes”60, and 
went on to say: “In Saxon Vogtland a city is fighting for its place in history books, because 
the state power was defeated first in Plauen – and not in Leipzig.” Today, a memorial plaque 
is located near the municipal theatre and describes th  historic event in the best terms 
possible: “At this place the first mass demonstration on the territory of the former German 
Democratic Republic began on 7 October 1989. It wasthe beginning of the change of our 
world.” Of course, while a few thousand demonstrators could not change the nature of the 
world, they were a part of the change and they were at least one of the reasons for the 
continuing protests all over the territory of the GDR in the subsequent weeks and months. 
Two days later, on 9 October 1989, around 70,00061 people took to the streets to protest and 
demonstrate in Leipzig. That day would later be called the ‘Day of Decision’; there was no 
violent intervention by police units. That day went down in history as the day on which the 
revolution became known as the ‘Peaceful Revolution’. Further mass demonstrations took 
place over the next few days after in Leipzig, Berlin, Dresden, Karl-Marx-Stadt, Halle, 
Magdeburg, Potsdam, Jena, Arnstadt and Plauen. The wav of protests culminated in Berlin 
on 4 November 1989 in62 and two days later in Leipzig. At both demonstrations more than 
half of a million protested against the political dictatorship, striving for a renewed GDR with 
democracy, freedom of speech and free elections – and not, primarily, for a reunited 
Germany. The initial guiding principal was ‘We are th  nation!’ which later changed ‘We are 
one nation!’. Further waves of protest consistently broke out all over the GDR. While the 
demonstrations on GDR territory lasted until the end of March and beginning of April 1990, 
the content of the protests changed. 
                                                
60 Berg, Stefan: Gedenken. Die unbemerkten Helden, in: Der Spiegel: No. 30 (2009), p. 44. 
61 Comp. Das Wunder von Leipzig. Friedliche Revolution, viewed on 
http://php2.arte.tv/wundervonleipzig/index_de.php, retrieved on 8 March 2014. 
62 Comp. Probst, R: 20 Jahre Mauerfall. Die größte Demo der DDR, in: Süddeutsche Zeitung (17 May 2010), 
viewed on http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/jahre-mauerfall-die-groesste-demo-der-ddr-1.142212, retrieved 
on 10 March 2014. 
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 The historian John Connelly said the following about the ‘Peaceful Revolution’: “The 
first demonstrations [in Plauen on 7 October 1989], concluded two days later in Leipzig, were 
the decisive moment in the East German revolution. They showed that the SED had in its own 
terms lost the right to rule, for it had ceded part of its power to ‘class enemies’ […] The 
demonstrations appeared suddenly like a few brilliant flashes of light on an otherwise 
darkened East German map. Excepting Berlin, all of these flashpoints emanated from the 
south, and most strongly from the industrial town of Plauen, located less than 20 miles from 
the West German border. Up to a quarter of its 80,000 citizens defied heavily armed state 
power that gloomy Saturday. Plauen was the first EaGerman community to express a united 
will for change; it was the only city where the East German upheaval was from its inception a 
mass affair.”63 
 
Figure 2: Alphabetical List of Mass Demonstrations with Large Attendance on the Territory 
of the GDR in 1989/199064 
City Date Number of Demonstrators* 
Berlin 4 November 1989 500,000 
Dresden 8 October 1989 20,000 
 23 October 1989 100,000 
 15 January 1990 150,000 
Halle 20 November 1989 100,000 
Karl-Marx-Stadt 6 November 1989 100,000 
Leipzig 9 October 1989 70,000 
 16 October 1989 110,000 
 23 October 1989 225,000 
 30 October 1989 350,000 
 6 November 1989 500,000 
Magdeburg 6 November 1989 80,000 
Plauen 21 October 1989 50,000 
Schwerin 30 October 1989 80,000 





                                                
63 Connelly, John: Moment of Revolution. Plauen (Vogtland), October 7, 1989, in: German Politics and Society, 
No. 20 (1990), p. 71. 
64 With information from: Kermas, Sören: Die Demonstrationsbewegung in der DDR 1989/90, viewed on 
http://edocs.fu-
berlin.de/docs/servlets/MCRFileNodeServlet/FUDOCS_derivate_000000001998/Kermas_Wissenschaftliche_Ha
usarbeit.pdf;jsessionid=F1455A7B82DAF78C347B027E6B2D8B69?hosts, p. 13, retrieved on 10 March 2014; 
Die Zeit: Wendezeit 1989. Das Anfang vom Ende der DDR, viewed on 
http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2009-10/Ende-DDR, retrieved on 10 March 2014; Archiv 
Bürgerbewegung Leipzig: Demonstrationen vom 13. August 1989 bis 30. April 1990 in der DDR, viewed on 
http://www.archiv-buergerbewegung.de/index.php/demonstrationen, retrieved on 11 March 2014. 
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3.1.4 Economic Crisis 
 
The natural underdevelopment of a centrally planned economy connected with a lack of 
competitive ability and – in the East German case – the loss of financial support and transfer 
benefits as an aid scheme by the Federal Republic of Germany led to a severe financial crisis 
in the GDR, deeply affecting its political system and its legitimacy, even though the GDR 
economy was not on the verge of bankruptcy65. Finally, the crisis called the continued 
existence of the GDR into question. Economic mismanagement, public debts, a non-
functioning, or at least only partly functioning economy, based on the supply of raw materials 
and manufactured goods rather than on the law of supply and demand shall be mentioned as 
reasons for the decline of the economy of the GDR. There is also the fact that the GDR 
leadership was not willing to introduce the necessary, important economic reforms. A 
consideration of the economic crisis in the GDR leads utomatically to the fact that both 
internal and external reasons can be found as a cause for the end of the autocratic system with 
regard to economic reasons. The GDR did not collapse due to the desolate condition of its 
economy, but due to the country living beyond its means.66 When considering the extent of 
this thesis, the economic crisis of the GDR shall not be at the centre of attention; just a few 
important pieces of information shall be provided to aid better understanding. 
 
Figure 3: Key Figures of Economic Development in the GDR 1987-198967 
 1987 1988 1989 
External Debts (in 
billion US-Dollars) 
16.8 18.5 - 
GDP (in billion GDR 
Marks) 
332.81 346.13 353.34 
Growth Rate of GDP 
(in %) 
2.5 2.8 2.3 
 
 The economic policy of the post-1971 GDR consisted of three non-combinable 
goals68: 1) improvement of living standards, 2) debt repayment towards foreign creditors and 
                                                
65 Comp. Martens, Bernd: Die Wirtschaft der DDR, viewed on http://www.bpb.de/geschichte/deutsche-
einheit/lange-wege-der-deutschen-einheit/47076/ddr-wirtschaft?p=all, retrieved on 12 March 2014. 
66 Comp. Ib. 
67 With information from: Ritschl, Albrecht: Aufstieg und Niedergang der Wirtschaft der DDR. Ein Zahlenbild 
1945-1989, Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte, No. 2 (1995), p. 37; Statistisches Amt der DDR, in: Statis : 
Bruttoinlandsprodukt (BIP) der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik (DDR) von 1980 bis 1989 (in Milliarden 
Mark der DDR), viewed on http://de.statista.com/stati ik/daten/studie/249230/umfrage/bruttoinlandsprodukt-
bip-der-ddr/, retrieved on 12 March 2014; Heske, Gerhard: Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnung 
DDR/Ostdeutschland, in: Historical Social Research, Vol. 30, No. 2 (2005), p. 282. 
68 Comp. Here and following: Martens, Bernd: Ib., retrieved on 14 March 2014. 
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3) capital investments in the country’s own economic structures. The first two goals were off 
higher priority due to the potential for destabilisat on of the populace. Instead of accepting 
destabilisation, the government focused on the meeting of basic needs through increased 
spending in the national budget. On the other hand, international financial transactions were 
seen as highly important for the GDR’s national independence. By saving on costs in energy 
and infrastructure, the government wanted to reduce b dgetary spending, however, this led to 
negative impacts in labour productivity. A further example for mismanagement can be found 
in the emergence of the GDR’s delayed, and never competitive, microelectronics industry, 
which subsidised with billions of Marks. 
 
3.1.5 Changes in the International Political Framework 
 
The end of the autocratic system in East Germany is deeply connected with developments in 
international politics and policy, particularly in the Soviet Union. The announcement of 
Gorbachev in March 1985 as the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union and his perestroika and glasnost reforms, followed by his annulment of the Brezhnev 
Doctrine on 7 July 1989, must be mentioned here. The idea of perestroika, denoting the 
introduction of slight elements of market economy refo ms, the restructuring of politics and 
society in the Soviet Union and the review of the central control system, and the idea of 
glasnost (the transparency and openness of leadership towards its citizens in order to achieve 
the increased acceptance of reforms) hit the GDR at its foundation, leading to a sudden 
change in foreign policy conditions, deeply affecting events both within and outside the GDR. 
 Development within the Soviet Union cannot be separated from progress towards 
democracy in other Warsaw Pact countries, e.g. Poland and Hungary. Helmut Kohl tried to 
lead events both the aforementioned states in order to influence the aftermath in the GDR: “In 
this situation it is very important for Helmut Kohl to promote the reform process in Hungary 
and Poland.”69 The West German government believed in aiding the transitional process in 
East Germany by promoting the events. Support mainly took the form of new credit70 from 
West Germany. Furthermore, the Poles voted for the first non-communist Prime Minister on 
the territory of Warsaw Pact in the partially free l ctions held in June 1989. These events 
were of prime importance in accelerating the pace of events in the GDR. 
 
                                                
69 Küsters, Hanns Jürgen: Ib., p. 64. 
70 Comp. Ib. 
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3.1.6 Loss of International Financial Aid Scheme 
 
Even though Kohl’s government was not interested in worsening political and economic 
conditions in East Germany, it certainly focused on its destabilisation71; however, this process 
of destabilisation would be controlled and led by Bonn. While the GDR repeatedly requested 
an amount of 15 billion DM as financial support from the West, Bonn was not willing to 
invest in a system that required fundamental renewal: “It will not solve the problems, it will 
just prolong them.”72 The financial support provided by the Soviet Union had cancelled at the 
beginning of the 1980s73. Following the Second Oil Crisis in 1979, the GDR profited from the 
differences in oil prices between the open, global m rket and the limited market in the East to 
obtain foreign currency through the export of oil-based products. The Soviet Union 
subsequently restricted the export of oil and pegged its export prices to global market prices. 
 The Bonn government then started to realise that the country had been presented with 
a unique historical opportunity: the reunification f the two Germanies after being separated 
for over forty years while results of World War Two might be changeable to a certain extent, 
particularly, but not exclusively, in the case of Germany. The uniqueness of the moment can 
be described as follows: “The GDR is in the middle of crisis in which the country is to the 
greatest possible extent isolated for the first time.”74 Internally, East Germany was isolated in 
respect of its population; the needless retention of power seemed utopian. Externally the GDR 
was isolated in respect of its foreign policy. The loss of the support in Moscow was followed 
by the loss of support in Bonn; finally, even East Berlin’s last remaining allies – Prague, 
Warsaw and Budapest – were entirely influenced by Bonn. 
 
3.2 The Democratisation Process 
3.2.1 The Beginning of Democratisation 
 
There is no clear dividing line between the start of the democratisation process and the end of 
the autocratic system; overlapping elements can be found in both processes. The prerequisite 
for a successful democratisation process is the accptance of democratic elements by a 
majority of people living within a political entity. The first stage of democratisation began 
long before mass demonstrations and departures from the GDR, even though the initial phase 
                                                
71 Comp. Ib., p. 66. 
72 Ib., p. 182. 
73 Comp. Martens, Bernd: Ib., retrieved on 14 March 2014. 
74 Küsters, Hanns Jürgen: Ib., p. 60. 
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of democratisation must be described as weak and far from being accepted by a clear majority 
of citizens. At the beginning of 1980s, people who were dissatisfied with the regime had 
started gathering and forming only small opposition groups of varying nature. Opposition 
groups primarily grew out of Christian and intellectual structures rooted in Protestantism. 
Churches took a leading role later on, especially in the ‘Peaceful Revolution’ which mainly 
emerged through the so-called ‘Monday Demonstrations’ that were held in churches. 
Churches offered an apparently safe and protected place, free from the influence of the 
Ministry for State Security (German: Ministerium für Staatssicherheit, Stasi, MfS). The 
leading role of churches developed and due to two factors: At first the churches experienced a 
process of inherent development, based on their inner structure. Secondly, the progress gained 
momentum from the people and for the people. Churches started to offer opportunities to 
think about the bigger picture; and the people demanded more. Hence, churches were a means 
to an end. Pastors in particular became important representatives of a slightly changing 
democratic society in the GDR. One of them, pastor Rainer Eppelmann, published the so-
called ‘Berlin Appeal’ on 25 January 198275. The appeal was entitled: ‘Make peace without 
weapons’ (German: Frieden schaffen ohne Waffen). This was the very first time that a pastor 
had expressed a view in public in this way; and he was permitted to do so by the authorities. 
 It took a couple of years until this wave of Christian protest put down deeper roots in 
East German society. Thus the first non-Christian movement, the ‘Peace and Human Rights 
Initiative’ (German: Initiative Frieden und Menschenrechte)76, the first non-church based 
opposition, was developed and founded in East Berlin in early 1986. In any case, it was still 
too early to call the situation a democratisation process. A spillover of the early stage of 
democratisation into other parts of society can be found in 1988. Following a demonstration 
in commemoration of Rosa Luxemburg on 17 January 1988, about 100 protestors calling for 
‘freedom for dissidents’ were arrested.77 This day marked the start of the expulsion of 
dissidents such as authors, musicians, actors, human rights activists and other public figures, 
as well as ordinary people, by the political elite. The beginning of the popular democratisation 
movement in the GDR can be dated to 7 May 1989, when demands for more democracy 
reached a large section of the populace. As mentioned above, electoral fraud was, at the same 
time, both a reason for the end of the autocratic system and of the beginning of the 
democratisation process. Dozens of citizens’ movements were subsequently founded all over 
the country in the summer and autumn of 1989. The most significant of these were: 1) the 
                                                
75 Comp. Fraude, Andreas: Ib., p. 49. 
76 Comp. Ib. 
77 Comp. Ib., p. 50. 
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‘New Forum’ (German: Neues Forum), a political platform for the whole country, founded on 
9 September 1989; 2) ‘Democracy Now’ (German: Demokratie jetzt), founded on 12 
September 1989; 3) ‘Democratic Awakening’ (German: Demokratischer Aufbruch), founded 
on 2 October 1989; and 4) the Social Democratic Party of the GDR (German: 
Sozialdemokratische Partei der DDR), founded on 7 October 1989.78 The foundation of 
several opposition movements and political parties was compelling evidence that the 
leadership of the GDR was losing power and control over the country, at first slowly, then 
rapidly. The beginning of the democratisation process was thus a two-dimensional one: the 
loss of political control by the old, illiberal political elites and the opposition’s direct response 
through democratic processes. The results of these processes, and the future path of the GDR, 
could not be and were not clear. While some parts of he society demanded a renewed society 
being based on more democratic features within the GDR, other sections of society saw a 
chance for a total overthrow of existing structures. Later, a new, so-called ‘third way’ 
emerged during the round-table talks. The ‘third way’ was based on the idea of a continuity of 
the GDR between capitalist and socialist political, economic and societal structures. 
 
3.2.2 Further Process of Democratisation 
 
The further course of the democratisation process wa  marked by rapid, radical upheavals of 
the status quo. People and politicians, mass media and publicity, foreign countries and 
scholars on both sides of the border were impressed by the speed of change. The loss of 
political power and authority by the ruling elite was more than obvious for a large section of 
society in mid-October 1989: The SED Politburo dismissed Erich Honecker on 18 October 
1989. Honecker had been in power for more than eight en years. He was replaced by Egon 
Krenz, who became the new General Secretary of the Central Committee of the SED.79 He 
promised a democratic renewal of Socialism in the GDR.80 Following the countrywide mass 
demonstrations in October and November 1989, the Prime Minister Willi Stoph resigned from 
office on 7 November 1989 after thirteen years in office, followed by the resignation of the 
whole Politburo one day later.81 On 6 November 1989 Erich Mielke, chairmen of the Ministry 
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for State Security, declared the destruction of all records of the ministry.82 On the 10th 
meeting of the Central Committee between 8-10 November 1989 the Socialist Unity Party of 
the GDR enacted the implementation of free and independent political elections, as well as the 
admission of opposition groups, freedom of press, aembly and speech and also economic 
reforms; these processes were embedded in intraparty reforms, although Marxism and 
Leninism remained the Party’s weltanschauung.83 In the evening of 9 November 1989 the 
unexpected happened: Günter Schabowski, Secretary for Information of the Central 
Committee, announced the immediate abolition of the Berlin Wall during a press conference, 
which was a sensational event.84 A few days later, on 13 November 1989, Hans Modrow was 
announced as the new Prime Minister.85 “With the election of Hans Modrow political power 
was shifted from the political party towards the GDR government which corresponded with 
Modrow’s self-understanding.”86 
 
3.2.3 The End of the Democratisation Process 
 
Events followed in quick succession in December 1989. On 1 December 1989 the Socialist 
Unity Party repealed Article 1 of the GDR constitution87, which declared the leading role of 
the SED in the country, the leading role of labouring class nd its Marxist-Leninist party. This 
decision was followed by a series of personnel changes. On 3 December 1989 the entire 
Politburo of the Socialist Unity Party, including Egon Krenz, resigned from office. Egon 
Krenz, the chairmen of the Privy Council, officially resigned on 6 December 1989. Manfred 
Gerlach was announced as his successor until 5 April 1990.88 Gerlach was the first member of 
the GDR government who was not a member of the SED, but of the LDPD (German: 
Landwirtschaftlich-Demokratische Partei Deutschlands), the Democratic Agricultural Party 
of Germany. 
                                                
82 Comp. Der Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen 
Demokratischen Republik: 6. November 1989. Weisung des Ministers zur Aktenreduzierung in den Kreis- und
Objektdienststellen, viewed on 
http://www.bstu.bund.de/DE/Wissen/DDRGeschichte/Revolutionskalender/November-
1989/Dokumentenseiten/06-November_c/06_nov_c_text.html?nn=1930806, retrieved on 30 March 2014. 
83 Comp. Fraude, Andreas: Ib., p. 25. 
84 Comp. Ib., p. 60. 
85 Comp. Ib. 
86 Ib., p. 28 f. 
87 Comp. Ib., p. 61. 
88 Comp. Ib. 
34 
 
 Gregor Gysi became the new chairmen of the SED in December 1989.89 Gysi, still a 
highly influential personality in the modern, reunited Germany and current parliamentary 
party leader of the political successor party Die Linke in the German Bundestag, started to 
transform the socialist political party into an apprently democratic or rather partly-
democratic political party. Political science in Germany judges the Die Linke party to be a 
(partly) extremist party on the left side of the political spectrum90; its representatives and 
policies are subject to observation by the German Office for the Protection of the 
Constitution. At least part of the party does have connections with the militant section of the 
left-wing movement. One of these is known as the Communist Platform of the Left Party 
(German: Kommunistische Plattform der Partei Die Linke, KPF), and stands for Marxism-
Leninism, advocating a transition into socialism and the overcoming of capitalism.91 Other 
significant observed organisations and movements on the lefts are: Socialist Left (German: 
Sozialistische Linke, SL), Association Cuba Si (German: Arbeitsgemeinschaft Cuba Si) and 
the Marxist Forum (German: Marxistisches Forum, MF). Gysi’s efforts cumulated in a 
change of designation of the party in mid-December 1989: the name SED was extended to 
include the abbreviation PDS (German: Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus) – Party of 
Democratic Socialism. The newly renamed SED/PDS lost more than one and a half million 
former party members in the following months.92 
 At the same time, on 7 December 1989, the so-called round-table talks based on the 
Polish model were institutionally established in the GDR.93 The Central Round Table in 
particular, constituted in Berlin, addressed the whole of East Germany. Opposition groups and 
civil right movements, as well as representatives of SED-PDS, the Free German Trade Union 
Federation (German: Freier Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, FDGB) and other parties joined 
the round table, which was organised by Demokratie jetzt. The Central Round Table was a 
decisive element that strongly influenced the policy of Hans Modrow’s government. The main 
achievements of the round table were94 the implementation of free and democratic elections 
and the dissolution of the Ministry for State Security and its successor, the Office for National 
Security (German: Amt für Nationale Sicherheit, ANS). The dissolution of the security 
apparatus was approved by a national committee established on 8 February 1990.95 Shortly 
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before this, the headquarters of the Office for National Security had been stormed by a mob 
on 15 January 1990.96 On 8 March 1990 all unofficial employees (approx. 100,000)97 of the 
National Security were dismissed. The Round Table was a representative of the 
aforementioned, so-called ‘third way’ of a renewed GDR encompassing democracy, 
capitalism and socialism: democratic socialism. The activities of the Round Table Talks 
culminated in the first, and only, democratic elections held in the GDR on 18 March 1990. 
 But back to December 1989. Four important dates mut also be mentioned regarding 
the transitional process in the GDR. First, on 8 December 1989, a case was opened by the 
GDR’s state prosecution service against leading functio aries of the previous regime, 
accusing them of corruption and abuse of authority.98 Secondly, political prisoners were 
released four days later following an amnesty.99 Thirdly, the foreign ministers of NATO 
declared their will regarding to a feasible German reunification on 14 December 1989.100 
From the beginning of January 1990 the physical borders separating West and East Germany 
began to be removed. The Brandenburg Gate was opened for the unrestricted movement of 
people on 22 December 1989 by Hans Modrow and Helmut Kohl.101 The Brandenburg Gate 
had been the symbol for the division of Germany since 13 August 1961, remaining closed for 
twenty-eight years. 
 Later, on 4 February 1990, the SED/PDS was again renamed. The political authority 
removed SED from the name and the PDS was established as the direct successor to the SED. 
This was the beginning of the institutionalised transition of the political party system in the 
GDR towards the West German system. Agendas, contents and policies were changed, 
political leaders were substituted and the political parties in the West and in the East became 
increasingly closer. The symbolic demolition of theB rlin Wall, which had divided Germany, 
began on 13 June 1990, first over a length of forty-seven kilometres in Berlin, where the 
history of the divided Germany had once began and, lmost forty years later, abruptly ceased. 
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 The final stage in the democratisation process were the first, and only, free and 
independent elections held in the GDR, on 18 March 1990102. This saw the beginning of the 
first democratic government under the leadership of L thar de Maizière’s Christian 
Democratic Union (German: Christlich-Demokratische Union, CDU). This election appeared 
to be democratic success: turnout was 93.4% and the result was judged to be a sensation. 
Contrary to expectations, only 21.9% of voters voted for the Social Democratic Party of 
Germany (German: Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD); the great winner of the 
election was the so called Alliance for Germany (German: Allianz für Deutschland), a 
coalition of three political democratic parties/movements consisting of CDU, DSU (German: 
Deutsche Soziale Union, DSU) and Democratic Awakening. The Alliance gained 48.1% of 
the vote. The aftermath of the election saw the establi hment of a Grand Coalition between 
the Alliance for Germany, the Social Democrats and the Union of Free Democrats (German: 
Bund freier Demokraten, BFD). According to the policies of the political parties forming the 
new government the result of the election can be int rpreted as a clear vote for a German 
reunification: approx. 75% of all voters elected a political party advocating reunification. 
 
3.2.4 External Elements of the Democratisation Process and Germany’s Reunification 
3.2.4.1 The Role of the Federal Republic of Germany 
 
 The Federal Republic of Germany played a major rolein the early stages of the end of the 
autocratic system and subsequently the democratisation process. Helmut Kohl, the German 
Christian Democratic chancellor, was at the epicentre of the subversions in the East of the 
country. Helmut Kohl and his West German government made a causal contribution to the 
reunification of Germany, the results of which would probably not have occurred without him 
and his negotiating skills. Kohl saw his chance andfloated, both at home and abroad, the 
prospect of a possible German reunification, and eventually went down in the history of the 
reunited Germany as the ‘Reunification Chancellor’, as he was known to the people. 
 Besides Hans-Dietrich Genscher’s declaration about passage to West Germany from 
the balcony of the Lobkowicz Palace in the evening of 30 September 1989, Helmut Kohl 
introduced a ‘Ten-Point Programme’ (German: Zehn-Punkte-Programm) aiming at 
overcoming the division of Germany. The programme was presented as part of a government 
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declaration on 28 November 1989103 and was connected to Hans Modrow’s idea of a contract 
union between the two German states; obviously Kohl wanted more than merely a contract 
union. Kohl’s ‘Ten-Point Programme’ was developed due to a non-existent concept for the 
case of Germany’s reunification: “Surprisingly, 40 years after foundation of both German 
states, the day of open borders has come and the Federal Government did not have a practical 
concept for what to do. In particular, there are no current preparations, no schedules and no 
crisis scenarios at all for imminent reunification that could be used by the Chancellor’s 
Office.”104 The ‘Ten-Point Programme’ aimed to achieve the following105: 1) immediate 
action (economic and humanitarian aid for the healtc re system together with the facilitation 
of right of entry to the GDR), 2) extension of co-operation between both German states in 
traffic and transportation as well as environmental protection, 3) extensive economic aid in 
the event of domestic democratisation, 4) contract union (common commissions for culture, 
the environment, economy and traffic/transportation, 5) creation of confederal structures (a 
democratically elected government in East Berlin is required), 6) embedding of Germany 
within the European architecture, 7) co-operative op nness of the European Community to the 
reforming states in Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe, 8) strengthening of negotiations 
with the Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe, 9) disarmament and arms 
control according to political developments, 10) a free, reunited Germany in a free and 
reunited Europe. “The reunification, id est recovery of national unity, remain the aim of the 
CDU”, is written in the last and obviously most important point. Helmut Kohl clearly stated 
that German reunification remained the chief goal: “Nobody knows what a reunited Germany 
will finally look like. But I am sure that unity will come, if that is what the people of Germany 
want.” 
 In summary, it can be stated that Kohl and his government connected the 
implementation of the ‘Ten-Point Programme’ to a democratic transition within the GDR. 
Kohl deliberately went through these processes without a fixed schedule. The ‘Ten-Point 
Programme’ can be judged a catalyst for the realisation of a discussed idea (Germany’s 
imagined reunification) towards a goal of political practice. Helmut Kohl’s speech on 28 
November 1989 was seen as one of the most highly significant and consequential statements 
                                                
103 Comp. Kohl, Helmut: Zehn-Punkte-Programm zur Deutschlandpolitik 1989, viewed on http://www.helmut-
kohl.de/index.php?msg=559, retrieved on 22 March 2014. 
104 Küsters, Hanns Jürgen: Ib., p. 85. 
105 Comp. Here and following: Kohl, Helmut: 28. November 1989. Erklärung vor dem Deutschen Bundestag: 
Zehn-Punkte-Programm zur Deutschlandpolitik, viewed on http://www.helmut-kohl.de/index.php?msg=627, 
retrieved on 22 March 2014. 
38 
 
in German history.106 It is worth mentioning that Kohl informed neither his parliamentary 
party in the German Bundestag nor his Liberal coalition partner, the FDP (German: Freie 
Demokratische Partei), nor West Germany’s allies in NATO.107 Helmut Kohl’s visit in 
Dresden on 19 December 1989 seemed to be a plebiscitary onfirmation of his efforts to 
achieve a reunited Germany: crowds of people cheered him due to his commitment to this 
goal. 
 
3.2.4.2 The International Dimension of Germany’s Reunification 
 
The international framework was of substantial importance to Germany’s reunification. 
Events thus proceeded due to an interplay of Bonn’s egotiations and East and Central 
European reforms embedded into negotiations, talks, encounters and conferences. The 
international scene cannot be described in its entirety; only few important aspects shall be 
presented, with a focus on the victorious powers of W rld War Two. 
 USA: the United States of America adopted a positive attitude towards any future 
German reunification. “They [the USA] want to bear down upon reunification within a slowly 
and carefully evolutionary process embedded in European unification.”108 Both the American 
President Bush and Mitchell, majority leader of Democrats in the Senate, spoke out in favour 
of German reunification. 
 France: the French government presented a legalist approach. President Mitterrand 
was of the opinion that the quest for a reunited Germany was embedded in a legitimate 
process, even if it might was a complicated, protracted procedure. On the one hand he 
demanded a peaceful and democratic development, and on the other he ruled out support by 
France; the French fear of a revitalised, reunited postwar Germany was still visible. 
 Great Britain: the British government in London, led by Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher, highlighted the right of self-determination of the Germans, particularly affirmed by 
Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd. Hanns Jürgen Küsters analysed the situation as follows: 
“The government in London seems to act up to the principle: We stand for reunification 
because we know it will not happen.”109 France served as an ally for Great Britain: both were 
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interested in self-determination of the Germans, but not in reunification. Later on, in her 
memoirs, Thatcher judged her foreign policy strategy to be a “flop”110. 
 Soviet Union: the situation in the Soviet Union must be viewed against the backdrop 
of domestic upheavals and the resulting loss of control by the Communist Party. The 
international dimension of the Soviet Union was determined by serious economic problems 
and the transition of its political system, as well as mass demonstrations and revolutions in 
other Warsaw Pact countries. The loss of power of the Soviet Union by the end of the 1980s 
was more than visible in almost all fields of politics, economics and society. It began by 
Gorbachev’s perestroika and glasnost reforms and initially resulted in the annulment of the 
Brezhnev Doctrine on 7 July 1989. Gorbachev’s speech to students in Moscow on 15 
November 1989 must be mentioned as a milestone on the path to the reunification of 
Germany: in it, Gorbachev announced the possibility of a reunited Germany. This was the 
catalyst for Kohl’s “Ten Point Programme”.111 In the end, the government in Moscow was 
open-minded112 with regard to Germany’s reunification on condition f the retention of the 
pan-European peace policy, even though Kohl had a difficult road ahead of him in his efforts 
to convince the Soviet leadership in Moscow. 
 Israel: the Israeli government was traditionally suspicious of Germany. Prime Minister 
Shamir was unsettled by a feasible German reunification; in an interview he mentioned the 
Israeli fear of a possible repetition of the Holocaust following reunification.113 Israel 
obviously had insurmountable issues with an enlarged G rmany. 
 The international dimension of the reunification of Germany proceeded as follows:  
Helmut Kohl participated in a special summit of theEuropean Community on 18 November 
1989. His mission seemed to be both simple and impossible at the same time: to do a lot of 
persuasion in favour of a reunited Germany. His ultima e objective was a European political, 
monetary and economic union, as well as assistance in the reform processes in Central and 
Eastern Europe: “The overcoming of Germany’s division has to come along with the 
overcoming of Europe’s division in the context of a st ble blueprint for lasting peace.”114 It 
was at this moment that the foundations of today’s European Union were laid; this came, 
however, at the cost of the future discontinuation of the beloved Deutsche Mark. 
 The international community was especially apprehensive about the rapidity of these 
processes, while also recognising the opportunities and benefits for Europe as a whole: 
                                                
110 Ib., p. 99. 
111 Comp. Kohl, Helmut: Zehn-Punkte-Programm zur Deutschlandpolitik 1989, ib., retrieved on 22 March 2014. 
112 Comp. Küsters, Hanns Jürgen: Ib., p. 90 f. 
113 Comp. Ib., p. 99. 
114 Ib., p. 87. 
40 
 
economic growth, stable borders (the recognition of P land’s western border by a reunited 
Germany), European integration and the enlargement of NATO, as well as disarmament. 
Nevertheless, Helmut Kohl was criticised for, amongst other issues, his lack of a timetable. 
Poland in particular was concerned about the prospect of an enlarged Germany due to the 
possible non-recognition of its western border by a reunited Germany. On 4 December 1989 a 
NATO summit was held in Brussels and only a few days later, on 14 December 1989, the 
foreign ministers of NATO declared their will regarding a feasible German reunification. 
Francois Mitterrand was the first statesman of the thr e victorious Western powers to visit the 
GDR. Between 20-22 December 1989, Mitterrand declard in Leipzig that nowadays “two 
sovereign German states” existed who “cannot be redemed out of reality at a single blow”115. 
One key question remained during all these negotiati ns: would a reunited Germany become a 
member of NATO? 
 Representatives of West and East Germany, as well as of the USA, France, Great 
Britain and the USSR, met in Ottawa to address this question, initially on 13 February 1990 at 
the so-called Two Plus Four Negotiations116, smoothing the way for the reunification of 
Germany. 
 
3.3 The Consolidation of Democracy 
 
The consolidation of the reform process towards democracy began even before the end of the 
democratisation process. The first and only free and democratic elections in the GDR were 
held on 18 March 1990 and marked a preliminary milestone at the end of the democratisation 
process. The requirement for an election based on democratic principles is the acceptance of 
democracy by a majority of people. An election turnout of almost 95% can be considered 
strong evidence for approval. Even though a democratic constitution had not yet been 
established, the first steps had been taken towards  new constitution, which would occur 
officially by accession to the Federal Republic of Germany on 3 October 1990. But before 
this, political competition and democratic political decisions were established; first 
democratic institutions were developed and the ‘old’ rules and norms of the previous regime 
replaced. The Unification Treaty (German: Einigungsvertrag) can be regarded as the first, and 
most important, step in the GDR’s consolidation of its political system in a reunited Germany. 
While, unfortunately, the exact point of intersection of the end of democratisation and the 
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beginning of consolidation cannot be definitely established, there is no doubt that the free 
elections marked the end of the democratisation process and the beginning of the 
consolidation of democracy. The GDR had been d  facto democratised.117 After a brief period 
of democratisation the GDR became a liberal-democratic state six months before the 
reunification with the Federal Republic.118 “By accession [of scope of West Germany] one 
democracy was substituted by another”, Richter said, dding: “Within a short while East 
Germans lived in two democracies, whereby the firstone was substantially self-created.”119 
Subsequent elaboration shall be seen as an attempt at classification. 
 The transition, and thus consolidation, of East Germany must be viewed as a 
Sonderweg in many respects compared to all other countries in Central and Eastern Europe. 
First of all, in the Federal Republic of Germany, the GDR had a partner who supported the 
transition process financially, politically, substanti lly, ideationally and with personnel. 
Secondly, the GDR simply assumed control of existing stable, sustainable and long-lasting 
institutional structures, with all their negative and positive aspects. Thirdly, the territory of 
what had previously been the GDR immediately joined NATO and other international 
organisations without a transitional period. The transition of the GDR can thus be described as 
shock therapy, while other countries experienced a gradual transition. The institutional 
transition proved particularly advantageous due to assistance given by West Germany, which 
absolved those in the East of the need to search fo solutions. 
 
3.3.1 The Socio-Economic Consolidation 
3.3.1.1 Economic, Monetary and Social Union: Exchange of Currency and Trust Agency 
 
The economic system experienced a rapid, literally overnight, change, including the 
introduction of modern banking and financial sectors embedded in an overall monetarisation, 
which were the preconditions for the introduction of the Deutschmark on the territory of the 
East and its integrated into the so-called economic, onetary and social union between the 
West and the East by 1 July 1990. The union was sealed in an agreement signed on 18 May 
1990 by the Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl and GDR Prime Minister Lothar de Maiziere, as 
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well as the both Ministers of Finance, Theo Waigel and Walter Romberg.120 Helmut Kohl 
later spoke of the birth of a free, united Germany.121 A heated public debate occurred with 
regard to the privatisation strategy of the Trust Agency (German: Treuhandanstalt, THA) and 
monetary union. “The transition-free introduction of the D-Mark in East Germany within few 
weeks was a feat of logistics”122, in the words of Hans-Jürgen Wagener. What seems more 
questionable is the non-involvement of the people of the GDR at the time. Decisions were 
made without the participation of the populace. Obviously, the transition of GDR’s monetary 
and price system took longer than the aforementioned overnight change of economy. 
Furthermore, none of the people had actually experienced the rules and behaviour of a 
capitalist economic system. A further aspect was the setting of the exchange rate between the 
Deutschmark and Ostmark. 1988 the exchange rate between the two currencies was 4.40 
Ostmark to 1.00 Deutschmark for internationally traded goods, albeit the purchasing power 
parity for consumer goods, including services, was roughly level at 1:1.123 Therefore a 
different exchange rate would not be acceptable to the people. There seemed to be a dilemma: 
on the one hand the transition should be done effici ntly, and on the other, Bonn was 
interested in equity. This dilemma met inherent structural deficits of the GDR economy: 
outdated manufacturing facilities (almost 60% of East German businesses required 
redevelopment124), the average wage in the manufacturing sector was only one-third that of 
West Germany and productivity was only one-third of the West German average for tradable 
goods, amongst others.125 The economy in the East could not be transformed gra ually and on 
its own terms. It was, rather, the unnatural shock that rapidly led to massive economic 
problems in the east of Germany, which was affected by the overall setting of wage and 
income policy. The assumption of assets and debts by West Germany became official with the 
Unification Treaty. The Unification Treaty regulated the integration of the GDR into the 
scope of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany by 3 October 1990. Even 
though the monetary union encountered problems, it can nevertheless be seen as a “successful 
operation, which stabilized the East German economy” 126. While the unemployment rate 
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increased dramatically, inflation remained moderate. At an early stage the German Central 
Bank discussed an exchange rate of 2 Deutschmark to 1 Ostmark, leading to protests within 
East German. Exchange rates were eventually fixed by both German governments as 
follows127: all current payments such as wages, salaries, penions, rents, were made at a ratio 
of 1:1. Savings were treated differently, with a limitation imposed: retirees were permitted to 
exchange up to 6,000 Ostmark at a ratio of 1:1 and children up to 2,000 Ostmark at a ratio of 
1:1, while average consumers could exchange up to 4,000 Ostmark at a ratio of 1:1. Any 
higher amount needed to be exchanged at a ratio of 1 Deutschmark to 2 Ostmark. The entire 
network of social benefits such as unemployment andsocial assistance, as well as the 
healthcare, pension and labour law systems were also converted to the West German model of 
a social market economy. One considerable political ch nge was also implemented: by the 
beginning of 1 July 1990 entry into and departure from both German states was possible 
without an identity check. 
 The privatisation strategy of the Trust Agency, which was founded on 1 March 1990, 
remained controversial. Dozens of people disagreed with the agency’s policy with regard to 
the processing of nationally-owned enterprises embedded in a global, market-based economy 
through the liquidation of enterprises labelled inefficient and non-competitive, immediately 
leading to a massive increase in unemployment, corruption and economic crime128. 
Approximately 8,000 enterprises with more than four million employees were supervised by 
the Trust Agency. The agency’s performance resulted in a black hole: by time the agency was 
disbanded on 31 December 1994, it had left behind debts amounting to 256 billion 
Deutschmarks. It is clear that the reason for these results can be found in the outdated 
structures of East German enterprises, as well as the bloated system of company benefits such 
as kindergartens, holiday facilities, libraries and double-digit percentage surpluses of 
employees. Political and economic decisions complicated the situation for the former GDR 
enterprises: sales figures decreased dramatically, as did export figures, due to monetary union 
and the resulting revaluation of the currency: East German goods simply increased in price. 
Within a twenty-month period 3,713 enterprises were liquidated and almost three million 
employees lost their jobs. The unemployment rate rocketed to 14.2% in the new federal states. 
In spring 1990 the value of GDR’s state assets was estimated at 600 billion Deutschmarks. 
                                                
127 Comp. Die Bundesregierung: Währungs-, Wirtschafts- und Sozialunion, ib., retrieved on 31 March 2014. 
128 Comp. Here and following: Rahmann, Tim: Ib. 
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85% of enterprises sold were bought by West Germans, and only 5% by East Germans.129 The 
rest of the property was acquired by foreigners. Rohweder, the Trust Agency’s business 
executive, was murdered130 in 1991. 
 
3.3.1.2 A Comparison between Unemployment in East and West Germany 
 
The economy of the new federal states in the reunitd Germany have not recovered, even to 
this day. The failures of the economic transition are still visible, and the unemployment rate in 
the former territory of the GDR remains much higher in comparison to the west German 
states, although people do see light at the end of the tunnel. Certain regions, especially the 
bigger cities, are nowadays more wealthy and perform more healthily, particularly the Saxon 
metropolises of Dresden and Leipzig, both of which have populations in excess of half a 
million. Between 1991 and 2004 the unemployment rate131 in East Germany almost doubled 
from 10.2% to 20.1%, and the number of unemployed in the East increased from 1 million to 
1.6 million. Compared to West Germany, the statistics sound like a nightmare: in 1990 West 
Germany show a unemployment rate of 6.4% (1.9 million in total). The differences appear to 
be marginal; but when the population is taken into account the figures132 become quite 
striking: in 1990 63.7 million people lived in the West and 16 million in the East (not 
including West Berlin). By 2000 the figures had changed: 67.1 million lived in West 
Germany and only 15.1 million in East Germany (not i cluding West Berlin). In conclusion: 
the unemployment rate in East Germany increased while the population decreased. A turning 
point can be finally found in 2005/2006, when, for the first time, there was a significant 
decrease in the number of unemployed. In 2013133 the unemployment rate of Germany as a 
whole was 7.7%, whereby the East was struggling with an unemployment rate of almost 
twelve percent: precisely 11.6% (870,000) of the peopl  were out of work. The West showed 
an unemployment rate at a height of 6.7% or 2.08 million people; more than four percentage 
points less than in the East. 
                                                
129 Comp. Augstein, Franziska: DDR: Treuhand-Anstalt. Ausverkauf der Republik, in: Süddeutsche Zeitung (17 
May 2010), viewed on http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/ddr-treuhand-anstalt-ausverkauf-der-republik-
1.137266, retrieved on 1 April 2014. 
130 Comp. Ib. 
131 Comp. Here and following: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung: Die soziale Situation in Deutschland. 
Arbeitslose und Arbeitslosenquote, viewed on http://www.bpb.de/nachschlagen/zahlen-und-fakten/soziale-
situation-in-deutschland/61718/arbeitslose-und-arbeitslosenquote, retrieved on 1 April 2014. 
132 Comp. Here and following: Bevölkerungsentwicklung Deutschlands ab 1950. Einwohnerzahlen West- und 
Ostdeutschland, viewed on http://www.pdwb.de/nd06, retrieved on 1 April 2014. 
133 Comp. Bundesagentur für Arbeit: Statistik. Arbeitsmarkt in Zahlen (Monats-/Jahreszahlen), viewed on 
http://statistik.arbeitsagentur.de/Statistikdaten/Detail/Aktuell/iiia4/alo-zeitreihe-dwo/alo-zeitreihe-dwo-b-0-
xls.xls, retrieved on 4 April 2014. 
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Figure 4: Development of Unemployment Rate in West Germany (excluding Berlin) and East 
Germany (including Berlin), as well as Germany as a whole, based on Dependent Civil 
Labour Force 1990-2013 in percentages134 
Year West Germany East Germany Germany 
1991 6.2 10.2 7.3 
1992 6.4 14.4 8.5 
1993 8.0 15.4 9.8 
1994 9.0 15.7 10.6 
1995 9.1 14.8 10.4 
1996 9.9 16.6 11.5 
1997 10.8 19.1 12.7 
1998 10.3 19.2 12.3 
1999 9.6 18.7 11.7 
2000 8.4 18.5 10.7 
2001 8.0 18.8 10.3 
2002 8.5 19.2 10.8 
2003 9.3 20.1 11.6 
2004 9.4 20.1 11.7 
2005 11.0 20.6 13.0 
2006 10.2 19.2 12.0 
2007 8.3 16.7 10.1 
2008 7.2 14.6 8.7 
2009 7.7 14.5 9.1 
2010 7.4 13.4 8.6 
2011 6.7 12.6 7.9 
2012 6.6 11.9 7.6 
2013 6.7 11.6 7.7 
 
 
 The highest unemployment135 rate in 1991 on a regional level could be found in the 
newly established federal state of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania with 12.5%. Compared to 
Baden-Wuerttemberg, with an unemployment rate of only 3.7%, the rate in Mecklenburg-
Western Pomerania was 338% higher. The lowest unemploy ent rate in East Germany in 
1991 could be found in the Federal State of Saxony with 9.1%. In 2004 Mecklenburg-Western 
Pomerania again came last in the whole of Germany, with a 22.1% unemployment rate. 
Baden-Wuerttemberg still had the lowest unemployment rate (6.9%) in the whole of reunited 
Germany, while the Free State of Thuringia had the lowest unemployment rate in East 
                                                
134 Comp. Ib. 
135 Comp. Here and following: Bundesagentur für Arbeit: Statistik. Zeitreihe für Länder ab 1950 (Jahreszahlen), 
viewed on http://statistik.arbeitsagentur.de/Statistikdaten/Detail/Aktuell/iiia4/laender-heft/laender-heft-d-0-
xls.xls, retrieved on 1 April 2014. 
46 
 
Germany (18.1%). Thuringia overtook Saxony, whose un mployment rate peaked at 19.4% in 
2004. Saxony found itself in second position in East Germany, 12.5 percentage points higher 
than in Baden-Wuerttemberg. After 2005 the number of unemployed decreased significantly 
and the gap between the West and the East got smaller, lthough distinctions can still be 
found today. In 2013, twenty-three years after reunification, the highest unemployment rate in 
Germany, 13.9%, could be found in Berlin, with the s cond-worst figures being shown, 
exceptionally, by the Western federal state of Bremen, with 12.3%. All other western German 
federal states showed unexceptional percentages that were lower than those of the eastern 
German federal states. Bavaria and Baden-Wuerttemberg w re the undisputed leaders with 
unemployment rates of less than five percent: 4.4% in the southeast and 4.5% in the southwest 
of Germany. Almost the entire territory of the former GDR found itself at the bottom of the 
table: 12.9% in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, 12.1% in Saxony-Anhalt, 11.0% in 
Brandenburg and 10.5% in Saxony. The only East German state below ten percent was 
Thuringia, with 9.1%, which showed the best figures of all the East German states, even 
overtaking one western non-city state, although the margin was minimal: North Rhine-
Westphalia with an unemployment rate of 9.2%. 
 
Figure 5: Development of Unemployment Rate in East Germany and Berlin based on 
























1991 12.5   10.3   10.6   10.3   10.2   9.1   
1992 16.8   14.8   12.4   15.3   15.4   13.6   
1993 17.5   15.3   12.8   17.2   16.3   14.9   
1994 17.0   15.3   13.2   17.6   16.5   15.7   
1995 16.1   14.2   13.6   16.5   15.0   14.4   
1996 18.0   16.2   15.2   18.8   16.7   15.9   
1997 20.3   18.9   17.3   21.7   19.1   18.4   
1998 20.5   18.8   17.9   21.7   18.3   18.8   
1999 19.4   18.7   17.7   21.7   16.5   18.6   
2000 19.0   18.4   17.6   21.4   16.5   18.5   
2001 19.6   18.8   17.9   20.9   16.5   19.0   
2002 20.0   19.1   18.9   20.9   17.2   19.3   
2003 21.7   20.4   20.2   21.8   18.1   19.4   
2004 22.1   20.3   19.9   21.7   18.1   19.4   
2005 22.1   19.9   21.5   21.7   18.6   20.0   
2006 20.8   18.7   20.1   19.9   17.0   18.8   
                                                
136 Comp. Ib., retrieved on 4 April 2014. 
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2007 18.1   16.4   17.9   17.4   14.4   16.3   
2008 15.5   14.4   16.1   15.2   12.3   14.3   
2009 14.9   13.6   16.4   14.8   12.6   14.3   
2010 14.0   12.4   15.8   13.5   10.9   13.1   
2011 13.8   11.9   15.5   12.5   9.8   11.8   
2012 13.2   11.3   14.5   12.4   9.4   10.9   
2013 12.9   11.0   13.9   12.1   9.1   10.5   
 
 Summarising the above-mentioned figures, data and statistics, it must be concluded 
that structural distinctions with regard to the economy are still clearly visible, in the twenty-
fourth year after reunification. A direct relationship between the transition process and the 
economic development of a particular region has still to be ascertained. German regions in 
transition show, on average, higher unemployment rates compared to regions in the West, 
even twenty-four years after. Nevertheless, a slight shifting of proportions in favour of East 
Germany has occurred in recent years. However, the shift remains very weak and there cannot 
yet be any talk of changes in trends.  
 
3.3.1.3 Domestic Migration between East and West Germany 
 
The difficult economic development has led to furthe  social problems with regard to 
domestic migration from the East to the West.137 Since 1990 there has been a significant 
reduction in the population of the eastern states: -11.7% (-1.7 million people), not including 
East Berlin, up until 2008. West German states regist red an increase in population of +6.5% 
(+4 million people), not including West Berlin. Bavaria in particular performed well, 
registering a population increase of more than 1 million compared to the 1990s. In 2008 13 
million people lived in the East and 65.5 million in the West. Saxony-Anhalt performed the 
worst of all the newly-founded East Germany federal st tes, registering a fall in population of 
-17.1% between 1990 and 2008, followed by Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania (-13.5%), 
Thuringia (-13.2%) and Saxony (-12.0%). Only two western federal states showed a negative 
net migration in the period under consideration: Bremen (-2.9%) and Saarland (-4.0%). 
Brandenburg, the last remaining East German state, registered a negative net migration of 
only -2.2%. A direct link between unemployment rate nd net migration is clearly visible: the 
higher the unemployment rate, the higher the domestic net migration within Germany. Thus, 
                                                
137 Comp. Here and following: Statistisches Bundesamt: 20 Jahre Deutsche Einheit. Wunsch oder Wirklichkeit, 
viewed on 
https://www.destatis.de/DE/Publikationen/Thematisch/Regionales/20JahreDeutscheEinheit.pdf?__blob=publicat
ionFile, p. 10, retrieved on 3 April 2014. 
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the East German states lost disproportionately more inhabitants due to higher unemployment 
rates then Western states, shown in the case of Bremen, with a relatively high unemployment 
rate but only moderate negative net migration. 
 
Figure 6: Comparison of Net Migration Development in East Germany 1990/2008 






Berlin 3.43 3.43 -0.1 
Brandenburg 2.58 2.52 -2.2 
Saxony 4.76 4.19 -12.0 
Thuringia 2.61 2.27 -13.2 
Mecklenburg-
Western Pomerania 
1.92 1.66 -13.5 
Saxony-Anhalt 2.87 2.38 -17.1 
West Germany (excl. 
East Berlin) 
61.57 65.54 +6.5 
East Germany (excl. 
West Berlin) 
14.75 13.03 -11.7 
 
3.3.1.4 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
 
The gross domestic product (GDP) can be regarded as another key parameter showing the 
economic development of a particular region. Since 1992 GDP has been measured for the 
regions of both East and West Germany, with Berlin not being counted as entirely part of the 
East or West. GDP figures thus do not cover the entirety of the former territory of East 
Germany, but can still be used as a proper approximate value. 
 
Figure 7: Development of Gross Domestic Product compared to the previous year in West 
Germany (excluding Berlin), East Germany (including Berlin) and Germany as a whole 1992-
2013 (in real terms and concatenated) in percentages138 
Year West Germany East Germany Germany 
1992 1.1 8.1 1.9 
1993 -2.5 9.2 -1.0 
1994 1.5 8.6 2.5 
1995 1.1 4.8 1.7 
1996 0.6 1.6 0.8 
1997 1.9 0.7 1.7 
1998 2.1 0.5 1.9 
1999 2.0 1.5 1.9 
                                                
138 Comp. Statistische Ämter der Länder: Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnungen der Länder. 
Bruttoinlandsprodukt, Bruttowertschöpfung in den Ländern der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1991 bis 2013 
(Reihe 1, Länderergebnisse Band 1), viewed on http://www.vgrdl.de/Arbeitskreis_VGR/tbls/R1B1.zip, retri ved 
4 April 2014. 
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2000 3.4 1.0 3.1 
2001 1.8 0.2 1.5 
2002 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2003 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 
2004 1.2 0.9 1.2 
2005 0.7 0.7 0.7 
2006 3.8 3.4 3.7 
2007 3.4 2.8 3.3 
2008 1.1 1.3 1.1 
2009 -5.5 -3.3 -5.2 
2010 4.2 3.0 4.0 
2011 3.6 1.9 3.3 
2012 0.8 0.2 0.7 
2013 0.5 0.3 0.4 
 
 In the first years after reunification, GDP grew much faster in East Germany. The 
most significant distinctions can be found in 1993, when West Germany recorded negative 
GDP growth of -2.5% while East Germany recorded positive growth of +8.6%. In subsequent 
years, GDP growth in the East slowed down and becam al ost equal between both West and 
East Germany. Nevertheless, the West recorded higher GDP growth between 1997 and 2007. 
The distinctions in GDP growth in the East German federal states below remain minimal. 
 
Figure 8: Development of Gross Domestic Product (in real terms and concatenated) 















1992 9.1 8.7 9.6 9.8 18.0 
1993 12.7 10.5 13.0 13.1 13.3 
1994 11.3 11.4 13.0 10.6 12.4 
1995 7.4 7.3 7.8 3.9 3.4 
1996 3.5 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.8 
1997 2.5 1.8 -0.1 2.9 3.3 
1998 1.0 -0.5 0.8 0.3 1.5 
1999 4.1 2.4 1.5 1.5 2.5 
2000 2.7 -0.2 0.1 1.0 1.3 
2001 0.4 -0.6 1.6 -0.6 0.9 
2002 -0.5 -0.3 1.6 1.9 -0.5 
2003 -0.3 -0.7 0.9 -0.5 1.1 
2004 1.7 1.4 2.0 1.2 1.9 
2005 1.3 0.6 -0.1 0.1 0.3 
                                                
139 Comp. Ib. 
50 
 
2006 2.6 1.7 4.1 3.2 3.2 
2007 1.5 4.3 2.7 2.3 2.8 
2008 1.6 1.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 
2009 -2.7 -1.6 -4.2 -5.1 -5.3 
2010 3.4 0.7 2.9 3.9 4.9 
2011 0.4 1.5 2.5 -1.5 3.6 
2012 0.7 0.7 -0.6 0.7 -0.6 




As happened in other Central and East European Countries going through transition, the new 
federal states of the reunited Germany were also affected by inflation. In the first years 
following reunification in particular, East Germany faced an inflation rate of 13.4% in 1992 
and 10.6% in 1993. Unfortunately, no data is available for the first common year 1992. One 
interesting fact is that the inflation rate stopped at the former inter-German border. While the 
East was suffering from inflation rates up to three times higher than in the West, the economic 
situation in the West remained stable: 3.9% in 1992 and 3.6% a year later. Between 1993 and 
1994 the inflation rate in the East eased and the spe d of price rises slowed down to moderate 
3.6%, followed by only 1.9%. Since then, inflation in East Germany has remained low, 
between 1.9% in 1995 and only 0.4% in 1999. 1999 can be seen as a further milestone: for the 
first time ever, price increases remained 0.3 percentage points below the Western level. 
 
Figure 9: Development of Inflation Rate compared to the previous year in West Germany 
(including West Berlin), East Germany (including East Berlin) and Germany as a whole 
1992-1999 in percentages140 
Year West Germany East Germany Germany 
1992 3.9 13.4 5.1 
1993 3.6 10.6 4.5 
1994 2.7 3.6 2.6 
1995 1.6 1.9 1.8 
1996 1.3 1.9 1.4 
1997 1.9 2.3 2.0 
1998 0.9 1.1 1.0 
1999 0.7 0.4 0.6 
 
                                                
140 Comp. Statistisches Bundesamt: Preise. Verbraucherpreisindizes für Deutschland. Lange Reihe ab 1948, 
viewed on 
https://www.destatis.de/DE/Publikationen/Thematisch/Preise/Verbraucherpreise/VerbraucherpreisindexLangeRe
ihenPDF_5611103.pdf?__blob=publicationFile, p. 5, retrieved 4 April 2014. 
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 Until 1999 the inflation rate in Germany was measured for both West and East 
Germany; since 2000 the Federal Office of Statistics has ceased to distinguish between the 
two German regions, and thus only one uniform, natio w de inflation rate has been published. 
The inflation rate in Germany as whole between 2000 and 2013 remained low. The lowest 
inflation rate figure could be found in 2009 with 0.3%, and the highest, 2.6%, in the previous 
year. Generally, the inflation rate ranged between 2.0% (2001) and 1.1% (2010) with one 
exception (besides 2008/2009), when it reached 2.3% in 2007. Germany’s inflation rate thus 
mainly fulfilled the European Union’s stability criteria of inflation around, but below 2%. 
 
Figure 10: Development of Inflation Rate compared to the previous year in Germany as a 



















The economy can be categorised as a substantial element of the consolidation with regard to 
both civic society and informal political actors. A wealthy, healthy economy is an important 
socio-cultural foundation for a functioning democracy, with all its typical, necessary 
structures. Functioning economies can only be generated through a long-term, decades-long 
process, granting stability and legitimacy and leads to the associated adoption of democratic 
values by informal political actors. 
 Even though East Germany’s economy is still catching up with the more prosperous 
West, a few hurdles have already been cleared. While t e new federal states are slowly 
coming into a period of success, they can still not catch up with the West, and cannot overtake 
                                                
141 Comp. Ib. 
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it at all. In any case, the East German economy can be judged to be consolidated after twenty-
four years of struggle, although still lacking in major success. 
 
3.3.2 The Political Consolidation 
 
The political consolidation in the GDR is deeply connected with the third wave of 
regionalism, which started in 1985. According to Robert Putnam, international negotiations 
are based on the theory of the so-called “two-level game”142. In his opinion, statesmen are 
strategically positioned between two negotiating tables: domestic and international. 
“Diplomatic tactics and strategies are constrained simultaneously by what other states will 
accept and what domestic constituencies will ratify.” If a statesman concludes negotiations 
successfully, they “must bargain on these two tables, both reaching an international agreement 
and securing its domestic ratification”. 
 
3.3.2.1 Two Plus Four Negotiations 
 
German reunification needed to be discussed before it could be successfully concluded. For 
this reason the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, went to 
Washington on 2 February 1990 for talks with his counterpart, James Baker. While Genscher 
wanted to promote Germany’s possible reunification, he needed to get the statement of 
agreement from the victorious powers from the Second World War. Genscher’s vision: setting 
the foreign-policy framework of Germany’s reunification while having a domestic declaration 
of will by East German society with regard to a new r unified Germany, an archetypal ‘two-
level game’. Thus the Foreign Ministers of the Federal Republic of Germany, the German 
Democratic Republic, the United States of America, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and 
France met in Ottawa on 13 February 1990. They annou ced talks with regard to the “outer 
aspects of the creation of German unity including the security of neighbouring countries”143. 
The first talks between the six Foreign Ministers, better known as Two Plus Four 
Negotiations, were held in Bonn on 14 March 1990. On 12 September 1990 the road to the 
reunification of Germany was officially cleared by the Treaty on the Final Settlement with 
                                                
142 Here and following: Moravcsik, Andrew: Double-Edge Diplomacy, viewed on 




Respect to Germany144, which included: 1) ultimate determination of Central European 
borders, including the new borders of a reunited Germany within the borders of West and East 
Germany, while Germany confirmed its waiver of terri o ial claims (including acceptance of 
Poland’s Western borders), 2) restrictions on the siz of German armed forces (the limit was 
fixed to 370,000 personnel), 3) notice of the abandonment by Germany of the production, 
disposal and possession of NBC weapons as well as of wars of aggression, 4) withdrawal of 
all Soviet troops by 1994, 5) the right to form alliances. 
 
3.3.2.2 Coming to Terms with the Stasi Past and Official Transfer to one Federal 
Republic of Germany 
 
The appointment of a high-level Federal Commissioner for the Stasi Archives (German: Der 
Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen 
Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, BStU) took place on 7 June 1990145. The first and only 
freely elected People’s Chamber in the GDR established the agency for the purpose of the 
complete resolution and clearance of crimes committed by the State Security Service of the 
GDR. Joachim Gauck, now President of the Federal Republic of Germany, was the first head 
of the agency. With more than 90,000 official employees and about 150,000 unofficial 
employees, the Stasi spied on more than six million citizens of both East nd West Germany. 
The establishment of the agency marked the beginning of the process of accounting for the 
past with regard to the crimes of State Security. 
 During a sitting of the People’s Parliament on 23 August 1990, it was also decided that 
the GDR would be dissolved and merged with the Federal Republic. The sitting can be 
described as tumultuous: 294 Members of Parliament voted for accession to West Germany 
and 62 voted against.146 The decision lead to accession on 3 October 1990. In the ironic words 
of Gregor Gysi: “The Parliament did no less than deci  on the demise of German Democratic 
                                                
144 Comp. Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung: Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Vertrag überdie 
abschließende Regelung in Bezug auf Deutschland, viewed on http://www.bpb.de/nachschlagen/gesetze/zwei-
plus-vier-vertrag/, retrieved on 30 March 2014. 
145 Comp. Here and following: Die Bundesregierung: Grundsteinlegung für die Gauck-Behörde, viewed on 
http://www.bundesregierung.de/Webs/Breg/DE/Themen/Dutsche_Einheit/2-Chronik-Wende/chronik-
uebersicht/ereignisse/chronik-1990-06-07-grundsteinlegung-
gauck.html;jsessionid=8C48946DAB3DF2AA0236E81EFC2B9A33.s2t2?nn=704580, retrieved on 6 April 
2014. 
146 Comp. Die Bundesregierung: Die Einheit rückt näher, viewed on 
http://www.bundesregierung.de/Webs/Breg/DE/Themen/Dutsche_Einheit/2-Chronik-Wende/chronik-
uebersicht/ereignisse/chronik-1990-08-23-einheit-rueckt-




Republic as of 3 October 1990.”147 Only one day later, on 31 August, the Unity Treaty was 
signed by the Federal Minister of the Interior, Wolfgang Schäuble and the State Secretary of 
the GDR, Günter Krause. The contract governing the accession of East Germany, with 
particular regard to political and institutional issues, ran to 1,000 pages148 and was drawn up 
in only four sittings. Berlin was re-established as the federal capital and five federal states 
were also re-established once the treaty came into force. The treaty also regulated the 
allocation, and resultant expansion, of the number of seats in the second chamber of 
parliament, the Federal Council (German: Bundesrat) of Germany. On 20 September 1990 
both the German Bundestag and the People’s Parliament voted to ratify the treaty by the 
required two-thirds majority. 442 out of 492 voted in favour of the treaty in Bonn, and 299 out 
of 380 in favour in East Berlin.149 The Federal Council voted unanimously.150 This process 
can be seen as more or less unique: the peaceful and democratic self-dissolution of GDR. 
 
3.3.2.3 International Community 
 
The GDR had been accepted in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) as 
far back as 29 September 1950.151 In May 1955 the GDR was accepted as a member of the 
Warsaw Pact.152 The Federal Republic of Germany joined NATO in 1955 following 
ratification of the so called General Treaty (German: Deutschlandvertrag).153 Four years prior 
to this, in 1951, West Germany had been one of the six founding members of the European 
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the predecessor of the European Union.154 In 1957 these 
six countries founded the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and the 
European Economic Community (EEC).155 In 1961 the Federal Republic of Germany was 
among the founding members of the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and 
                                                
147 Ib. 
148 Comp. Ib. 
149 Comp. Die Bundesregierung: Zustimmung zum Einigungsvertrag, viewed on 
http://www.bundesregierung.de/Webs/Breg/DE/Themen/Dutsche_Einheit/2-Chronik-Wende/chronik-
uebersicht/ereignisse/chronik-1990-09-20-einigungsvertrag.html?nn=704580, retrieved on 6 April 2014. 
150 Comp. Ib. 
151 Comp. Weber, Hermann: Dir DDR 1945-1990, München 2006, p. 327. 
152 Comp. Ib., p. 47. 
153 Comp. Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung: Interationale Organisationen, viewed on 
https://www.bpb.de/politik/grundfragen/24-deutschland/40496/internationale-organisationen, retrieved 8 April 
2014. 
154 Comp. Europäische Union: Ein friedliches Europa. Die Anfänge der Zusammenarbeit, viewed on 
http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/1945-1959/index_ .htm, retrieved 8 April 2014. 
155 Comp. Ib.: 1957, viewed on http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/1945-1959/1957/index_de.htm, retrieved on 
8 April 2014. 
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Development (OECD).156 The membership in the aforementioned organisations was followed 
by both West and East Germany joining the United Nations (UN) in 1973.157 Both Bonn and 
East Berlin also participated in the Conferences on Security and Co-Operation in Europe 
(CSCE) starting in 1973 and both signed the Helsinki Final Act two years later.158 With the 
Final Act the OSCE organisation itself was founded. Both German states participated as 
independent nations, which was of key importance for the GDR in particular. East Berlin 
wished to secure the status quo with regard to its international recognition. In 1975 Bonn also 
joined the Group of 7 (G7)159. The reunited Germany joined the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) in 1995.160 Due to West Germany’s profound and long membership in several 
international organisations, its role can be briefly assessed as a story of success. Even though 
both German states and, later, the reunited Germany f ced temporary problems in the 
accession of the territory of the East to NATO and the European Union, the difficulties can be 
regarded as unimportant in this context. Germany’s membership of the WTO in 1995 – the 
very first membership of the reunified Germany in an organisation of such significance – can 
thus be described as trouble-free. In any case the conflicts caused by the inclusion of the 
enlarged Germany in NATO and EU structures will be examined shortly. 
 
Figure 11: Membership of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic 
Republic of the most important International Organisat ons 




1950  COMECON 
1951 ESCS  









                                                
156 Comp. Ständige Vertretung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland bei der OECD in Paris: Mitgliedsstaaten der 
OECD, viewed on http://www.paris-oecd.diplo.de/Vertr tung/parisoecd/de/03/Oecd__MS.html, retrieved on 8
April 2014. 
157 Comp. Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung: Interationale Organisationen, viewed on ib. 
158 Comp. Haus der Geschichte: Sicherheit und Zusammenarb it in Europa. Konferenz über Sicherheit und 
Zusammenarbeit in Europa (KSZE), viewed on 
http://www.hdg.de/lemo/html/DasGeteilteDeutschland/NeueHerausforderungen/SicherheitUndZusammenarbeit/
ksze.html, retrieved on 8 April 2014. 
159 Comp. Die Bundesregierung: Gruppe der Acht, viewed on 
http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/StatischeSeit n/Breg/G8G20/G8-
uebersicht.html;jsessionid=FACDB6F9E2C21182FBD908F8FCF49ED5.s4t2?nn=437032#doc115978bodyText
2, retrieved on 8 April 2014. 
160 Comp. World Trade Organization: Members and Observers, viewed on 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm, retrieved on 8 April 2014. 
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1975 OSCE* (Helsinki Accords) 
G7 
OSCE* (Helsinki Accords) 
1995 WTO  
* The OSCE was not formally established until 1975 
 
3.3.2.3.1 European Union/European Community 
 
The GDR acceded to NATO and the European Community and their political and 
administrative structures overnight. Until 2 October 1990 the independent and democratic 
GDR had been part of the structures of the Warsaw Pct; next morning the population awoke 
as part of the structures of NATO, the former ideological enemy of the GDR. The bipolar 
division of the world was over – at least in Germany. But not only the NATO accession took 
place by joining scope of West Germany; the internatio l community was facing structural 
conflicts with regard to the integration of the new German territory into its structures. The fair 
allocation of seats in the European Parliament in particular led to intense arguments, 
sometimes ideologically-driven, both for and against a reunited Germany. The integration of 
the reunited Germany into the structures of European Union led to deep discussions. A 
landmark decision of the European Council in Dublin in April 1990 in Dublin permitted the 
integration of East Germany as part of an expanded Federal Republic of Germany with no 
changes161 to the EEC treaty, reducing the immediate institutional and financial consequences 
for the European Community compared to standard accession pursuant to article 237. “The 
extension of the federal territory should be neutrally implemented for institutions of the 
community meaning allocations of seats and votes in Council, Commission, European 
Parliament and European Court of Justice remained unchanged.” The representation of the 
new citizens of the Federal Republic of Germany wasprovided by giving observer status to 
representatives of the newly-founded federal states. Compared to the far-reaching 
achievements of East Germany, the adaptabilities and measures of the EC towards East 
Germany must be judged as, at the very least, inadequat , showing sensitive intra-institutional 
balance of power and forced the European Community to reflect on legitimacy and the 
maturation of its democracy. With regard to the Community’s minimalism, the outcome for 
its structures could be seen as weak. The European Community was following an assumption 
based on the idea of imposing a full market economy n the territory of the GDR overnight 
without providing interim period for transition to he Single European Market. 
                                                
161 Comp. Here and following: Lippert, Barbara: Einleitung. Denkschulen und Handlungsoptionen zur 
Europäischen Einbindung des vereinten Deutschlands, i : Lippert, Barbara/Günther, Dirk and others: Die EG 
und die neuen Bundesländer. Eine Erfolgsgeschichte von kurzer Dauer?, Bonn 1993, p. 19-34. 
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 West Germany and the European Community faced the question of how to include 16 
million new citizens at European level until the sub equent European parliamentary elections. 
The GDR had been given the aforementioned observer status, but only until the reunification 
process had been completed.162 There was only one problem: observer status did not exist at 
the time. At the same time the GDR requested to participate in European-level negotiations on 
reunification. The international community acceded to this request: experts from the East 
were invited to participate as members of the German delegation without a basis in 
legislation. The professionals were particularly involved in separate issues concerning East 
Germany. 
 The European Parliament’s judiciary committee demanded the creation of such 
observer status by a special committee entitled ‘German Reunification’. This status was to be 
for a fixed period only and dissolved at the same ti  as the next elections, in 1994: “By then 
a balanced solution for a adequate future representatio  of the citizens in the new federal 
states […] shall be found.” The amendment of the Community’s internal regulations was 
associated with the establishment of observer status. The French, British, Spanish, Italian and 
Portuguese Members of the European Parliament in particul r were against this amendment. 
Chiefly promoted by the German Christian Democrats in the European Parliament, a 
resolution on the establishment of observer status was successfully passed at a plenary session 
on 12 July 1990. The Parliament subsequently followed the resolution and advised all other 
institutions of European Community to officially invite observers from East Germany. Hence 
in September 1990 the People’s Parliament of the GDR sent eighteen representatives to 
Strasbourg. There are different approaches to the number eighteen; the most likely was that 
the ‘magic limit’ of 100 representatives was due to the number of representatives already sent 
by Bonn. West Germany was represented by eighty-one Members of the European Parliament 
in Strasbourg; together with the eighteen additional bservers, Germany remained just under 
the fixed number of one hundred representatives. The discussion continued after both German 
states had finally reunited. Initially, the problem was discussed within Germany alone. Rita 
Süssmuth, President of the German Bundestag, set preconditions for future observers at 
European level: 1) any observers must have their places of permanent residence on the 
territory of East Germany and 2) any observers must have a parliamentary seat either in Bonn 
or in the Landtag of one newly-founded federal states. Coincidentally, almost all of the 
existing observers fulfilled these criteria, even though the distribution of mandates had 
                                                
162 Comp. Here and following: Viertel, Grit: Die Vertre ung der neuen Bundesbürger in den Institutionen der 
Gemeinschaft, in: Ib., p. 103-114. 
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slightly changed. On 24 October 1990 the European Prliament voted on the form of the 
observers’ involvement in the parliament’s structures: 346 Members of Parliament agreed on 
the creation of observer status, only 19 were against d 14 abstained. In accordance with the 
vote, Statute 136a came into effect immediately. The resolution included the following core 
provisions: 1) observers have the right to participate in parliamentary business while not 
having the right to speak, vote or be elected, 2) the number of observers is guaranteed by the 
President of the Parliament, 3) observers may participate in all parliamentary committees, and 
4) the law will expire following the 1994 European Parliamentary elections. Some Members 
of the Parliament labelled the decisions “undemocratic and unacceptable”, others called that 
“unsatisfactory” and others again judged that the situation was “without any alternatives”, 
while some were advocated the re-election of the Parliament for the reunited Germany only. 
Finally, on 21 February 1991, the Bundestag delegated eighteen observers to Strasbourg, all 
of whom were former members of Peoples’ Parliament elected in 1990 in the first, and only, 
free elections in the forty years of GDR history. 
 “The European Community contributed with regard to German reunification early and 
freely.”163 As early as 4 December 1990164 the European Council had decided to transfer the 
Community’s national regional support to the new federal states. Between 1991 and 1993 
funding was covered by overall, flat-rate amounts. Initially, the federal government had no 
say in the distribution. In 1995 the European Commission promoted a gradual cessation of 
these methods of funding.165 
 The case of GDR’s accession to West Germany led to a wider debate about the 
procedures to be followed by the European institutions in the event of expansion of the 
Community. With regard to the allocation of seats, on 9 October 1991 the European 
Parliament passed a resolution fixing the number by which Germany’s allocation would 
increase to eighteen, which came into force at the next subsequent European Parliamentary 
elections in 1994. 
 The integration of the reunited Germany into the European Community is based on a 
theoretical strategic concepts against the backdrop of the future position of Germany in 
Europe. Two schools of thought can be described with regard to different European 
perceptions of Germany’s anticipated power: 1) integration policy approach and 2) realist 
approach. These approaches are influenced by two fact rs: 1) Germany’s power in the future 
                                                
163 Comp. Sturm, Roland/Pehle, Heinrich: Das neue deutsche Regierungssystem, 2nd edition, Wiesbaden 2005, p. 
327. 
164 Comp. Ib., p. 327 f. 
165 Comp. Ib., p. 328 f. 
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and 2) courses of action to be taken by both Germany and the international community. The 
theoretical approach is associated with realism as a core school of thought and power-political 
zero-sum situation of international relations and the integration-oriented concept. Both 
approaches are in opposition to each other. 
 The so called ‘power perception’, on the one hand, provides information about the 
successful German unification, including Germany’s ability to overcome domestic economic 
and political problems within a moderate timeframe while increasing its political and 
economic power through its connections to Central and Eastern Europe. Germany’s position 
thus might be seen as that of a central anchor and a economic driver (realist approach) and as 
a global power dominating the continent’s economy (integration policy approach). Germany’s 
new political strategy might be the leadership and integration of Europe. 
 On the other hand is the so-called ‘weakness percetion’, which provides information 
on the unsuccessful (partially successful) or rather less-successful reunification of Germany: 
Germany would not be able to overcome the conflicts ari ing following reunification, leading 
to a highly unstable situation in Central and Eastern Europe. Weak economic and political 
structures would lead to Germany developing a certain level of domestic instability for a 
considerable period of time. Germany’s traditional i fluence with regard to economic power, 
social consensus and political stability may decrease tendentially and could lead to negative 
spill-over effects in Western, Central and Eastern Europe. In terms of the weakness 
perception, Germany could be viewed as a possible unr liable partner (realist approach) while 
being a ‘normal’, co-equal state in Europe (integration policy approach). Even if the outcomes 
were negative for Europe as a whole, it still had the power to develop strong political 
instruments for the resolution of problems. 
 
3.3.2.3.2 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)  
 
The accession of the enlarged Germany to NATO was preceded by a long series of public 
discussions. Controversies centring around the question of whether Germany could remain 
within NATO structures not had started long before reunification was definite. Eventually the 
unification of the GDR and West Germany led to changes in NATO’s inner structures. A new 
strategic concept was developed during a NATO meeting in London in July 1990: “At their 
meeting […] NATO’s Heads of State and Government agreed on the need to transform the 
Atlantic Alliance to reflect the new, more promising, era in Europe. While reaffirming the 
basic principles on which the Alliance has rested since its inception, they recognised that the 
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developments taking place in Europe would have a far-re ching impact on the way in which 
its aims would be met in future.”166 NATO had already mentioned an enlarged Germany in 
November 1990: “In the West, there have also been significant changes. Germany has been 
united and remains a full member of the Alliance and of European institutions. The fact that 
the countries of the European Community are working towards the goal of political union, 
including the development of a European security identity, and the enhancement of the role of 
the WEU are important factors for European security.”167 Germany thus assumed a key role in 
NATO structures: NATO saw Germany as a future arbitrator between the states of Central 
and Eastern European who were not yet members of NATO. In addition to this: with 
Germany’s membership and the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1994, the long-awaited 
disarmament of Europe could begin. Furthermore, with Germany’s overcoming of territorial 
division after more than 40 years, it could also be said “that the division of Europe is also 
being overcome”168, in the words of NATO’s London Declaration of 5 July 1990. NATO’s 
perception of Germany’s role was as follows: “A united Germany in the Atlantic Alliance of 
free democracies and part of the growing political and economic integration of the European 
Community will be an indispensable factor of stability, which is needed in the heart of 
Europe. The move within the European Community towards political union, including the 
development of a European identity in the domain of security, will also contribute to Atlantic 
solidarity and to the establishment of a just and lasting order of peace throughout the whole of 
Europe.”169 
 A continuance of Germany in NATO was thus uncertain during the entire reunification 
process. NATO was theoretically pursuing two main objectives: 1) expansion of its power as 
a political alliance and 2) the alliance’s function as an instrument of change had to be 
developed towards “island of change”.170 While NATO supported the right of self-
determination171, the continuity of Germany within NATO was not assured172. The USA173 
spoke in favour of a enlarged Germany being included in NATO and Helmut Kohl also 
wished to see Germany included in NATO structures.174 However, the victorious Western 
                                                
166 NATO: The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept, viewed on 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_23847.htm?selectedLocale=en, retrieved on 6 April 2014. 
167 Ib., retrieved on 10 April 2014. 
168 NATO: Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, viewed on 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_23693.htm?selectedLocale=en, retrieved on 10 April. 
169 Ib. 
170 Küsters, Hanns Jürgen: Ib., p. 59. 
171 Comp. Ib. 
172 Comp. Ib., p. 123. 
173 Comp. Ib., p. 97. 
174 Comp. Ib., p. 100. 
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powers were afraid that Germany would be put under pr ssure by the Soviet Union: 
reunification and the European Community or no reunification and the continuity of 
Germany’s membership in NATO was seen as feasible in Moscow.175 However, the USSR’s 
view started to change slightly and it later endorsed the integration of Germany into NATO. 
The USA in particular took a hard line over Germany’s membership of NATO. At a meeting 
in Munich James Baker tried to persuade the powers of the senselessness of the enlarged 
Germany being neutral. Baker promoted the advantages of German membership of NATO 
and advocated giving NATO jurisdiction over the terri o y of the GDR176. This was evidently 
a matter of self-interest, as the USA wished to maintain the presence of its armed forced in 
Germany. On the other hand, Genscher discussed five conditions177 that Germany had to fulfil 
in order to achieve unity: 1) no enlargement of NATO onto the territory of GDR, 2) higher 
level of integration of the Soviet Union into European security structures, 3) the CSCE as 
instrument of a new security agreement, 4) CSCE summit eeting as a basic condition for 
negotiations about the German question and 5) finally, the institutionalisation of the CSCE. 
Genscher’s declaration ran into opposition in both Washington and Bonn. The German 
government feared that it would be “preventive capitulation”178 to the USSR. Genscher was 
feared a hardening of the USSR’s attitude towards German reunification. Horst Teltschik, 
Agency Executive of German Chancellery, created his own concept179 of a pan-European 
security architecture. Teltschik included four components of future German security policy in 
his strategic paper: 1) Germany’s self-reflection as a core country of Europe, 2) Germany will 
not become nuclear power, 3) Germany disposes of unlimited capacities to forge alliances and 
4) Germany would possess its own armed forces. Teltschik’s strategy was mainly influenced 
by six security policy factors: 1) CSCE, 2) economic cooperation abilities, 3) dialogue on 
arms control and disarmament, 4) Germany’s membership of NATO structures, 5) 
maintenance of the German armed forces and 6) stationing of American armed forces on 
German soil. However, Teltschik was aware that Germany had to go further in order to 
improve relations, and thus achieve rapprochement with Moscow; Germany had to offer a 
price worth paying for unity. Teltschik had five chief points in mind: 1) eschewal of NBC 
weapons, 2) negotiations on the extent of the German armed forces, 3) verifications of arms 
control, 4) permission of inspections for chemical weapons and 5) possibly assurances that no 
NATO troops or institutions would cross the inter-German border (but: the stationing of 
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German armed forces in the East would be allowed). In the event of the Soviet Union not 
relenting, the USA would have been willing to accept an extraordinary status in terms of 
security policy for former GDR territory in a reunited Germany by means of the non-
jurisdiction of NATO over East German territory.180 Meanwhile, different approaches with 
regard to NATO jurisdiction over the eastern part of Germany led to disagreements181 
between Hans-Dietrich Genscher and Gerhard Stoltenberg, Minister of Defence in Bonn. 
While Stoltenberg advocated the inter-German expansion of NATO, Genscher favoured a 
demilitarised zone in East Germany. Moscow’s positin on the NATO question remained 
unclear and fluctuating: “Moscow do not want a unilateral surrender of its achieved position 
in World War Two in Germany’s Eastern part.”182 
 Article 5 and 6 of the NATO treaty were in the focus of subsequent negotiations. 
Finally, on 15 and 16 July 1990, Gorbachev agreed on the application of Articles 5 and 6 of 
NATO treaty to the whole of Germany during partly informal talks with Kohl in Moscow and 
in Gorbachev’s hometown in the Caucasus183, which were to remain in force despite the 
continued presence of Soviet troops in East Germany. Gorbachev’s strategic points were: 1) 
eschewal of NBC weapons, 2) non-expansion of nuclear armed forces over GDR territory, 3) 
independent treaty between Bonn and Moscow about the s ationing of Soviet troops, 4) 
Germany would be allowed to freely forge alliances. While Point 4 does not explicitly 
mention NATO itself, it de facto granted Germany the right to remain a member of NATO. 
Kohl consented to this under following conditions: 1) limitation of German armed forces at a 
height of 370,000 soldiers, 2) independent treaty with Soviet Union, 3) non-stationing of 
NATO troops in East Germany and 4) withdrawal of Soviet troops within three to four years. 
The results of negotiations were laid down in the Tr aty on the Final Settlement with Respect 
to Germany. Kohl later called the negotiations an “historic hour”184 afterwards. 
 
4. The Transition of Czechoslovakia 
 
The Czechoslovakian transition was predominantly influe ced by its specific internal points 
of departure and the already well-known external circumstances in the countries of the 
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Warsaw Pact, especially the USSR. Nevertheless, a lack of opposition movements185, 
democratic-pluralistic attitude of society, as well as a relatively high adaptability led to a 
highly specific political situation which could be described as stable for a long time due to 
moderate positive economic development186 such as wave increases, increase in GDP, low 
rates of unemployment and inflation and a relatively well-functioning supply situation. Apart 
from the above, the Czechoslovakian economy also faced the normal Communist 
underdevelopment187: low productivity, high usage, and thus wastage, of resources and 
energy, regional environmental pollution, outdated mono-industrial structures and only 
marginal competitiveness. The following aspects188 can therefore be recognised as 
Czechoslovakian’s specific internal points of departure: the general and conflict-laden 
construction of the state, the division of the country into a Czech and a Slovak part (which 
later even led to the dissolution of Czechoslovakia) and a long tradition of the non-existence 
of anti-governmental movements and militant protest b haviour. 
 
4.1 The End of the Autocratic System 
 
The end of the autocratic system in Czechoslovakia occurred due to both internal and external 
factors. Mass demonstrations (‘voice’) can be seen as the reason for the internal loss of the 
regime’s legitimacy, while the international political situation can be taken as external reasons 
for the end of the autocratic system in Czechoslovakia. Three different, continuous forms of 
the end of the autocratic system in Czechoslovakia re identifiable: 1) the controlled change 
of the political system, at least partially initiated and directed by the ‘old’ elite, 2) a forced 
change of the political system from the bottom up through uprisings and mass opposition 
demonstrations, which led to the rapid changing of the autocratic authorities, and 3) a 
negotiated change of Czechoslovakia’s political system. 
 
4.1.1 ‘Voice’ instead of ‘Exit’: the ‘Velvet Revolution’ 
 
Czechoslovakia is one of the nations whose autocratic system ended swiftly and non-
violently, introduced by demonstrations and mass protests. The entire process of the end of 
the Communist dictatorship is described by the term ‘Velvet Revolution’. The end of the 
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autocratic system which was mainly led by orthodox Communist powers was brought about 
by mass demonstrations. The first protests took place as early as the beginning of January 
1989189 during various protest events held in remembrance of Jan Palach and his self-
immolation. These demonstrations were brutally put down by the police, after which 
increasing numbers of demonstrators gathered to demand democratisation, or rather for 
democratic elements to be included in the Czechoslovakian constitution. More than 40,000 
citizens190 signed a petition between spring and autumn 1989 demanding open dialogue, 
criticism of the regime and democratisation. At this time a Green movement was established, 
in Slovakia in particular, advocating the renewal of state structures. During summer 1989 the 
situation in the country became even more febrile, caused on the one hand by external factors 
such as events in Poland and Hungary, and on the other by external factors which turned into 
internal factors: the exit of GDR refugees waiting for transport to West Germany from the 
embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in Prague. Even though the churches did not 
play an important role in Czechoslovakia, they were involved in the democratisation process 
that was taking place between Aš and Košice. The protest movement in Czechoslovakia 
remained low-profile until as late as October 1989, with only a few thousand people 
participating in public demonstrations.191 The changing of the situation in Czechoslovakia 
was deeply connected to events in the GDR. It can be described as a change of mood. The 
power of the regime started to crumble, as did its legitimacy. In a survey held in 1989, only 
one-third of those asked recognised the leading role f the Communist Party of 
Czechoslovakia (Czech: Komunistická strana Československa, KSČ).192 The youth of 
Czechoslovakia in particular had stopped believing i  the system. The first illegal mass 
demonstration took place on 17 November 1989 and developed out of protests of students 
demanding the end of the Communist leadership. These w re met with brutal interventions by 
the police. Between 15,000 and 50,000 students193 joined the riots; sources are ambiguous 
about exact numbers. One day previously, students had taken to the streets of Bratislava. The 
demonstration in Prague and its bloody suppression were like the lighting of a powder keg. 
The long-simmering conflict was backed up by a social ontract of non-intervention by state 
representatives as long as there was no public opposition by the population. In the following 
weeks more mass demonstrations were organised and held, mainly in Prague. Approximately 
                                                
189 Comp. Ib., p. 323 f. 
190 Comp. Ib., p. 324. 
191 Comp. Ib. 
192 Comp. Ib. 
193 While Jakob Juchler take 50,000 participants into account, the German Federal Agency for Civic Education 
start out from 15,000. 
65 
 
200,000 protestors participated in each event.194 According to some reports Czechoslovakia’s 
secret police interfered in these protests by infiltrating them with agents provocateurs to 
inflame the situation. These demonstrations naturally determined the further course of events: 
perestroika-style political reforms were no longer possible; the elite began to lose control over 
its actions and unintentionally accelerated the end of the autocratic system. 24-25 November 
1989 saw the largest mass demonstrations that Czechoslovakia had ever experienced: between 
700,000 and 800,000 people took to the streets of Prague to fight the Communist regime. 
These mass protests were accompanied by a general strike several days later, which increased 
the pressure on Party leadership. Strikers called for free elections, the unrestricted practice of 
religion, the resignation of Czechoslovakian Presidnt Gustáv Husák, as well as the 
condemnation of the Warsaw Pact invasion in 1968.195 
 
4.1.2 Opposition Movements 
 
According Vít Hloušek196 four aspects can be recognised that sealed the end of autocratic 
regime: 1) economic staganation, 2) political dissat f ction, 3) social stagnation and 4) 
intellectual and cultural stagnation. While the mass demonstrations can be regarded as 
Czechoslovakia’s answer to economic stagnation and political dissatisfaction, the foundation 
of opposition movements and groups were the societal answer towards stagnation in culture 
and society. 
 Firstly, the Charta 77 movement, founded and initiated by Vaclav Havel197 among 
others in 1977, was the very first organised opposition movement in Czechoslovakia, and the 
charter was signed by important public figures such as artists, actors, musicians and other 
intellectuals, as well as students. In the first months following Charta’s foundation only a few 
hundred198 followers had signed; approximately 1,200 by 1986. Unfortunately, the opposition 
movements remained weak for a long time. Their members “suffered various forms of 
repression during the years of the communist regime for their political convictions”199, 
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Hloušek said. New opposition groups200 were founded on 19 November 1989, two days after 
the first mass demonstration: The Civic Forum (Czech: Občanské fórum, OF) in the Czech 
Republic and the Public Against Violence (Slovak: Verejnost‘ proti násiliu, VPN) in Slovakia. 
The Civic Forum consisted of several opposition groups such as Charta 77 and Communist 
dissidents of the Renaissance (Czech: Obroda) group, as well as members of political parties. 
The opposition groups and movements pressed for the resignation of the Communist 
government and renewal of the democratic system. Party Chairman Miloš Jakeš resigned from 
office on 24 November.201 Afterwards, Václav Havel and Alexander Dubček appeared on a 
balcony at Wenceslas Square, both of whom were cheered by the crowds present. This can be 
seen as the beginning of the democratisation process in Czechoslovakia. 
 
4.2 The Democratisation Process 
4.2.1 The Beginning of Democratisation 
 
The democratisation process started just after General Secretary Miloš Jakeš’s resignation 
from office. On 29 November 1989 the Communist government took the decision to make 
significant changes to the Czechoslovakian constitution. Two important amendments must be 
mentioned: 1) the leading role of the Communist Party was abolished by the elite of the 
regime itself and furthermore 2) the leading role of Marxism-Leninism in society was also 
removed from the constitution. 
 However, the Communist dictatorship was still fight ng for its survival. One faction of 
KSČ which was eager for reform made a final attempt to maintain its hegemony in early 
December 1989. A ‘new’ government was appointed. 16 out of 21 ministers in this 
government belonged202 to the Communist Party while Ladislav Adamec became the new 
Communist Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia. This situation led to a new wave of protests. 
“After a tough bargaining the new government of national understanding was finally 
appointed on 10 December 1989 which only consisted of ten Communist ministers led by 
reform-minded Marián Čalfa.”203 At the same time President Gustáv Husák resigned from
office. For the first time since the Communists had t ken power in Czechoslovakia after 
World War Two a majority of non-Communists minister formed the government, even 
though Čalfa was still a representative of Communism. Important non-Communists now 
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participated in the new government. The most famous per onalities were Václav Klaus, who 
later became Prime Minister, and then President, of the Czech Republic and Jiří Dienstbier, a 
dissident and former spokesmen for Charta 77.  
 The time between Jakeš’s resignation from office and the newly appointed 
government can also be seen as a important interim period setting the course of the further 
democratisation process in Czechoslovakia. Again, there is no single, clear turning point 
marking the end of autocratic system and beginning of democratisation, the same issue that 
affected the transition of the GDR’s transition. 
 
4.2.2 Further Process of Democratisation 
 
By the end of December 1989 two symbolic figures of the opposition movement had been 
elected to the two most powerful positions in Czechoslovakia. On 29 December 1989204 
Václav Havel and Alexander Dubček were announced as, respectively, the President of 
Czechoslovakia and the Chairman of the Parliament by the Communist National Assembly, 
which still held a majority. 
 Within only six weeks the political system of Czechoslovakia had been transformed 
into a semi-democratic framework with its first non-Communist heads of state. The process of 
democratisation continued in the subsequent months towards a political system based on 
democratic standards and embedded in a liberal environment. An internal process of the 
dismantling of Communist structures such as ‘old’ rules, laws and polities as well as 
dissolution of Czechoslovakian state security apparatus and the removal of the Communist 
Party from the national decision-making processes wa initiated. The resetting of relations 
between state and the churches became a key item on the political agenda of 1990’s and the 
following years. 
 The direction of transition and especially the way in which the structures should be 
changed was the subject of public discussion in Czechoslovakia. The further course of the 
democratisation, and thus consolidation, process was significantly determined by the abrupt, 
politically-driven change of regime. “The rejection f the previous system was deeply rooted 
[in Czechoslovakian society] even though the concrete route of societal restructuring 
remained controversial and unclear for most of the people.”205 Communists still remained part 
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68 
 
of the parliament, although a considerable majority of people wished to achieve206 essential 
political changes. The continuity of transition remained uncertain even within the Civic 
Forum, which actually represented a wide spectrum of political opinions and ideologies, from 
left-wing Socialism to right-wing conservativism. Due to the range of different opinions, the 
establishment of stable formal democratic structures took top priority. In the following weeks 
of January 1990, one hundred and twenty Communist Members of Parliament resigned; they 
were replaced with representatives of the opposition m vement. 
 At the same time slight economic reforms207 such as 1) equalisation of the private 
sector, 2) establishment of joint stock companies, 3) break-up of state monopoly enterprises 
and 4) permission to found small businesses despite the slow start to the liberalisation of 
prices, and thus the economy as a whole. The main priorities in Czechoslovakia’s transition 
were rather a political transition; the transition of economy remained of secondary 
importance. 
 
4.2.3 The End of the Democratisation Process 
 
The end of democratisation and the beginning of the consolidation process was marked by the 
free democratic elections held in June 1990. These elections can be regarded as a preliminary 
milestone of the end of democratisation. Nevertheless the elections could not provide a real 
political choice due to the lack of a clear range of political parties, brief preparation time, lack 
of formal election programme and specific political and societal divisions. The main divisions 
were between supporters of the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ regimes. The past significantly influenced 
the present. In other words: the election was used by the previous elite, embodied in the 
Communist Party, which eschewed a change of name and only went through a partial 
transition. Despite losing two-thirds of its members, the KSČ remained powerful in terms of 
its membership and disposed of considerable organisational and mobilisation potential.208 The 
Czech Civic Forum and the Slovak Public Against Violence gained more and more popularity 
in the weeks leading up to the elections. The Civic Forum was seen as a heterogeneous 
political party209 that, according to polls held just before the election, lacked prospects for 
success due to the short period of its existence and people’s mistrust in the concentration of 
power. The same applied in Slovakia. Both the Civic Forum and Public Against Violence 
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struggled to establish transparent internal structues. The Civic Forum finally grew in 
popularity weeks before the election thanks to Václav Havel and his personal popularity and 
charisma. The Civic Forum was considered the most eligibl  candidate to overcome the 
Communist past. 
 Before the elections took place there was also a debate about the future federal 
structure of Czechoslovakia. As early as March 1990, the existence of the so-called 
Czechoslovakian Federal Republic led to massive protests in the Slovak entity210 and was 
replaced on 22 April 1990 with the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (Czech: Česká a 
Slovenská Federativní Republika, ČSFR), which was accepted by a majority of people. 
 The first free elections to the Federal Assembly and the Czech and Slovak National 
Council on 8 and 9 June 1990 resulted in the victory of the ‘new’ regime. Prior to the 
elections, a new electoral law and law on political p rties being based on free competition, 
defining “the legal conditions for the activities of political parties and movements211” were 
adopted. The legislative period of the newly elected parliament was shortened to only two 
years. During its two-year term, the restructuring of the state began, including the drawing-up 
of a new constitution.212 The Civic Forum gained almost 50% of the vote (49.5%) in the 
Czech213 entity in the election to the Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech 
Republic, followed by the Communist Party in second, with 13.2% of the vote. Two further 
political parties were elected to parliament: the Christian and Democratic Union-
Czechoslovak People’s Party (Czech: Křesťanská a demokratická unie-Československá strana 
lidová, KDU-ČSL) with 8.4% of the vote and the Movement for Autonomous Democracy-
Party for Moravia and Silesia (Czech: Hnutí za samosprávnou demokracii-Společnost pro 
Moravu a Slezsko, HSD-SMS) with 10.0% of the vote. Voter turnout was 96.8% – a 
considerable number. In the Slovak214 entity the Public Against Violence platform won the 
election with 29.4% of the vote, followed by the Christian Democratic Movement 
(Kresťanskodemokratické hnutie, KDH) with 19.2%, the Slovak National Party (Slovenská 
národná strana, SNS) with 13.9% and the Communist Party (KSČ) with 13.4%. The other 
parties that gained seats in the parliament were the Coexistence-Hungarian Christian 
                                                
210 Comp. Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung: Tschechi n. Politisches System nach 1989, ib., retrieved on 19 
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Democratic Movement (Spolužitie-Maďarské kresťanskodemokratické hnutie, ESWMK) with 
8.7%, the Democratic Party (Demokratická strana, DS) with 4.4% and the Green Party 
(Strana zelených, SZ) with 3.5% of the vote. Voter turnout was 95.4%. In Slovakia the VPN 
formed a coalition with KDH and DS. In the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic as a whole, 
the Civic Forum and Public Against Violence formed a coalition together with the Christian 
Democrats. The most important outcome of the elections was that the Communist Party was 
no longer in power in Czechoslovakia and the party slid into isolation. The new government 
of the Czech Republic was thus mainly led by former dissidents. Václav Klaus became 
Minister of Finance, Jiří Dienstbier took over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and former 
Communist Marián Čalfa, now a member of Public Against Violence, became Prime Minister 
of the ČSFR as a whole while Havel remained president. In Slovakia, Vladimír Mečiar 
became the new Prime Minister and in the Czech Republic Petr Pithart remained Prime 
Minister. 
 
4.3 The Consolidation of Democracy 
 
The consolidation of democracy in Czechoslovakia began even before the end of the 
democratisation process. The free elections marked a turning point in Czechoslovakia’s 
transition, as essential democratic features were established and the Communist Party lost all 
its power. Nevertheless, a completely new constitution, based on democratic norms, had not 
yet been established. 
 
4.3.1 The Socio-Economic Consolidation 
 
The further progress of consolidation was mainly characterised by a robust discussion about 
the path of reform. Brief disagreements occurred after the elections: “After the victory over 
the Communists the unifying tie of the ‘opposition movement’ ceased to exist and 
disagreements erupted due to the upcoming important decisions about economic and social 
policy.”215 The country’s future economic alignment remained unclear. There were two main 
points of view: 1) a rather social democratic approach favouring a slow, cushioned transition 
in social terms towards a market economy, against a 2) more radical neoliberal programme. A 
further so called ‘third way’ must also be mentioned here; but it was never a real option. 
Václav Klaus was an adherent of the neoliberal agenda while Deputy Prime Minister Valtr 
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Komárek advocated the first option. In the words of Václav Klaus and Tomas Ježek on their 
economic worldview: “As true liberals, we should start with a very heavy dose of monetarist 
medicine – with economic policy measures, not with formal institutional reform – because 
with ‘easy money’ no real changes in economic behavior of any agents can be achieved.”216 A 
clear shift of priorities is visible: while political reforms took priority in the decision-making 
processes of Czechoslovakia’s democratisation process, this shifted to new values focusing on 
economy and only then politics. In mid-September 1990217 the second path, a neoliberal 
economic transition, was adopted by parliament. Thefirst steps had already been taken in 
autumn 1990: 1) a new tax law was introduced to promote growth in the private sector, 2) the 
national currency was devalued in October 1990 to 54.5% of its previous value and 3) 
privatisation programmes such as the law on restitution and ‘minor privatisation’ regulating 
the sale of small-scale enterprises. Furthermore, a so-called ‘corporate tripartism’ – the joint 
ownership of institutions between official representatives of the state, employers and 
employees – was enacted in order to “establish social partnership organizations”218. 
Additionally, a two-tier banking system was established as early as April 1990219, together 
with unemployment compensation provisions, the abolition of both the Planning Commission 
and Prices Board, as well as the state monopoly of foreign trade. The main process of 
economic consolidation started in early 1991 with the unleashing of market mechanisms such 
as economic competition, including large-scale general privatisation, the increasing of prices 
for food in particular due to the reduction of subsidies, the convertibility of the Czech crown, 
import tax and “tax-based measures to restrict the growth of wages”220. From a macro-
economic perspective, the Czechoslovakian government focused on a moderate rate of 
inflation, restrictive budgets and a tight monetary policy. The direct result of this was a 
deterioration in the social and economic situation221 in both the Czech and Slovak Republics, 
based on a fall in real earnings, high rates of inflation and unemployment as well as reduced 
industrial production. “Czechoslovakia experienced a deep transition recession during the 
1991-1992 period.”222 Tensions then emerged between trade unions and government. 
However, large-scale strikes failed to occur. At the same time, people’s fears about the 
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dangers of economic change started to become more and more real; Czechs and Slovaks both 
pointed to growing dissatisfaction with regard to political and economic development223. The 
privatisation process224 in Czechoslovakia took place simultaneously to restructuring. The 
small-scale privatisation programme in 1990 (terminated by the end of 1993) was followed by 
large-scale privatisation in 1991 (conducted between 1992 and 1994) and so-called ‘voucher 
privatisation’ being implemented for the direct or indirect mass privatisation of approximately 
2,000 companies in 1992. After 1993, privatisation remained centralised in the Czech 
Republic. The process was under state control; the stat  determined the speed and strategy of 
privatisation. 1996 saw a third wave of privatisation in the Czech Republic, with the 
privatisation of hospitals and other social institutions, while the third wave in the Slovak 
Republic was characterised225 by the sale of large industrial enterprises in the c mical, oil 
and paper industries. Additionally, following the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, the Council 
for Economic and Social Agreement226 was created in both the Czech and Slovak Republics.  
 In the years following the country’s dissolution, the Czech Republic and Slovakia 
experienced a kind of post-Communist ‘social shock’, characterised by unemployment, 
reduced income, poverty, corruption and social polarisation: “The main reason for social 
shock, however, was cultural, the sharp collision of state socialist, and traditional values on 
the one hand and new values and social behavioral requirements on the other. The doors 
openly widely, but most of the people were frightened to enter into an unknown world.”227 
Despite all the negative phenomena such as reduced real wages, economic insecurity and 
“other uncertainties into their [people’s] daily lives”228, the neoliberal reforms can be seen as 
a success story in the Czech Republic. Slovakia, on the other hand, was hit much harder 
compared to the Czech Republic due to differing economic structures and a level of 
industrialisation.229 In the summary of Miroslav Beblavý: “Consequently, the transition 
recession was more painful in Slovakia […]”; this shall be illustrated below. 
 After Czechoslovakia’s dissolution by 1 January 1993, Slovakia started to implement 
an independent economic policy after the end of the Cz ch-Slovak monetary union on 8 
February 1993. The idea of independence was originally b sed on “a more gradualist path of 
transition including extensive state intervention in the economy and highly ambitious 
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industrial policy”230. In the first years of Slovakia’s independency the country experienced an 
even more severe economic downturn. Fiscal transfers by Czech Republic did not happen, 
taxes went up, expenditure was cut and the country’s credibility in international financial 
markets remained low.231 
 In a review232 in 2006, Klaus settled scores with the former advocates of the so-called 
‘third way’ in Czechoslovakia: “It seems almost unimaginable today, but for the majority of 
people the alternative to communism in our country was not capitalism.” Klaus called the 
visions of a third way “utopian”. Politically, third way adherents favoured non-political 
politics while seeking an “exceptional role for intellectual and cultural elites in the running of 
the country.” Klaus labelled them “neocollectivists” and “postdemocrats”’ who “reject liberal 
democracy”. Economically, in the words of Klaus, the supporters of the third way “did not 
wish to change the existing economic system”, but wanted to emphasise elements of 
perestroika. The advocates of the third way stood for a middle course between socialism and 
capitalism, similar to the ‘third way’ in the GDR. Klaus’ goals in the transition of 
Czechoslovakia were capitalism and parliamentary democracy: “The group, of which I was a 
part, pushed for the adoption of the Scenario for Economic Reform by the Federal Parliament 
of the then-Czechoslovakia in the fall 1990.” The compromise consisted of important policies 
which were needed to bring the economy into line on the path towards a free, liberal market 
economy, such as the dissolution of institutional structures of the centrally planned economy, 
repeal of Communist laws, bans and orders, liberalisation of prices, foreign trade and markets, 
as well as the privatisation of small- and large-scale public enterprises. Two things were 
essential for the creation of a liberal market economy: macro-economic stability and the 
establishment of infrastructure on which a functioning market could be based. “All of us who 
were thinking about economic reforms at that time kn w that it was necessary to take all of 
those steps simultaneously.” According to Mitchell A. Orenstein, Klaus’ ideas about the 
economic path of Czechoslovakia can be seen as “radical”233. In spite of this, the neoliberal 
economic path became the dominant item on Czechoslovakia’s transition and consolidation 
agenda. 
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Figure 12: Development of Inflation (compared to the previous year), General Unemployment 
Rate and Gross Domestic Product (compared to the previous year) in the Czech part of 
Czechoslovakia and then the Czech Republic 1989-2013 in percentages234 




1989 1.4 - - 
1990 9.7 - - 
1991 56.6 2.3 -10.0 
1992 11.1 3.3 -2.0 
1993 20.8 4.3 1.2 
1994 10.0 4.3 2.9 
1995 9.1 4.0 6.2 
1996 8.8 3.9 4.5 
1997 8.5 4.8 -0.9 
1998 10.7 6.5 -0.2 
1999 2.1 8.7 1.7 
2000 3.9 8.8 4.2 
2001 4.7 8.1 3.1 
2002 1.8 7.3 2.1 
2003 0.1 7.8 3.8 
2004 2.8 8.3 4.7 
2005 1.9 7.9 6.8 
2006 2.5 7.1 7.0 
2007 2.8 5.3 5.7 
2008 6.3 4.4 3.1 
2009 1.0 6.7 -4.5 
2010 1.5 7.3 2.5 
2011 1.9 6.7 1.8 
2012 3.3 7.0 -1.0 
2013 1.4 - - 
 
 The inflation rate in the Czech part of Czechoslovakia increased dramatically from 
9.7% to 56.5% between 1990 and 1991 due to the new economic measures such as 
devaluation of the national currency and neoliberal m rket reforms. In other terms: the prices 
for goods and services rose by more than 580% within a year. During the next three years the 
unemployment rate remained double-digit, reaching 20.8% in 1993 and subsequently falling 
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to 10.0% one year later. Between 1995 and 1998 the inflation rate remained relatively high, 
reaching 9.1% in 1995 and 10.7% in 1998. In 1998 the Czech Republic recorded its last two-
digit inflation rate until the present day. Since 1999 inflation has been moderate, varying 
between 0.1% (2003) and 6.3 (2008). The inflation rate in 2003 was the lowest ever 
measured. The unemployment rate was never seen as a m jor problem in the Czech Republic. 
 
Figure 13: Graphs showing the Development of Inflation (compared to the previous year), 
General Unemployment Rate and Gross Domestic Product (compared to the previous year) in 
the Czech territory of Czechoslovakia, and then the Cz ch Republic, between 1989-2013 in 
percentages according to the figures in ‘Figure 12’
 
 
 During the final years of the existence of Czechoslovakia the unemployment rate 
remained low: 2.3% (1991) and 3.3% (1992). In the years following the division of 
Czechoslovakia, the rate remained low and stable, at around 4%, until the end of 1997. In 
1998 6.5% of Czechs were out of work; in subsequent y ars this varied between 8.8% (2000) 
and 7.1% (2006). The unemployment rate in the year 2000 was the highest ever recorded, 
while remaining moderate. Between 2007 and 2008 the unemployment rate fell to 4.4%. 
Since 2009 the unemployment rate has remained stable at around 7%. The unemployment rate 
never reached two digits. 
 In 1991 and 1992 the Czech Republic experienced a neg tive annual GDP growth of -
10% and -2%. In 1993, after the split, the Czech Republic’s GDP development amounted to 
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1997 and 1998, when the Czech Republic faced slight negative growth of -0.9% and -0.2%. In 
the following years the GDP growth remained stable at between 1.7% (1999) and 3.8% 
(2003), before reaching a unique, robust growth level of 7.0% in 2006. Since 2009 the Czech 
Republic has faced the aftermath of the global financial and economic crisis, recording its 
second highest negative GDP growth of -4.5% (2009), followed by weak GDP growth. In 
2012 GDP growth was again negative (-1.0%). The wayout of the crisis remains a difficult 
one for the Czech Republic. 
 
Figure 14: Development of Inflation (compared to the previous year), General Unemployment 
Rate and Gross Domestic Product (compared to the previous year) in the Slovak territory of 
Czechoslovakia and then the Slovak Republic 1989-2013 in percentages235 




1989 - - 1.2 
1990 - - -2.7 
1991 - 11.1 -14.6 
1992 - 10.9 -6.7 
1993 - 12.2 -3.7 
1994 13.4 13.7 6.2 
1995 9.9 13.1 5.8 
1996 5.8 11.3 6.9 
1997 6.1 11.9 4.4 
1998 6.7 12.6 4.4 
1999 10.6 16.4 0.0 
2000 12.0 18.8 1.4 
2001 7.3 19.3 3.5 
2002 3.3 18.6 4.6 
2003 8.6 17.5 4.8 
2004 7.5 18.1 5.1 
2005 2.7 16.2 6.7 
2006 4.5 13.3 8.3 
2007 2.8 11.0 10.5 
2008 4.6 9.6 5.8 
2009 1.6 12.1 -4.9 
2010 1.0 14.4 4.2 
2011 3.9 13.5 3.0 
2012 3.6 13.9 1.8 
2013 - - - 
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 In comparison to the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic faced massive social 
problems with regard to post-Communist economic development. Compared to the Czech 
Republic, the inflation rate remained relatively low, reaching a high of 13.4% in 1994 before 
falling to 5.8% (1996) and 6.1% (1997). Between 1998 and 2000 inflation increased 
dramatically, from 6.7% (1998) to 10.6% (1999) and 12.0% (2000). In 2000 – ten years after 
the collapse of Communism – the second highest inflat on rate ever was recorded. The 
inflation rate subsequently remained unstable: 7.3% in 2001, 3.3% in 2002, 8.6% in 2003 and 
2.7% in 2005. In 2010 the Slovak Republic experienced its lowest ever measured inflation 
rate of only 1.0%, followed by a relatively moderat 3.9% (2011) and 3.6% (2012).  
 A bigger problem has been the unemployment rate, which has remained high even up 
to the present. In 1991 and 1992 the Slovaks were confronted with a unemployment rate 
amounting to 11.1% and 10.9% followed by a stable, ut high, rate of between 13.7% (1994) 
and 11.3% (1996). Afterwards the unemployment rate increased significantly, reaching a 
maximum of 19.3% in 2001. The rate remained high, fluctuating between 18.6% (2002), 17.5 
(2003) and 18.1% (2004) before falling from 16.2% (2005) to 9.6% in 2008. This was the first 
and only time that a single-digit unemployment rate was recorded. Since 2009 the Slovak 
Republic has experienced the negative results of the global financial and economic crisis, with 
a further increase in the number of people out of wrk. 
 
Figure 15: Graph showing the Development of Inflation (compared to the previous year), 
General Unemployment Rate and Gross Domestic Product (compared to the previous year) in 
the Slovak territory of Czechoslovakia, and the Slovak Republic 1989-2013 in percentages 
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 Between 1991 and 1993 the Slovak Republic recorded negative GDP growth four 
times in a row reaching a record low of -14.6% in 199 . Between 1994 and 1998 Slovakia 
showed positive, stable GDP growth varying between 6.2% and 4.4%, followed by non-
growth in 1999 (0.0%). In 2000 and 2001 the GDP improved by 1.4% and 3.5% before 
reaching a robust rate of 5.1% in 2004. GDP thus developed significantly reaching its first and 
only two-digit figure of 10.5% in 2007. In 2009 the d velopment of the Slovak Republic was 
suddenly interrupted by the economic crisis, with negative GDP growth of -4.9%. Only one 
year later, however, GDP stabilised at +4.2% (2010). In 2011 and 2012 GDP growth 
remained moderate and stable, varying between 3.0% and 1.8%. 
 
4.3.2 The Political Consolidation 
 
Two key aspects will be examined with regard to the political consolidation: the dissolution of 
Czechoslovakia as well as the Czech and Slovak Republic’s return to Europe and the 
international community. In this, the second current of domestic-level theories – the regime 
type and democratisation – will provide the theoretical framework for the examination of the 
international co-operation and integration of the Czech and Slovak Republics. 
 
4.3.2.1 Dissolution of Czechoslovakia 
 
Arguments between the opposition movements and between the autonomous Czech and 
Slovak Republics within Czechoslovakia about the future direction of reforms with regard to 
the restructuring of politics and economics started immediately after the first elections in June 
1990. The main political movements, Civic Forum in the Czech Republic and Public Against 
Violence in the Slovak Republic, broke under the prssure. Both platforms were experiencing 
insurmountable differences of opinion about the further course of the transition. While Public 
Against Violence was moving towards becoming a political party with a strong hierarchical 
structure, the Civic Forum strived for decentralised structures and the integration of 
members.236 The Civic Forum was shaken by power and leadership truggles between right-
wing, liberal and left-wing factions.237 In February 1991 the Civic Forum split238 into three 
parties. The first of these was the Civic Democrati Party (Czech: Občanská demokratická 
                                                
236 Comp. Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung: Tschechi n. Politisches System nach 1989, ib., retrieved on 26 
April 2014. 
237 Comp. Juchler, Jakob: Ib., p. 332. 




strana, ODS) which, under the leadership of Václav Klaus, became a major player in the 
Czech political landscape in the following years. The second was the Citizens’ Movement 
(Czech: Občanské hnutí, OH), which attracted former dissidents. The third was the Civic 
Democratic Alliance (Czech: Občanská demokratická aliance, ODA). The same process took 
place in Slovakia a mere two months later. The VPN was dissolved and transformed into the 
Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (Slovak: Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko, HZDS) led 
by Vladimír Mečiar, which became the leading political party in post-Communist Slovakia. 
The split let to a political crisis in Slovakia when Mečiar and his followers were thrown out of 
the government. The political landscape became more fragmented, more polarised and more 
heterogeneous compared to late 1989 and the early 1990s. 
 Potential for conflict also existed with regard to the devolution of powers to both 
autonomous regions and the issue of self-administration. Even the mere name of the country 
was a source for friction, as described in previous chapters. The Slovak Republic strove for a 
higher degree of autonomy and disengagement239 from the hegemony of Prague. As early as 
June 1990, several federal ministries were dissolved and their powers transferred to the 
autonomous governments, followed by substantial powers in taxation and budgeting. 
Negotiations on the restructuring of powers between the two entities had begun in August 
1990. After much to-ing and fro-ing, the first solutions were found in November, concluding 
with tough, suspenseful parliamentary debates in December 1990: “The Slovak leaders 
threatened with a constitutional crisis […]”. Slovak laws were thus to take priority over 
federal laws. Finally, the bill was accepted with only minor changes. In a survey in November 
1990 only a small minority of the people wanted the country to split into autonomous regions: 
while 12% of people in Czech Republic favoured the division of Czechoslovakia, 16% were 
in favour in Slovakia. 
 Even though the conflict between both entities seemed to have been resolved in the 
winter of 1990, the conflict heated up again during 1991. The new constellation of political 
parties led to further clashes. Protracted negotiati ns failed in the autumn 1991. Even Václav 
Havel240 was not able to mediate successfully. Nevertheless, hi  idea of holding a referendum 
was accepted by parliament; however, this could not be implemented due to Slovak 
resistance241. A further step towards the split of the Czech and Slovak Republics was the 
unequal economic development of the two territories. A resolution to the so-called ‘Slovak 
question’ was forced by, in particular, Mečiar’s circle and SNS members who wanted to 
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promote national Slovak interests while being on a collision course regarding to the new 
government of the Slovak part of the federation, which had been led by the Christian 
Democrat Ján Čarnogurský since Mečiar’s exclusion from the Slovak government following 
the restructuring of political landscape. The elections of June 1992 can thus be seen as the 
final milestone in the dissolution of Czechoslovakia. The result of the elections can be 
regarded as the pre-programming of division.242 Klaus’s ODS became the strongest party in 
the Czech Republic and Mečiar’s HZDS the strongest in Slovakia. The points of conflict 
between Klaus and Mečiar were insurmountable. Klaus advocated a federation model and 
Mečiar a confederation.243 Once both Klaus and Mečiar saw that a compromise could not be 
reached, both pursued the division of Czechoslovakia: Klaus, because he wished to have free 
rein in the configuration of his territory, particularly with regard to his economic policy; and 
Mečiar, because he wished to achieve economic advantages. Havel’s endeavours to 
discourage the division were not successful and he resigned from office on 17 July 1992. On 
the same day the Slovak declaration of independence was adopted. Thus a new president 
could not be elected and a federal interim government was established. 
 Meanwhile, dates for more than ten meetings244 between Klaus and Mečiar were set. 
By the end of October 1992 agreement had finally been reached that regulated most critical 
aspects of the process. On 25 November 1992245 the Federal Assembly ratified the dissolution 
of Czechoslovakia as of 1 January 1993. “The division was carried out peacefully on the basis 
of mutual agreement.”246 Approximately thirty agreements were required between both 
federal governments governing future relations betwe n the two countries. The core points of 
the agreement were: 1) establishment of single market, 2) customs union, 3) monetary union 
and 4) dividing property 2:1 in favour of the Czech Republic. The allocation of land 
ownership remained unresolved. “Thereby the separation took place in a well-arranged and 
legal way, certainly an exceptional phenomenon in the modern history of state units falling 
apart […].”247 Additionally, new democratic constitutions were adopted by 1 January 1993248 
in both, now-separated countries. 
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 The discussion249 about the reasons for the dissolution of Czechoslovakia remains a 
difficult one. On the one hand, experts see the reasons in the history of nation-building in 
Czechoslovakia in 1918, and on the other hand the establishment of Communism is seen as a 
factor in later efforts for independence due to the emergence of the first tensions between 
Czechs and Slovaks within the Communist Party. Furthermore, the ‘Velvet Revolution’ might 
be seen as the third reason for the separation as it led to the establishment of new political 
parties (and new political streams/ideologies) and inequalities in economic development. Both 
the Czech and Slovak Republics had different visions about how the transition should be 
achieved. Worth mentioning is the fact that a majority of neither Czechs nor Slovaks ever 
supported the separation250 of the two entities according to different surveys: “[…] the state 
was actually divided against the wishes of its citizens”, but divided by “the consensus of the 
Czech and Slovak political elites”. 
 
4.3.2.2 The Czech and Slovak Republics Return to Europe and to the International 
Community 
 
The inhabitants of Prague, Bratislava and elsewhere are currently celebrating the tenth 
anniversary of their countries’ accession to the EU; but the foundations for this had been laid 
in 1989 and 1990. Prior to this, Czechoslovakia hadbeen a member of most important 
international organisations such as the United Nations (1945), COMECON (1949), the 
Warsaw Pact (1955) and the entire process of CSCE and OSCE (1973/1975). A new 
dimension of membership in international institutions was reached during and after the 
‘Velvet Revolution’. In 1990 Czechoslovakia joined CEI; one year later the so-called 
Visegrád Group was established. Following Czechoslovakia’s dissolution in 1993, both the 
Czech and Slovak Republics used their new powers to join all previous international 
organisations as separate states, with the exception of COMECON and the Warsaw Pact, 
which had been disbanded. The Czech Republic succeeded in joining further international 
organisations before the Slovak Republic, e.g. the OECD; Slovakia only joined the OECD 
five years later. The Czech Republic also became a ember of NATO five years before the 
Slovak Republic. However, in 1995 both countries joined the WTO at the same time. 2004 
can be regarded as a special year for both the Czech and Slovak Republics, as both became 
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members of the European Community on 1 May and Slovakia also joined NATO. The 
opposite applied in 2009, when only Slovakia became  member of the Eurozone. 
 
Figure 16: Membership of Czechoslovakia and the Czech and Slovak Republics of the most 
important International Organisations 
Date Czech Republic Slovak Republic 
1945 United Nations (as Czechoslovakia) 
1949 COMECON (as Czechoslovakia) 
1955 Warsaw Pact (as Czechoslovakia) 
1973 CSCE (as Czechoslovakia) 
1975 OSCE* (Helsinki Accords) (as Czechoslovakia) 
1990 CEI (as Czechoslovakia) 
1991 Visegrád Group (as ČSFR) 
1993 United Nations 
Visegrád Group 











1999 NATO  
2000  OECD 
2004 EU EU 
NATO 
2009  Eurozone 
* The OSCE was not formally established until 1975 
 
 The Czech and Slovak Republics’ membership in international organisations was 
determined by the Russian threat from the very beginning of their existence in 1993. The 
governments in Prague and Bratislava tried to find a swers to Russia’s hegemony and self-
perception as a global power. The key response to this hegemonic supremacy was regionalism 
by means of integration and co-operation. In particular, the NATO membership of both the 
Czech and Slovak Republics can be judged as the cor anchor of military defence. The 
geopolitical fear of Russia and its desire for terri o ial enlargement can be finally judged to 
have come true: the current issue, the conflict betwe n Ukraine and Russia with regard to 
Crimean Peninsula and the eastern territories of Ukraine, can be seen as evidence of this. This 
trend was fortunately foreseen by Klaus in the 1990s251. Hence, both successor states, the 
Czech and Slovak Republics, responded through membership of different international, sub-
regional and regional bodies so as to embed themselves, firstly politically and secondly 
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economically. In summary, it can be stated that NATO and EU can be considered as the most 
important international organisations for both the Czech and Slovak Republics, followed by 
the Visegrád Group. NATO, the EU and the V4 will thus subsequently be at the centre of 
research, while the CEI and CEFTA will be only briefly presented. 
 First of all, Czechoslovakia joined the Central European Initiative (CEI) in 1990. The 
CEI, founded in November 1989, is a “regional intergovernmental forum committed to 
supporting European integration through cooperation” through the combination of 
“multilateral diplomacy and project management, both as donor and recipient, while bridging 
Europeans macro-regions”252. The CEI’s goals253 are: 1) support for member states on their 
path to EU integration, 2) alignment of member states to EU standards, 3) deepening of co-
operation among member states not only in politics, but also the economy and the 
environment. The CEI also addresses technology, culture and society. However, the regional 
organisation “operates in a flexible manner to promote intergovernmental, inter-parliamentary 
and business cooperation”254. Nevertheless, the CEI does not and did work well for states in 
transition in Central and Eastern Europe; apart from this, the CEI now concentrates on the 
Balkan states. There the CEI can be recognised as an important regional player, but neither for 
the Czech Republic nor for the Slovak Republic due to weak structures and inadequate 
organisation. 
 In late 1992 the Central European Free Trade Agreement was established255 following 
to the Visegrád Declaration of 15 February 1991 andthe Cracow Declaration of 6 October 
1991 by the same group of states that founded the Vis grád Four: the Czech and Slovak 
Republics, Poland and Hungary. The agreement entered into force on 1 March 1993. 
Membership expired on the accession of these countries to European Union in May 2004. 
CEFTA was originally formed as preparation for a country’s path to EU accession. The main 
objectives256 are: 1) co-operation in European economic integration being based on a market 
economy, competition and financial stability, 2) elimination of trade barriers, 3) expansion of 
(global) trade and productivity, 4) improvement of living conditions and employment 
standards. The agreement is a classic free trade treaty focusing solely on economic 
development and relations, to the exclusion of politics. Nevertheless, Article 19 mandates the 
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non-proliferation of NBC weapons. From a European pers ective, membership of CEFTA is 
an important criteria for the future accession to the EU of Central and South European states 
through regional economic development and co-operation leading to stable and peaceful 
conditions: “The speed with which the parties ratified this ambitious agreement indicates the 
importance of this agreement to economic development in the region.”257 Thus the agreement 
is entirely compliant with EU regulations, as well as WTO rules: “Effectively implemented, 
the agreement provides an excellent framework for the Parties to prepare for EU accession, 
thus continuing the tradition of the original CEFTA, whose founding members are now in the 
EU.”258 
 One year before CEFTA was signed, the Visegrád Group was created in 1991 by three 
states: Czechoslovakia/ČSFR, Poland and Hungary. After Czechoslovakia’s dissoluti n its 
successor states the Czech and Slovak Republics suceeded in 1993. The Visegrád Group 
“reflects the efforts of the countries of the Central European region to work together in a 
number of fields of common interests within all-European integration”259. The group was 
founded, on the one hand, due to the strong traditional ties among the aforementioned 
countries, who shared a common Communist heritage and similar culture and values, while 
being territorially and geographically connected to each other and facing similar issues with 
regard to the transition towards a market economy and democracy. The declaration’s 
signatories consider that all states in the Visegrád Group had the same point of departure, thus 
giving the best conditions for the resolution of common problems. On the other hand, the 
Visegrád countries are the core of Central Europe and wished to create a counterpoint to the 
Western European countries, which were already deeply involved in international 
organisations and co-operation with each other. Co-operation between four previous 
Communist states was further seen as a response to th Russian threat. “In the wake of post-
1989 changes, three […] countries decided to forge closer cooperation with the aim of 
‘returning’ to Europe”260, the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak 
Republic assessed. Even though the V4 is an “informal grouping” it is considered to be a 
“living and informal regional structure” that is regarded as a very important sub-regional body 
of political and economic international co-operation, below the EU and NATO. The structures 
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of the V4 can be regarded as dynamic. The current ky goals are: 1) strengthening co-
ordination and consultation in the fields of economy, regional development and culture, 2) 
regional representation of developing democracy and 3) achieving common opinions, options 
and positions with regard to foreign and European policies. The key objectives in 1991 
differed and were tailored with regard to the special needs of countries in transition, such as: 
1) restoration of states’ sovereignty, 2) abolition f Communist structures in the political 
system, 3) support of transition towards parliamentary democracy, 4) establishment of a 
competitive market economy and 5) membership of the “European political, security, 
economic and legal system”261. Slovakia in particular benefits from its membership of the 
Visegrád Group. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany judges 
Slovakia’s membership to be important.262 Slovakia uses this as a platform to coordinate 
positions with regard to NATO and EU. Even though the structures of the V4 “began to 
slacken due to the prevalence of the idea that individual efforts towards accession to the Euro-
Atlantic integration formations will be more efficient”263, Slovakia assessed the work of the 
Visegrád Group positively: “For more than 20 years, regional cooperation of the V4 has 
successfully developed in the intersectoral/interministerial field, e.g. in such areas as the 
economy, infrastructure, energy, cross-border cooperation, cultural exchanges and 
scholarships, coordination of foreign policy positions and pursuance of common interests 
within the EU and vis-à-vis third countries/regions.”264 The V4 was most important in the 
“initial period of existence265”, between 1991 and 1993, when talks with NATO and EU took 
place. The Visegrád Group was resumed in 1998. 
 Apart from this, the two most important membership of the Czech and Slovak 
Republics are the supra-national, inter-governmental bodies of the European Union and the 
transatlantic, inter-governmental military alliance NATO, based on the North Atlantic Treaty. 
In the words of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs: “The most important goals of Slovak 
foreign policy were achieved by means of the country’s integration in European Union and 
NATO” 266. With regard to the Czech Republic, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization can be 
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regarded as a cornerstone of its national security policy.267 However, the road towards 
integration in EU and NATO structures was a rocky one. The Czech Republic became a 
member in NATO seven years after independence, while Slovakia needed to wait more than 
ten years. The belated accession of Slovakia may be explained by the brief, interim period of 
autocracy, led by the “autocratic Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar”268, at the beginning of the 
consolidation process between 1994 and 1998. Slovakia thus fell behind the Czech Republic 
with regard to its political system and the economic development. In that time Slovakia’s 
democracy faced “many setbacks”269. In the further evaluation of ‘Freedom House’: “[…] the 
ruling coalition fought with the opposition over the very rules of the political game [and] the 
process of building the institutions of the new state took place against the backdrop of the 
democratic opposition’s efforts to preserve the degre  of freedom and democracy achieved 
during the initial transition period […]”270. Slovakia’s democratic consolidation actually 
started in the post-1998 era under Mikuláš Dzurinda, who brought the country to successful 
negotiations on accession to the EU and NATO, which did not occur under Mečiar’s 
autocratic leadership. Freedom House labelled Dzurinda’s premiership a “turning point”271. 
While the Czech Republic joined NATO in the first wave of post-Cold War enlargement, 
Slovakia was supposed to join in the second wave. Prague’s accession to NATO can be 
considered recognition of the country’s successful consolidation. As mentioned previously in 
the chapter about the GDR’s accession to NATO, the international organisation found itself 
being embedded in a new political and military environment after the fall of the Berlin Wall 
and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. The end of the Cold War “opened up the possibility 
of further NATO enlargement”272. Thus the accession of the Czech and Slovak Republics was 
a direct consequence of the upheavals in previous Communist countries and their transition 
towards democracy. In a process comparable to the debate in Germany on the accession of the 
territory of the GDR to NATO, the possible membership of the Czech and Slovak Republics 
also led to public discussion. The modality and timeframe of the accession were of particular 
importance: “[…] Czech and Slovak leaders began a campaign to join existing European and 
transatlantic institutions” in the early 1990s, and thus “the EU and NATO were main targets 
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of these efforts”273. While Slovakia’s accession to NATO and the EU was determined by 
particular politicians, the Czech Republic did not depend on such personalities to join NATO 
and the EU, even though Václav Klaus, who held office of Prime Minister between 1992 and 
1998, is not known as an adherent of the European Union and its structures. However, Klaus, 
who continues to be a vocal critic of the EU, is an European; this is what distinguishes Klaus 
from Mečiar. Another great European was leading the Czech Republic at that time: Václav 
Havel, President of the Czech Republic between 1993 and 2003. Nevertheless, the Czech 
Republic’s accession to the NATO was of greater priority for both Havel and Klaus. As a 
consequence the Czech Republic was invited, together with Hungary and Poland, to begin 
accession talks at the NATO summit in Madrid in 1997. Two years previously the Alliance 
had published “the results of a Study on NATO Enlargement that considered the merits of 
admitting new members and how they should be brought in”274. The study can be seen as a 
milestone on the road to accession to NATO: “The Study further concluded that enlargement 
would contribute to enhanced stability and security for all countries in the Euro-Atlantic area 
by encouraging and supporting democratic reforms, including the establishment of civilian 
and democratic control over military forces; fostering patterns and habits of cooperation, 
consultation and consensus-building characteristic of relations among members of the 
Alliance; and promoting good-neighbourly relations.”275 The end of the Cold War was thus 
considered an opportunity to improve security and stability within the region. According to 
the study the formal requirements276 for NATO accession negotiations were: 1) functioning 
democratic structures, 2) market economy, 3) recogniti n of minorities, 4) peaceful resolution 
of disputes, 5) capacity for a military contribution to NATO operations and 6) commitment to 
civil/military relations and institutional structures. Before negotiations took place, NATO 
took five key approaches277 to former Warsaw Pact states: 1) internal change/transformation 
of NATO structures according to the new political and military conditions, 2) building 
partnerships and co-operation, 3) establishment of “regular diplomatic liaisons”, 4) reduction 
of distrust and 5) establishment of meetings, summits, talks and dialogues. The Czech 
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Republic’s objectives278 in NATO are to: 1) fulfil the North Atlantic Treaty, 2) protect 
members’ freedom and security by political and military means, 3) promote democracy and 
its values, 4) recognise liberty, the rule of law and the peaceful resolution of conflicts. In a 
survey in 2001279, two years after accession, 70% of Czechs were in favour of Prague’s 
accession to NATO, with 24% against. Russia, on the o r hand, was against the accession of 
the Czech Republic to NATO, regarding which Václav Havel said (2001): “Lack of the 
natural self-confidence of an entity that is sure of its identity, and thus also of its boundaries, 
seems to be replaced by a slightly imperialistic rhetoric accompanied by nationalist bombast, 
which we know so well from people like Mr. Zhirinovsky, but which appears in Russia in a 
more cultured form on a much wider scale. For example, I find it almost absurd that such a 
large and powerful country should be alarmed by the prospect of three small democratic 
republics at its borders joining a regional grouping which it does not control […].”280 Havel 
always wanted to show that Prague’s accession to NATO was not in opposition to Russia, 
while promoting the internal transformation of NATO and the CSCE as the most stable 
foundation for future talks.281 In the early 1990s Havel also said the following: “We know that 
for many different reasons we cannot become full memb rs of NATO at present. At the same 
time, however, we feel that an alliance of countries united by a commitment to the ideal of 
freedom and democracy should not remain permanently closed to neighbouring countries 
which are pursuing the same goals. History has taught s that certain values are indivisible; if 
they are threatened in one place, they are directly or indirectly threatened everywhere.”282 
Following the Alliance’s experience in accession negotiations of the first wave of NATO’s 
post-Cold War enlargement, the so-called Membership Action Plan (MAP) was launched at 
the Washington Summit in April 1999. This had been stablished to support countries with 
their preparations for their future accession. Slovakia thus participated in the MAP along with 
six other countries. Slovakia joined accession talks t the Prague Summit (2002). Two years 
later, on 29 March 2004, Slovakia became a member of NATO, “making this the largest wave 
of enlargement in NATO history”283. Slovakia sees its NATO membership as the “main 
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guarantee of [national] security”284. Bratislava’s key objectives285 in NATO are to: 1) 
maintain strong trans-Atlantic links and active participation, 2) achieve success and the 
effective functioning of structures, resources and capabilities, 3) maintain peace and stability, 
4) prevent conflicts through the “advancement of a deeper partnership and cooperation 
between the EU and NATO in the area of crisis management”, 5) strengthen of joint defence 
commitments and 6) develop strategic concepts. 
 With regard to the accession of the Czech and Slovak Republics to the European 
Union, five different chronological dimensions286 according to Lippert/Becker have to be 
mentioned: 1) initial stage of bilateral agreements with regard to trade and economic co-
operation in 1989, including the establishment of PHARE (transfer of know-how and 
democracy programme), 2) first round of ‘cumbersome’ Europe Agreements in December 
1991, such as the prospects for EU membership, “asymmetrically scheduled opening of 
markets” with regard to a free trade area for industrial goods, rules regarding freedom of 
movement, co-operation in economic matters and institutionalised political dialogue, 3) two-
level clarification of qualitative future membership requirements in June 1993 for associate 
members (stability of democratic institutions, rule of law, recognition of human rights, 
protection of minorities and functioning market economy based on competition) and towards 
the EU itself (“the Union’s capacity to absorb new members, while maintaining the 
momentum of European Integration […]”), 4) the “pre-accession strategy” (influenced by a 
re-launch of PHARE) in December 1994 consisted of tw  paths: (a) European Agreements as 
a bilateral track covering economic pre-accession and (b) “structured relations with the 
institutions of the Union as the multilateral track” overing political pre-accession, and 5) an 
informal questionnaire in April 1996 to all applicant countries as part of ‘Agenda 2000’ 
launched in July 1997. The negotiated European agreements towards ČSFR membership 
concluded in 1991 and entered into force in the now-divided Czech and Slovak Republics in 
1995, “whereas provisions on trade and related aspect  had already taken effect in March 
1992 […]”. The European Community was surprised the by rapidity of upheavals in Central 
and Eastern Europe. The EC was thus not prepared to r -establish Europe. The EU’s approach 
during Europe’s restructuring was judged to be “dilatory, technical and ad hoc rather than as 
determined and coherent”. In March 1998 the EU opened accession talks with the Czech 
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Republic and, in February 2000, with the Slovak Republic.287 “The perspective of EU-
membership likewise deeply affects the internal order and political-administrative 
‘constitution’ of the new democracies.”288 The domestic-level theory focusing on regime type 
and democratisation is the underlying theoretical assumption of a correlation between 
transition and consolidation of democracy, as well as European integration as component of 
regionalism: “[…] the EU is regarded as a relevant external actor that tries to influence the 
path of transformation by setting strategic objectives (free trade area, membership), conditions 
(provisions in Association/European agreements), membership criteria) and by giving 
political and financial assistance and incentives (PHARE; privileged cooperation and 
consultation e.g. through structured dialogue).”289 The Czech and Slovak Republics’ EU 
integration was embedded in an international context and can be evaluated as an enhanced 
factor in the consolidation of both democratic and economic systems. Transformation, or 
rather consolidation, and EU integration are two roted components, determining each other. 
Three levels of EU implementation have to be considere : 1) political and legal, 2) 
institutional and administrative and 3) economic and business. 
 The Czech Republic, part of the so-called Luxembourg Group, applied for EU 
membership on 17 January 1996 and Slovakia (part of the Helsinki Group) on 27 June 
1995.290 Bratislava’s accession to the EU was endangered following the country’s step 
backwards with regard to the consolidation of democracy.291 Prague always had an 
ambivalent perspective on EU accession. Klaus knew about the advantages that Europe would 
bring to his country, even though he had never been sure about the timetable of the Czech 
Republic’s membership. Klaus also wished to achieve a “velvet revolution”292 in the EU. In 
his view, the entry of the Czech Republic would influence EU’s nature, stopping a shift of 
“socialism from the West to the East”293. After its experience with Communism, Prague has 
always been afraid of the influence of external powers. Nevertheless, the Czech Republic’s 
transformation strategy is “partly legitimized by […] indivisible from the ‘return to 
Europe’”294. Four so-called joint bodies295 were used to implement the Europe Agreement: 1) 
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the Association Council, 2) the Association Committee, 3) subcommittees and 4) the 
Parliamentary Association Committee. Furthermore, ev ry country took a different approach 
to accession negotiations. Usually the process was embedded in institutionalised structures led 
by mediators from the EU and the country in question.296  
 The accession of Prague and Bratislava to the EU must be considered a gradual 
process, concluding with full, official EU membership in 2004 as part of the fourth, and 
biggest, enlargement of the European Union. The EU membership of the Czech and Slovak 
Republics can be seen as a milestone and as a succes  story, both political and economical. In 
the Slovak Republic, the GDP grew four times in a row after 2004 and the unemployment rate 
decreased five times in a row, while the rate of inflation remained relatively low and stable. 
Politically, the negotiations that started in 2000 and concluded in 2002, boosted Bratislava’s 
democratic performance. In 1998, the EU judged thatSlovakia did not meet the political 
criteria for accession. Four years later the country fulfilled the same criteria. Two years later, 
Slovakia became a fully-fledged member state of the European Union as a well-consolidated 
democracy thanks to Dzurinda’s reforms. In the words of Freedom House: “The successful 
negotiations came during a period of democratic consolidation that began in 1998. As a sign 
of the country’s political maturity, Slovakia made important progress during this time despite 
being ruled by a broad coalition of parties that often bickered over ideology and policy 
priorities.”297 Similar phenomena could be observed in the Czech Republic: the 
unemployment rate decreased five times in a row and GDP grew three times in a row, while 
the rate of inflation also remained stable and low. According to Freedom House: “Thanks to 
government policies and imminent EU membership, the Cz ch economy has experienced a 
boost in direct foreign investment.”298 Freedom House also attested that Prague’s EU 
membership came about due to “the country’s hard work” 299. In 2004, fourteen years after the 
‘Velvet Revolution’, “the Czech Republic has reached an important stage in the development 
of its democracy”300. 
 The accession of the Czech and Slovak Republics to the EU was concluded at the 
Copenhagen Summit on 12-13 December 2002, where the membership of ten states was 
                                                                                                                                              
295 Comp. Lippert, Barbara/Becker, Peter (editors): Ib., p. 110-113. 
296 Comp. Lippert, Barbara/Umbach, Gaby: The Pressure of Europeanisation. From Post-Communist State 
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297 Freedom House: Nations in Transit, Slovakia (2003), ib., retrieved on 4 May 2014. 
298 Freedom House: Nations in Transit, Czech Republic (2004), viewed on 
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299 Freedom House: Nations in Transit, Czech Republic (2003), viewed on 
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accepted. On 9 April 2003 the European Parliament clearly301 voted in favour of EU 
enlargement: 458 members of the parliament voted in favour of enlargement, 68 against and 
41 abstained. The European Parliament vote was followed by referendums in each of the ten 
future member states. On 16-17 May 2003302 the people of Slovakia voted in favour of 
accession to the EU: 92.46% voted for membership, wth voter turnout of 52.15%. The 
referendum in the Czech Republic took place on 13-14 June 2003303: 77.33% voted in favour 
of EU accession, with voter turnout of 55.21%. It is worth mentioning that the Treaty of 
Accession was signed by all future member states on 16 April 2003 in Athens304, i.e. before 
the referendum was held in the Czech Republic. Prague’s key objectives in EU305 are to: 1) 
provide assistance with regard to economic development in the context of single market, 2) 
safeguard south-eastern and eastern European enlargement and neighbourhood policy, 3) 
protect the Czech Republic’s and the Union’s relations with the USA. Slovakia’s key 
objectives in EU306 are to: 1) deepen European integration and common foreign and security 
policy, 2) provide assistance with regard to economic and social development, 3) introduce 
the Euro currency (successfully achieved in 2009), 4) assist with environmental protection, 5) 
fill higher managerial positions within the EU, 6) support the decision-making process and 
multi-annual strategic EU issues. “Slovakia’s performance in the EU was marked by the 
continuing effort to achieve further integration into European structures.”307 
 In conclusion, there is a clearly visible link betw en regional integration and 
transition. Complex cause-and-effect relations308 can be found; both regionalisation and the 
transition to democracy occur at the same time. Lippert/Umbach called this process “double 
transformation”309. They also speak about a “EU adaptation pressure” that “increases with the 
degree of institutional incompatibilities”310. The pressure should be stronger in candidate 
countries, leading to domestic change with regard to political conditions. Nevertheless, the so-
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Two different terms are key to the recent history of the German Democratic Republic, 
Czechoslovakia and their successor states: the ‘Peaceful Revolution’ with regard to East 
Germany and the ‘Velvet Revolution’ with regard to Czechoslovakia. Even though two 
different words are used, both revolutions stand for a common event: the dissolution of the 
autocratic Communist regime and the transition towards democratic consolidation and a 
market economy. Despite all similarities in the bigger picture, considerable distinctions can be 
drawn between the aforementioned countries. Six core reasons can be determined with regard 
to the end of the hegemony of SED in the German Democratic Republic: 1) electoral fraud, 2) 
the ‘exit’ to West Germany, 3) mass demonstrations (‘voice’), 4) economic crash, 5) political 
changes in the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries, 6) loss of transfer benefits and 
financial assistance from West Germany. Thus, the end of the GDR’s autocratic system was 
due to internal and external factors. Only two major reasons can be found with regard to the 
end of the ‘old’ political system in Czechoslovakia: 1) mass demonstrations (‘voice’) and 2) 
changed international conditions. These two internal a d external reasons must be considered 
valid factors in the end of the autocratic system in both the GDR and Czechoslovakia. 
Nevertheless, the external factors with regard to the GDR were deeply connected to West 
Germany, while in the case of Czechoslovakia they wre more connected to the Soviet Union 
and Warsaw Pact. Thus all four theoretical continuous f rms could be recognised in the GDR, 
and only the first three (controlled change, forced hange, negotiations) could be found in 
Czechoslovakia. Both countries were facing economic problems; nevertheless, this was a 
bigger issue in East Germany than in Czechoslovakia. Mass demonstrations took place in East 
Germany before they began in Czechoslovakia. The first so-called mass demonstrations began 
on 7 October 1989. Only two days later, on 9 October, approximately 70,000 people took to 
the streets in Leipzig. The first mass protests in Bratislava and Prague took place on 16-17 
November 1989. The upheavals in Czechoslovakia are deeply connected to the situation in the 
GDR: the populace was influenced by East Germany’s ma s demonstrations and furthermore 
by refugees waiting in the West German embassy in Prague. With regard to opposition 
movements, Czechoslovakia can be judged as forerunn: Charta 77 was founded in 1977, 
                                                
311 Ib., p. 22. 
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while the first GDR opposition movement, the ‘Berlin Appeal’, was founded five years later. 
In the GDR the churches played a major role during mass demonstrations, but not in 
Czechoslovakia. 
 The democratisation process in Czechoslovakia began on 24 November 1989, or even 
slightly before, only a few days after the first mass demonstrations. The starting-point for 
democratisation in East Germany was long before this, with the recognition of electoral fraud 
on 7 May 1989. Thus, recognition of electoral fraud can be judged both a reason for the end 
of the autocratic system and beginning of the democratisation process. The further process of 
democratisation was characterised in both countries by a rapid change of the political elite. 
This change at first took place much more rapidly in Czechoslovakia than in Germany, but 
slowed down after the initial wave. Seven weeks passed between the dismissal of Erich 
Honecker on 18 October 1989 and the appointment of the first non-Communist leader, 
Manfred Gerlach, on 6 December 1989 and exactly five months between the dismissal of 
Honecker and the first and only free elections in the GDR, which were held on 18 March 
1990. Slightly more than five weeks passed in Czechoslovakia between the resignation of 
Jakeš on 24 November 1989 and the appointment of the government of national 
understanding on 10 December 1989 and six and a half months between Jakeš and the first 
free elections. 18 March 1990 marked the end of democratisation in East Germany, 8-9 June 
1990 in Czechoslovakia (or, Czech and Slovak Federal Republic). The process of 
democratisation in East Germany was highly influenced by external players such as West 
Germany, the Soviet Union, the USA, France and Great Britain, as well as NATO; and in 
Czechoslovakia only by the Soviet Union. 
 With regard to the consolidation of democracy, the processes that took place in the 
two countries were quite distinct due to the widely differing conditions in Czechoslovakia and 
the German Democratic Republic and their successor states. While the GDR was absorbed by 
the structures of the Federal Republic almost overnight, the political and economic 
consolidation in the Czech and Slovak Republics following the dissolution of Czechoslovakia 
lasted for decades. East Germany was at an advantage due to its transition into a functioning 
market economy based on well-established democratic elements such as a party political 
system, political culture and membership of regional and sub-regional bodies such as NATO 
and the European Union. On the other hand, the Czech and Slovak Republics did not have a 
‘big brother’ leading them into democracy. All elemnts needed to be created and developed 
on their own terms. This evaluation can be clarified by taking a look at integration into 
regional organisations: East Germany became an integral part of NATO and EU immediately 
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after reunification, virtually overnight. While the concrete implementation remained initially 
unclear, it was resolved over the next few years. The accession of the Czech and Slovak 
Republics to international organisations, for example CEFTA, began immediately after the 
dissolution of Czechoslovakia, even though the road to accession to NATO and the EU 
remained long and rocky. Prague became a member of NATO structures in 1999 (nine years 
after East Germany) and Bratislava in 2004 (fourteen y ars after East Germany). Both 
countries acceded to the European Union at the sametime, fourteen years after the territory of 
East Germany acceded. The Euro was adopted by Germany in 1999 and in Slovakia ten years 
later, while it has not yet been adopted by the Czech Republic.  
 Economic development can be evaluated as ambivalent in all three successor states. 
On the one hand, the new German federal states, as well as the Czech and Slovak Republics, 
shared common economic problems with regard to unemploy ent rate. On the other hand, the 
growth of inflation and the growth, or rather negative growth, of GDP can be taken as a huge 
distinction between them. In the first years after he reunification of Germany, the 
unemployment rate in the eastern territories increased dramatically from 10.2% (1991) to 
19.2% (1998) and 20.1% (2003). The Slovak Republic fa ed similar problems: the 
unemployment rate increased from 11.1% (1991) to 16.4% (1999) and then to 19.3 (2001); 
however, the unemployment rate remained relatively low in the Czech Republic, even though 
it increased moderately from 2.3% (1991) to 6.5% (1998) and 8.8% (2000). The development 
of the rate of inflation has to be seen as dramatic; especially Prague experienced several 
intermittent leaps. In the Czech Republic the inflation rate increased from 9.7% to 56.6% 
between 1990 and 1991, before decreasing to 11.1% in 1992, then reaching 20.8% in 1993, 
and falling back to 10.0% one year later. Compared to the Czech Republic, the rate of 
inflation in the Slovak Republic remained relatively moderate and stable at between 13.4% 
(1994) and 12.0% (2000). East Germany also faced a r latively moderate inflation in the first 
two years following reunification: 13.4% in 1992 and 10.6% in 1993, before decreasing to a 
stable, low level of 3.6% in 1994. East Germany’s rate of inflation in the first two years can 
be compared to Slovakia’s performance in the first years after the dissolution of 
Czechoslovakia. Nevertheless, a high inflation ratehas never been a big issue in the East of 
Germany. Significant distinctions between all three successor states can be found when one 
takes a look at GDP growth. While East Germany experienced a rapid, stable GDP growth to 
a high level of between 8% and 9% in the first three y ars after reunification, the Slovak 
Republic was facing a minus growth in 1993, the first year after Czechoslovakia’s dissolution, 
while the Czech Republic showed a weak growth of +1.2% in 1993. The further development 
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of Prague’s GDP growth remained moderate, but stable. Not so in East Germany: GDP 
growth slowed to +1.6% (1996), stuttered along betwe n +1.5% (1999), -0.4% (2003) and 
+0.7% (2005). 
 Further geopolitical aspects must be mentioned and evaluated: firstly, a common 
feature of all the aforementioned countries is their origin. Both East Germany and 
Czechoslovakia were founded on the aftermath of World War Two. Compared to the previous 
German dictatorship, the Third Reich, the Socialism in the German Democratic Republic was 
not a German dictatorship, but a dictatorship on German territory. The same statement applies 
to Czechoslovakia: Communism was neither a Czech nor a Slovak dictatorship, but a 
dictatorship on their territories. Both countries further shared similar geopolitical features 
with regard to their position in Central Europe. The GDR and Czechoslovakia had common 
borders with West Germany and with Poland; both countries were connected (and separated) 
by a common border. Population exchange took place regularly. Additionally, both the GDR 
and Czechoslovakia experienced two turning points during the Communist era: Berlin 1953 
and Prague 1968. Both dates significantly determined the future development of the 
dictatorship. Finally, as a late result of World War Two, both states, the German Democratic 
Republic and Czechoslovakia, were dissolved: one in 1990, the other on by the end of 1992. 
This similarity at the same time led to a distinction: the dissolution of the GDR did not result 
in the emergence of a new country, but the dissolution of Czechoslovakia resulted in the 
emergence of two new states: the Czech and Slovak Republics. 
 Further elements worth mentioning are the current attitudes of political parties and the 
populace with regard to their countries’ membership of international, regional and sub-
regional organisations. The current political situation in Germany can be viewed as a wide 
consensus on Germany’s integration processes. All established political parties agree with 
Germany’s engagement in the country’s membership of several organisations. Within the 
established parties only The Left represents ‘soft’ Euroscepticism. The Left rejects the Treaty 
of Lisbon as a base for further European integration312; furthermore, the former Communist 
Party of East Germany advocates the dissolution of NATO313. Another established party, the 
Christian Social Union in Bavaria (German: Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern, CSU) also 
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advocates ‘soft’ Euroscepticism. ‘Hard’314 Euroscepticism can only be found among non-
established political parties in the radical right-wing spectrum, such as the National 
Democratic Party of Germany (German: Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands, NPD), 
The Republicans (German: Die Republikaner, REP) and the newly-emerged Alternative for 
Germany (German: Alternative für Deutschland, AfD), which currently has a real chance of 
gaining seats in the European Parliament for the first time. 
 The party political system in the Czech Republic can be seen as highly polarised315 
with regard to Euroscepticism. While the Czech Social Democratic Party (Czech: Česká 
strana sociálně demokratická, ČSSD), the KDU-ČSL and Tradition/Responsibility/Prosperity 
(Czech: Tradice, odpovědnost, prosperita, TOP 09) stand for a moderate pro-European 
attitude, the ODS is an adherent of ‘soft’316 Euroscepticism in the Czech Republic, while 
supporting membership of NATO (along with the Social Democrats and KDU-ČSL)317, as 
well as the Action of Dissatisfied Citizens (Czech: Akce nespokojených občanů, ANO)318, as 
far as can be judged. The Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (Czech: Komunistická 
strana Čech a Moravy, KSČM), along with the Dawn of Direct Democracy (Czech: Úsvit 
přímé demokracie, Úsvit), represent ‘hard’319 Euroscepticism. The Communist Party further 
advocates the dissolution of NATO structures320. 
 The situation in the Slovak Republic can be described as follows: the most important 
anti-European movement in Slovakia is represented by the Slovak National Party321, which 
advocates ‘hard’ Euroscepticism. The KDH322, on the other hand, advocates ‘soft’ 
Euroscepticism, while the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union-Democratic Party (Slovak: 
Slovenská demokratická a kresťanská únia – Demokratická strana, SDKÚ-DS) can be judged 
as an adherent of NATO323 and moderate pro-Europeanism324. One pro-European party that 
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also supports membership of NATO are the Social Democrats325 (Slovak: SMER – sociálna 
demokracia, SMER-SD). Euroscepticism has never been a major issue in Slovakia, and more 
in the Czech Republic: “Slovakia, unlike the Czech Republic – above all in person of 
President Václav Klaus, did not exhibit open, party-based Euro-scepticism, nor would the 




While many things have already been said about the topic, some puzzles still remain. The 
focus of the author in writing this thesis was on the description of the transition in the German 
Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia and their successor states. The end of the autocratic 
system, the process of democratisation and the political consolidation with regard to 
democracy, economy and regional integration was present d, embedded in a historical-
descriptive approach based on theorisation, analysis and evaluation. Thus the underlying 
theoretical assumptions, especially the domestic-level theory, must be judged as valid 
following practical examination. Nevertheless, what s not been in the focus of research yet 
is: what did and do people in Germany and the Czech and Slovak Republics think about their 
country’s membership of international structures such as the European Union? How does the 
populace judge it? A majority of the German populace agrees with their country’s 
membership of the European Union according to Eurobarometer surveys. In autumn 2004, the 
year of the Czech and Slovak Republics’ accession to the EU, 60% of the populace saw 
Germany’s EU membership as “a good thing”, 45% said that the Czech Republic’s 
membership “is a good thing”, while 57% in Slovakia were of the opinion that their country’s 
membership is a “good thing”.327 Two years later, public opinion on the same question 
improved in the Czech (51%) and Slovak (61%) Republics, while acceptance was lower in 
Germany (58%).328 In autumn 2008 public opinion in Germany (64%) and Slovakia (62%) 
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325 Comp. Kleine Zeitung: Sternstunde der Euro-Freunde, viewed on 
http://www.kleinezeitung.at/nachrichten/politik/eu/2968127/sternstunden-euro-freunde.story, retrieved on 9 May 
2014. 
326 Gyarfasova, Olga: EU ante portas or is there a new Division Line in Slovak Politics?, in: Österreichische 
Zeitung für Politikwissenschaft, Vol. 42, No. 3 (2013), p. 279-293, viewed on http://www.oezp.at/pdfs/2013_3-
3-Gyarfasova.pdf, p. 281, retrieved on 9 May 2014. 
327 Comp. European Commission: Standard Eurobarometer. Eurobarometer 62. Public Opinion in the European 
Union, p. 68, viewed on http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb62/eb_62.de.pdf, retrieved on 9 May 
2014. 
328 Comp. European Commission: Standard Eurobarometer. Eurobarometer 66. Public Opinion in the European 
Union, p. 7, viewed on http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb66/eb66_highlights_en.pdf, retrieved on 
9 May 2014.  
99 
 
improved, while the acceptance in the Czech Republic decreased by five percentage points to 
46%.329 In 2002, two years before the accession of the Czech and Slovak Republics to the EU, 
43% in the Czech Republic and 58% in Slovakia said that EU membership is a “good 
thing”.330 
 Nowadays, all three countries – Germany, the Czech and Slovak Republics – are a 
integral part of the European Union and NATO. Germany has taken a leading role in EU 
structures. Politically, Germany fulfils a key function due to its reputation with regard to 
foreign policy; economically, Germany is seen as the driving force due to its prosperity. 
Compared to Germany, the Czech and Slovak Republics can play only a minor role in the 
European family due to being smaller countries, with smaller populations, and hence limited 
power. Nevertheless, the development of the GDR, the Czechoslovakia and thus the Czech 
and Slovak Republics and the new federal states in Germany can be seen as a success story, 
even though Slovakia’s consolidation started late. Today, the consolidation in all these 
aforementioned countries can be judged to have concluded. Of course, some aspects still 
function as witnesses of the past. Whilst taking into account the development of the political 
party system, the landscape of political parties show typical post-Communist structures in the 
successor states: Communist successor parties remain strong and influential in Germany and 
the Czech Republic, while radical right-wing political parties rule Slovakia. On the other 
hand, almost every year sees the emergence of new – or the dissolution of old – political 
parties in the Czech and Slovak Republics. The shifting of votes in elections remains chaotic, 
and voter turnout is relatively weak in the successor states of Czechoslovakia, as well as in 
East Germany. Nevertheless, a political phenomenon such as the meteoric rise of the Czech 
political party ANO could never happen in Germany, where the political party system is well-
consolidated. Both, ‘Freedom House’ and the ‘Bertelsmann Transformation Index’ indicate 
that the Czech and Slovak Republics’ democracies ar consolidated. ‘Freedom House’ on the 
Czech Republic: “The institutions of governance in the Czech Republic are stable and 
democratic.”331 On a list consisting of 128 states in transition othe ‘Bertelsmann 
Transformation Index’, the Czech Republic is placed second and the Slovak Republic 
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ninth.332 “Slovakia has consolidated democratic and market economy structures“333, 
Bertelsmann concluded. To give a brief outlook, the future main challenges for Germany, the 
Czech and Slovak Republics might be found in the final resolution of the global financial and 
economic crisis, as well as the stabilisation of the Euro. The possible rise of Eurosceptic 
parties in the next EU parliamentary election could lead to a new internal conflict amongst the 
states of Europe. The refugee problem could become a significant internal and external 
problem, especially for Germany. The prospects of NATO could be a problem with regard to 
foreign affairs due to different perceptions of theregional organisation in Europe and beyond: 
while NATO’s member states view the military alliance as a regional organisation 
maintaining peace and stability, Russia considers NATO to be an organisation promoting 
military aggression.334 
 The thesis opened with a statement of Václav Havel nd it will be closed by him: “We 
may all be different, but we are all in the same boat. We can fight for our places and means of 
coexistence on this boat, but we also can agree on them peacefully. I understand European 
unity as a magnanimous attempt to choose the second of these possibilities, and to give 
Europe for the first time in its history the kind of order that would grow out of the free will of 
everyone, and be based on mutual agreement and a common longing for peace and 
cooperation. It would be a stable and solid order, one based not merely on military and 
political treaties, which anyone can break or ignore at will, but on such a close cooperation 
between European nations and citizens that it would limit, if not exclude, the possibility of 
new conflicts. This is not a mere dream.”335  
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Figure 1: Relocations from the German Democratic Republic to the Federal Republic of 
Germany 1981-1990 
 Relocations to West 
Germany (according 
to West Germany) 
 
Approved relocations 
Relocations to West 
Germany (according 
to East Germany) 
1990* 250,000 0 238,384 
1989 343,854 101,947 203,116 
1988 39,832 27,939 0 
1987 18,958 11,459 0 
1986 26,178 19,982 0 
1985 24,912 18,752 0 
1984 40,974 34,982 0 
1983 11,343 7,729 9,154 
1982 13,208 9,113 11,118 
1981 15,433 11,093 13,166 
Total 784,692 242,996 474,938 
* estimated indication 
 
 
Figure 2: Alphabetical List of Mass Demonstrations with Large Attendance on the Territory 
of the GDR in 1989/1990 
City Date Number of Demonstrators* 
Berlin 4 November 1989 500,000 
Dresden 8 October 1989 20,000 
 23 October 1989 100,000 
 15 January 1990 150,000 
Halle 20 November 1989 100,000 
Karl-Marx-Stadt 6 November 1989 100,000 
Leipzig 9 October 1989 70,000 
 16 October 1989 110,000 
 23 October 1989 225,000 
 30 October 1989 350,000 
 6 November 1989 500,000 
Magdeburg 6 November 1989 80,000 
Plauen 21 October 1989 50,000 
Schwerin 30 October 1989 80,000 
* Number of demonstrators is approximate. 
 
 
Figure 3: Key Figures of Economic Development in the GDR 1987-1989 
 1987 1988 1989 
External Debts (in 
billion US-Dollars) 
16.8 18.5 - 
GDP (in billion GDR 
Marks) 
332.81 346.13 353.34 
Growth Rate of GDP 
(in %) 
2.5 2.8 2.3 
112 
 
Figure 4: Development of Unemployment Rate in West Germany (excluding Berlin) and East 
Germany (including Berlin), as well as Germany as a whole, based on Dependent Civil 
Labour Force 1990-2013 in percentages 
Year West Germany East Germany Germany 
1991 6.2 10.2 7.3 
1992 6.4 14.4 8.5 
1993 8.0 15.4 9.8 
1994 9.0 15.7 10.6 
1995 9.1 14.8 10.4 
1996 9.9 16.6 11.5 
1997 10.8 19.1 12.7 
1998 10.3 19.2 12.3 
1999 9.6 18.7 11.7 
2000 8.4 18.5 10.7 
2001 8.0 18.8 10.3 
2002 8.5 19.2 10.8 
2003 9.3 20.1 11.6 
2004 9.4 20.1 11.7 
2005 11.0 20.6 13.0 
2006 10.2 19.2 12.0 
2007 8.3 16.7 10.1 
2008 7.2 14.6 8.7 
2009 7.7 14.5 9.1 
2010 7.4 13.4 8.6 
2011 6.7 12.6 7.9 
2012 6.6 11.9 7.6 





Figure 5: Development of Unemployment Rate in East Germany and Berlin based on 
















1991 12.5   10.3   10.6   10.3   10.2   9.1   
1992 16.8   14.8   12.4   15.3   15.4   13.6   
1993 17.5   15.3   12.8   17.2   16.3   14.9   
1994 17.0   15.3   13.2   17.6   16.5   15.7   
1995 16.1   14.2   13.6   16.5   15.0   14.4   
1996 18.0   16.2   15.2   18.8   16.7   15.9   
1997 20.3   18.9   17.3   21.7   19.1   18.4   
1998 20.5   18.8   17.9   21.7   18.3   18.8   
1999 19.4   18.7   17.7   21.7   16.5   18.6   
2000 19.0   18.4   17.6   21.4   16.5   18.5   
2001 19.6   18.8   17.9   20.9   16.5   19.0   
2002 20.0   19.1   18.9   20.9   17.2   19.3   
2003 21.7   20.4   20.2   21.8   18.1   19.4   
2004 22.1   20.3   19.9   21.7   18.1   19.4   
2005 22.1   19.9   21.5   21.7   18.6   20.0   
2006 20.8   18.7   20.1   19.9   17.0   18.8   
2007 18.1   16.4   17.9   17.4   14.4   16.3   
2008 15.5   14.4   16.1   15.2   12.3   14.3   
2009 14.9   13.6   16.4   14.8   12.6   14.3   
2010 14.0   12.4   15.8   13.5   10.9   13.1   
2011 13.8   11.9   15.5   12.5   9.8   11.8   
2012 13.2   11.3   14.5   12.4   9.4   10.9   
2013 12.9   11.0   13.9   12.1   9.1   10.5   
 
 
Figure 6: Comparison of Net Migration Development in East Germany 1990/2008 






Berlin 3.43 3.43 -0.1 
Brandenburg 2.58 2.52 -2.2 
Saxony 4.76 4.19 -12.0 
Thuringia 2.61 2.27 -13.2 
Mecklenburg-
Western Pomerania 
1.92 1.66 -13.5 
Saxony-Anhalt 2.87 2.38 -17.1 
West Germany 
(without East Berlin) 








Figure 7: Development of Gross Domestic Product compared to the previous year in West 
Germany (excluding Berlin), East Germany (including Berlin) and Germany as a whole 1992-
2013 (in real terms and concatenated) in percentages 
Year West Germany East Germany Germany 
1992 1.1 8.1 1.9 
1993 -2.5 9.2 -1.0 
1994 1.5 8.6 2.5 
1995 1.1 4.8 1.7 
1996 0.6 1.6 0.8 
1997 1.9 0.7 1.7 
1998 2.1 0.5 1.9 
1999 2.0 1.5 1.9 
2000 3.4 1.0 3.1 
2001 1.8 0.2 1.5 
2002 0.0 0.0 0.0 
2003 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 
2004 1.2 0.9 1.2 
2005 0.7 0.7 0.7 
2006 3.8 3.4 3.7 
2007 3.4 2.8 3.3 
2008 1.1 1.3 1.1 
2009 -5.5 -3.3 -5.2 
2010 4.2 3.0 4.0 
2011 3.6 1.9 3.3 
2012 0.8 0.2 0.7 





Figure 8: Development of Gross Domestic Product (in real terms and concatenated) 















1992 9.1 8.7 9.6 9.8 18.0 
1993 12.7 10.5 13.0 13.1 13.3 
1994 11.3 11.4 13.0 10.6 12.4 
1995 7.4 7.3 7.8 3.9 3.4 
1996 3.5 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.8 
1997 2.5 1.8 -0.1 2.9 3.3 
1998 1.0 -0.5 0.8 0.3 1.5 
1999 4.1 2.4 1.5 1.5 2.5 
2000 2.7 -0.2 0.1 1.0 1.3 
2001 0.4 -0.6 1.6 -0.6 0.9 
2002 -0.5 -0.3 1.6 1.9 -0.5 
2003 -0.3 -0.7 0.9 -0.5 1.1 
2004 1.7 1.4 2.0 1.2 1.9 
2005 1.3 0.6 -0.1 0.1 0.3 
2006 2.6 1.7 4.1 3.2 3.2 
2007 1.5 4.3 2.7 2.3 2.8 
2008 1.6 1.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 
2009 -2.7 -1.6 -4.2 -5.1 -5.3 
2010 3.4 0.7 2.9 3.9 4.9 
2011 0.4 1.5 2.5 -1.5 3.6 
2012 0.7 0.7 -0.6 0.7 -0.6 





Figure 9: Development of Inflation Rate compared to the previous year in West Germany 
(including West Berlin), East Germany (including East Berlin) and Germany as a whole 
1992-1999 in percentages 
Year West Germany East Germany Germany 
1992 3.9 13.4 5.1 
1993 3.6 10.6 4.5 
1994 2.7 3.6 2.6 
1995 1.6 1.9 1.8 
1996 1.3 1.9 1.4 
1997 1.9 2.3 2.0 
1998 0.9 1.1 1.0 
1999 0.7 0.4 0.6 
 
 
Figure 10: Development of Inflation Rate compared to the previous year in Germany as a 


















Figure 11: Membership of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic 
Republic of the most important International Organisat ons 




1950  COMECON 
1951 ESCS  









1975 OSCE* (Helsinki Accords) 
G7 
OSCE* (Helsinki Accords) 
1995 WTO  




Figure 12: Development of Inflation (compared to the previous year), General Unemployment 
Rate and Gross Domestic Product (compared to the previous year) in the Czech part of 
Czechoslovakia and then the Czech Republic 1989-2013 in percentages 




1989 1.4 - - 
1990 9.7 - - 
1991 56.6 2.3 -10.0 
1992 11.1 3.3 -2.0 
1993 20.8 4.3 1.2 
1994 10.0 4.3 2.9 
1995 9.1 4.0 6.2 
1996 8.8 3.9 4.5 
1997 8.5 4.8 -0.9 
1998 10.7 6.5 -0.2 
1999 2.1 8.7 1.7 
2000 3.9 8.8 4.2 
2001 4.7 8.1 3.1 
2002 1.8 7.3 2.1 
2003 0.1 7.8 3.8 
2004 2.8 8.3 4.7 
2005 1.9 7.9 6.8 
2006 2.5 7.1 7.0 
2007 2.8 5.3 5.7 
2008 6.3 4.4 3.1 
2009 1.0 6.7 -4.5 
2010 1.5 7.3 2.5 
2011 1.9 6.7 1.8 
2012 3.3 7.0 -1.0 






Figure 13: Graphs showing the Development of Inflation (compared to the previous year), 
General Unemployment Rate and Gross Domestic Product (compared to the previous year) in 
the Czech territory of Czechoslovakia, and then the Cz ch Republic, between 1989-2013 in 
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Figure 14: Development of Inflation (compared to the previous year), General Unemployment 
Rate and Gross Domestic Product (compared to the previous year) in the Slovak territory of 
Czechoslovakia and then the Slovak Republic 1989-2013 in percentages 




1989 - - 1.2 
1990 - - -2.7 
1991 - 11.1 -14.6 
1992 - 10.9 -6.7 
1993 - 12.2 -3.7 
1994 13.4 13.7 6.2 
1995 9.9 13.1 5.8 
1996 5.8 11.3 6.9 
1997 6.1 11.9 4.4 
1998 6.7 12.6 4.4 
1999 10.6 16.4 0.0 
2000 12.0 18.8 1.4 
2001 7.3 19.3 3.5 
2002 3.3 18.6 4.6 
2003 8.6 17.5 4.8 
2004 7.5 18.1 5.1 
2005 2.7 16.2 6.7 
2006 4.5 13.3 8.3 
2007 2.8 11.0 10.5 
2008 4.6 9.6 5.8 
2009 1.6 12.1 -4.9 
2010 1.0 14.4 4.2 
2011 3.9 13.5 3.0 
2012 3.6 13.9 1.8 






Figure 15: Graph showing the Development of Inflation (compared to the previous year), 
General Unemployment Rate and Gross Domestic Product (compared to the previous year) in 
the Slovak territory of Czechoslovakia, and the Slovak Republic 1989-2013 in percentages 




Figure 16: Membership of Czechoslovakia and the Czech and Slovak Republics of the most 
important International Organisations 
Date Czech Republic Slovak Republic 
1945 United Nations (as Czechoslovakia) 
1949 COMECON (as Czechoslovakia) 
1955 Warsaw Pact (as Czechoslovakia) 
1973 CSCE (as Czechoslovakia) 
1975 OSCE* (Helsinki Accords) (as Czechoslovakia) 
1990 CEI (as Czechoslovakia) 
1991 Visegrád Group (as Czechoslovakia) 
1993 United Nations 
Visegrád Group 











1999 NATO  
2000  OECD 
2004 EU EU 
NATO 
2009  Eurozone 
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